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Abstract 
Much research has shown that firms’ ego-network configurations, i.e., structural holes or 
network closure, help them achieve superior innovation outcomes. However, little is 
known about how overall ego-network stability affects innovation. In this two-part 
dissertation, I first argue that in the alliance network context the stability is detrimental 
for the focal firm’s innovation performance. Moreover, firms are affected differentially 
by the stability depending on whether they span structural holes and on whether their 
inventive activities are geographically concentrated. Spanning structural holes mitigates 
the negative effect of ego-network stability whereas the geographic concentration of 
firms’ inventive activities further worsens the negative relationship. Next, I develop 
propositions about the origins of firms’ ego-network stability. I limit my theorizing in this 
case to structural hole stability or the stability of open structures only, with special focus 
on the embeddedness of alliance brokerage structures in geographic and network 
community space. I argue that the stability of network structures increases with the 
geographic distance between member firms. In contrast, I hypothesize that member 
firms’ location in different network communities has a negative effect on the stability of 
networks. I empirically test my propositions regarding the (ego-network) stability-
performance relationship using 198 biopharmaceutical firms headquartered in the U.S. 
over a 21-year period from 1985 to 2005. My estimation sample for testing the origins of 
structural hole stability comprises of 329 broker and 680 alter firms over 1985-2005, 
yielding 61,495 triad-year observations in the global pharmaceutical industry context. I 
find support for my ideas. I contribute theoretically by highlighting the importance of 
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network stability, a salient but lost dimension of social capital, for the focal firm’s 
performance. My work has practical implications in terms of network rewiring and 
maintenance.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In strategy research a firm’s performance takes center stage (Gulati, Nohria, & 
Zaheer, 2000; Baum, Cowan, & Jonrad, 2014). Stressing interfirm heterogeneity, strategy 
researchers attempt to understand how and why a firm differs from another in 
performance (Nelson, 1991). The firm’s performance, in this regard, is multidimensional 
in nature, with scholars focusing, among many other dimensions, on financial or 
accounting performance (e.g., Barnett, Greve, & Park, 1994), firm’s market performance 
(e.g., Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002), survival and growth (e.g., Sapienza, Autio, George, & 
Zahra, 2006), CSR (corporate social responsibility) (e.g., Johnson & Greening, 1999), 
and innovation (e.g., Schilling & Phelps, 2007). For the purposes of this dissertation, I 
focus solely on innovation. The reason is that modern-day economic activities are 
becoming more and more knowledge intensive. Innovation in such knowledge-based 
environments is quite challenging but necessary – challenging because the knowledge 
relevant for innovation exhibits high rate of obsolescence, and necessary because 
innovation might be a key determinant for the firm’s survival and performance 
(Utterback, 1994). The following excerpts from the Economist article aptly characterize 
innovation: 
Innovation has become the new theology…Yet there is still much confusion over 
what it is and how to make it happen… INNOVATION has become the industrial 
religion of the late 20th century. Business sees it as the key to increasing profits 
and market share. Governments automatically reach for it when trying to fix the 
economy… economists are still struggling to understand this most mysterious part 
of the wealth-creation process (The Economist, 1999). 
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Research into the ‘how and why’ of the differences in interfirm performance can 
be broadly categorized into two streams: One view treats the firm as an individual, 
atomistic actor, devoid of relations, and tries to explain the firms’ conduct on the basis of 
the firm’s resources (e.g., Barney, 1991) or on the basis of industries to which the firm 
belongs (e.g., Porter, 1979). The other view, taking a relational stance, emphasizes 
network resources as drivers of firms’ performance (e.g., Gulati, 1999). Without a doubt, 
both streams have enriched and complemented the strategic management research. 
However, I, through this dissertation, intend to build on and contribute to the second 
stream, the ‘embeddedness’ view (Granovetter, 1985). My broader research objective is 
to a) improve the understanding of when and how interfirm networks affect firms’ 
innovation performance, and b) how firms can make performance-enhancing network 
structures, if any exist, persist. 
The social capital that firms derive from their ego-network structures of direct 
alliance relations acts as a resource. Along the lines of Bourdieu, I define social capital as 
“the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by 
virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119). On the whole, 
social capital is a property of the collectivity (Burt, 1992). It helps produce goods and 
services, in my context innovation, similar to physical or human capital (Coleman, 1988: 
S98). Structures and the associated social capital set the scope of knowledge exchange 
(Cowan & Jonard, 2004; Krackhardt, 1992) by influencing the level and quality of inter-
 3 
 
organizational interaction and by serving as a gateway to critical resources such as 
information and knowledge (Gulati, 2007; Bourdieu, 1980; Kogut, 2000). The social 
capital embedded in the structural pattern of connections affects the firm’s innovation 
performance (Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Baker, 1990; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 
1996; Schilling & Phelps, 2007) across such diverse contexts as nanotechnology (Funk, 
2014), biotechnology (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000), computer (Sytch & 
Tatarynowicz, 2014), semiconductor (Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan, 1996), automotive 
(Dyer & Nobeoka, 2002), telecommunication (Majumdar & Venkataraman, 1998) and 
chemical (Ahuja, 2000).  
Scholars generally agree that (egocentric) network structures, which the firm 
inhabits, are heterogeneous in their ability to generate social capital, which, in turn, 
explains interfirm differences in performances (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997; Burt, 
2000). Studies acknowledge that the flow of ideas and information varies based on the 
differences in the structural configuration of network “pipes” (Podolny, 2001), with 
different firms facing different costs and benefits of accessing information based on the 
configuration of their alliance network structures (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004).  
Two distinct structural configurations have dominated the structure-performance 
debate. First, closed structures (Coleman, 1990), in which all partner firms have alliance 
relationship with each other, generate social capital by engendering mutual trust and 
creating and maintaining group norms (Uzzi, 1997; Granovetter, 1985). Also, any partner 
firm is less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior because of the imminent censure 
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from other members and the related reputational risk (Coleman, 1988). The social capital 
from these closed structures fosters knowledge sharing by group members and 
subsequent integration, thus affecting innovation (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Adler & Kwon, 
2002). Second, open structures or structural holes, the structural configurations in which 
the focal firm is connected with two unconnected alliance partner firms, generate social 
capital by providing access to non-redundant and a diverse set of ideas. The focal firm in 
these structures enjoys the undivided attention of the two partners vying for the same 
relationship, leading to better terms for knowledge exchange, catalyzing the performance 
of innovating firms (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). Thus, notwithstanding the discussions 
about competing network configurations, extant scholarly debate has veered around to the 
key idea that the configuration of the ego-network structure, and the ensuing social 
capital, determines the focal firm’s innovation outcomes.  
In this dissertation, I draw attention to another relevant yet underemphasized 
dimension of the ego-network structure – network stability – in an attempt to build “a 
more general network model of social capital” (Burt, 2001:31). The original theorizing 
about social capital underscored both the configuration and the stability of the network of 
relations to understand performance differentials. As Coleman (1990:320) insightfully 
suggests: 
A second factor which affects the creation and destruction of social capital is the 
stability of social structure. Every form of social capital, with the exception of 
that deriving from formal organizations with structures based on positions, 
depends on stability.  
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Other scholars (cf. Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006) have emphasized stability’s 
theoretical import. Insofar as the firms (‘nodes’) in the alliance network are in perpetuity 
homogenous in knowledge and in nature, i.e., in their willingness to share knowledge, a 
sole focus on the configuration of alliance network ties to evaluate the focal firm’s 
innovation performance makes sense. However, the focal firm’s network stability 
becomes salient when the nodes in its alliance network are heterogeneous and nodal 
identities matter. In this vein, in addition to the configuration, the composition of the 
network matters (Phelps, 2010).  
Furthermore, focusing on network dynamics, studies have shown that structural 
holes are “fragile” (Stovel, Golub, & Milgrom, 2011), and their benefits are short-lived 
(Buskens & van de Rijt, 2008). Scholars also suggest that structural holes “decay” (Burt, 
2002), and “timing” matters for their performance benefits, implying that stability (or the 
lack thereof) and the ensuing change in the composition of the ego-network structure may 
be relevant to the network’s value-creating potential (Burt, 1992; Soda, Usai, & Zaheer, 
2004; Baum, McEvily, & Rowley, 2012).  
Stability is usually seen as being positively related to performance in the alliance 
literature (e.g., Luo, 2005) because it reduces the alliance partners’ costs of coordination 
and monitoring (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997) and enhances their knowledge transfer 
efficiency (Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). Along similar lines, the human capital literature 
argues that turnover negatively affects productivity (Osterman, 1987). Dees and Shaw 
(2001) show this detrimental effect of turnover due to the social capital losses resulting 
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from changes in social structures. Thus, in certain contexts, including alliances, stability 
may increase performance.  
However, there are reasons to believe that stability will negatively influence 
innovation. The firm’s network stability and the ensuing continual information flows 
among the focal firm and its partners over time could make knowledge less valuable 
because of increased similarity in their knowledge bases, reducing the knowledge 
recombination potential and, thus, innovation. In sum, stability might have a dark side 
when it comes to innovation performance. 
The first objective of my dissertation is to bring stability back in theories of 
(egocentric) network structure-conduct-performance. In light of this emphasis, in Chapter 
2, I attempt to explicitly define network stability and articulate its importance as a 
theoretical construct. In order to do so I integrate scholarly articles in which stability is 
either discussed explicitly or alluded to. Drawing on Burt and Merluzzi’s (2016) measure 
of network churn, I propose a fine-grained measure of network stability. To delineate 
how stability affects the focal firm’s innovation performance, I investigate the outcomes 
of ego-network stability in the alliance context, arguing that the stability reduces the 
innovation advantages of the focal firm. I further investigate two contingencies, namely, 
the structural holes spanned and the geographic concentration of the inventive activities 
of the focal firm, that moderate the detrimental effects of ego-network stability on 
innovation. The focal firm may be able to limit the negative effects of stability on 
innovation by spanning structural holes in its alliance portfolios whereas the negative 
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effects are worsened when the focal firm’s inventive activities are geographically 
concentrated. I empirically test and find support for these hypotheses using 198 
biopharmaceutical firms headquartered in the U.S. over a 21-year period from 1985 to 
2005.  
The second objective of my dissertation is to examine the origins of ego-network 
stability. In Chapter 3, I develop propositions about what determines the stability of open 
structure configurations or structural holes. My switching from the stability of the overall 
ego-network in the prior discussion to the stability of open structural configurations needs 
further justification. First, I show in Chapter 2, among other things, that though network 
stability reduces innovation, open network configurations or structural holes help 
mitigate this negative relationship. As a follow-up study, I believe it makes sense to look 
into what makes these performance-enhancing open structure configurations persist. 
Second, most research has found a positive relationship between structural holes and 
performance both at the individual and at the firm levels of analysis. At the same time, 
scholars have suggested that structural holes or brokerage structures are “fragile” (Stovel, 
Golub, & Milgrom, 2011) and that structural holes “decay” (Burt, 2002). Searching for 
ways to enhance their stability is worthy of attention. Third, inclusion of the overall 
network would have necessitated an enormous amount of time and effort to collect 
additional fine-grained data such as the exact latitude and longitude of partner firms, with 
probably not much theoretical traction beyond the findings from looking at the origins of 
structural holes.  
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I consider the effects of the embedding of interfirm alliance brokerage structures 
in both geographical space and in network communities to understand their persistence or 
decay. I argue that geographic distance between member firms increases the stability of 
open network structures or structural holes. Distance reduces information quality and 
quantity, making brokerage identification difficult, and imposes additional coordination 
and communication costs, affecting alters’ expected value of new relationship formation 
and maintenance, hence stabilizing brokerage. In contrast, I suggest that brokerage triad 
firms’ membership in different network communities exerts a destabilizing effect on 
brokerage because of inter-community competition. I test my hypotheses with 329 broker 
and 680 alter firms over 1985-2005, yielding 61,495 triad-year observations in the global 
pharmaceutical industry context. I show that both the distance between the two alter firms 
and the distance between the broker and the alter firm are salient in reducing the 
likelihood of brokerage decay. However, brokerage triad firms’ location in different 
network communities increases brokerage decay. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss key takeaways from my studies. Here I answer the so-what 
question for managers and researchers. I hope the readers find the manuscript an 
interesting read. I chose not to create a separate chapter for the empirical analysis and 
instead kept them together with my propositions because I believe both theory and 
empirics go better together as a unit to tell a richer coherent story. To the extent that my 
work is able to draw the reader’s attention to the second important aspect of network 
structure, its stability, which has otherwise been relatively less studied with the dominant 
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focus being on the configuration of network structures, I consider this dissertation makes 
a contribution to the emerging literature on network dynamics and performance.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Ego-Network Stability and Innovation Performance 
Five months ago the stream did flow, 
The lilies bloomed within the sedge, 
And we were lingering to and fro, 
Where none will track thee in this snow, 
Along the stream, beside the hedge. 
Ah, Sweet, be free to love and go! 
For if I do not hear thy foot, 
The frozen river is as mute, 
The flowers have dried down to the root: 
And why, since these be changed since May, 
Shouldst thou change less than they. 
-From Change Upon Change by Elizabeth Barrett Browning 
 
Inter-organizational relationships are considered the prime determinants of firm 
innovation because of access to knowledge and R&D capabilities from network partners 
(Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). How firms structure their alliance network 
relationships is even more important in knowledge-intensive industries because of the 
rapid obsolescence of existing knowledge and the inability of firms to keep up with fast-
paced technological changes on their own (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Much 
network research has focused on the association between the structure of firm’s 
relationships, the ensuing structural social capital (Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998) and the 
focal firm’s performance (Baum, Cowan, & Jonrad, 2014).  
More specifically, a large number of studies have examined the configuration of 
ego’s network or the structural organization of focal firm’s direct alliance ties and, in 
turn, the focal firm’s innovation performance using two ideal types, namely, structural 
holes (Burt, 1992) and closure (Coleman, 1990). A structural hole arises when the focal 
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firm has alliances with two other firms (‘alters’) that are not themselves connected, 
providing diverse, nonredundant, and timely information to the focal firm and, thus, 
improving its innovation performance (e.g. Hansen, 1999). The other ideal type, closure, 
represents a structure in which all partner firms are connected to one other through 
alliances, enhancing mutual trust and maintaining norms of group conduct (Uzzi, 1997). 
The social capital thus generated facilitates the focal firm’s innovation via knowledge 
sharing by group members and subsequent integration (e.g., Schilling & Phelps, 2007). In 
sum, whatever the type, the main focus of extant work, for the most part, has been on the 
configuration of the (egocentric) alliance network structure and the resulting innovation 
outcomes for the focal firm.  
I supplement this structural (or ‘configurational’) lens by suggesting that prior 
research may have underemphasized how the stability of the ego-network structure, a key 
ingredient in the original theorizing on social capital, may play the role of an overlooked 
factor in explaining the innovation outcomes of firms inhabiting these structures. I define 
network stability as the obverse, or complement, of ‘network churn’ (Burt & Merluzzi, 
2016; Sasovova, Mehra, Borgatti, & Schippers, 2010). Stability reflects the extent to 
which the composition of the focal firm’s ego network remains unchanged from one time 
period to the next (see pages 36-37 for a detailed description of my construct definition).  
More generally, it is worth recalling that seminal scholarship on the role of social 
capital, the operant mechanism in networks, has underscored the importance of stability. 
According to Coleman (1990: 320), “a second factor [the first is structure] which affects 
the creation and destruction of social capital is the stability of social structure. Every 
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form of social capital…depends on stability.” Burt calls for “a more general network 
model of social capital” (Burt, 2001: 31) and inclusion of stability is an important 
direction in this regard. More recently, Burt supports the contention noting that, “Stability 
cannot be taken for granted...Current answers to this question are typically little more 
than assumptions convenient for formal models or speculation from cross-sectional 
evidence” (2007: 101, emphasis mine). Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) also underscore the 
importance of network stability as one of the three network orchestration processes, 
besides knowledge movement and appropriability, to which a hub firm must pay attention 
in order to reap innovation benefits. However, how ego-network stability affects 
innovation outcomes mostly remains an open question.  
The little work in which stability is either alluded to or explicitly mentioned, hints 
at the construct’s relevance for the focal firm’s performance outcomes in general and 
innovation performance in particular. For example, although global network properties 
such as the network’s overall clustering coefficient or average network size might seem 
stable, research suggests that such apparent stability might disguise the continual churn 
occurring at the individual network level (Kossinets & Watts, 2006; Wellman, Renita, 
David, & Nancy, 1997), with recurrent changes occurring in an individual focal firm’s 
ties (Moody, McFarland, & Bender-deMoll, 2005). Further alluding to these underlying 
network dynamics, scholars have suggested that structural holes are “fragile” (Stovel, 
Golub, & Milgrom, 2011), and their benefits fleeting (Buskens & van de Rijt, 2008). 
Scholars have also posited that structural holes “decay” (Burt, 2002), and that their value 
arises from “timing,” implying that stability (or the lack thereof) and the resulting change 
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in the composition of ego’s network structures may be relevant to their value-creating 
potential (Burt, 1992; Soda, Usai, & Zaheer, 2004; Baum, McEvily, & Rowley, 2012).  
Extant work on stability in the alliance literature usually views stability as a 
positive (e.g., Luo, 2005). Stability reduces the coordination and monitoring costs (Mjoen 
& Tallman, 1997). It enhances knowledge transfer efficiency, thus facilitating learning 
(Lee & Cavusgil, 2006). Similarly, the human capital literature posits that turnover is 
negatively associated with productivity (Osterman, 1987). Dees and Shaw (2001) 
underscore the negative effect of turnover, and the ensuing change in social structures, 
due to social capital losses. Thus, in certain contexts, including alliances, stability may be 
an asset for performance.  
 However, there are reasons to believe that ego-network stability has a dark side 
in that the stability may negatively influence innovation at the firm level. The stability of 
the firm’s network structure could make knowledge less valuable as continual 
information flows across the focal firm and its partners over time create greater 
commonality in their knowledge bases. Further, structural persistence promotes a 
deepening of inter-firm relationships because of enhanced trust (Gulati, 1995a). The 
resulting ease of communication and coordination may make knowledge transfer more 
efficient, but also promote similarity of knowledge resources across the partner firms and 
the focal firm, further reducing the innovation potential from knowledge recombination.  
I also suggest that contingencies may influence the strength of the relationship of 
network stability to innovation. A focal firm’s open structure – the structural holes in its 
network – allows it to access nonredundant and diverse knowledge. The information 
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benefits thus available might help attenuate the negative innovation effect of network 
stability. Conversely, the focal firm’s geographic concentration or the location of its 
inventive activities in one country might enhance the negative effects of stability on 
innovation due to the lack of knowledge diversity. Compared to high concentration, 
geographic dispersion exposes the focal firm to heterogeneous knowledge environments 
from multiple countries, increasing the focal firm’s recombination potential (Kogut & 
Zander, 1993; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997). In sum, I investigate the following 
questions: How does ego-network stability affect a focal firm’s innovation performance? 
Further, how does structural hole spanning and geographic concentration mitigate or 
aggravate the effects of network stability? I note that most of the limited work on 
network stability has theorized about its antecedents (e.g., Stovel et al., 2011) and tested 
it with mathematical models or individual level empirical data (Burt, 2002). I theorize 
about and test the consequences of stability on innovation at the interfirm level.  
Notable exceptions to the paucity of work on the structure-stability-performance 
link are Soda et al.’s (2004) work on the declining performance effect of structural holes 
bridged in the past, and Baum et al.’s (2012) research on the decreasing market share 
benefits of bridging ties with age. However, unlike my work, Soda et al. (2004) focus on 
holes spanned in the past relative to more current holes whereas Baum et al. (2012) 
emphasize the fragility of older bridging ties. My study differs from this prior research in 
two key ways. First, I construct a theoretical framework to explain the direct and 
contingent outcomes of the stability of the ego-network structure rather than compare the 
outcomes of past and current structural holes. Put another way, Soda et al. examine the 
 15 
 
persistence of outcomes from the “memory” of a historically prior structural hole; I 
examine the outcomes of the persistence of current structures. Second, in contrast to 
Soda et al., or Baum et al., I evaluate the outcomes of the stability of the overall ego 
network, rather than its configuration as structural holes (Soda et al.) or as ties (Baum et 
al.). Specifically, I differ from Baum et al. (2012) by moving from the age of the tie to the 
stability of the network structure. Placing dyadic relationships in an ego network context 
allows me to “identify quite dramatic changes in seemingly stable relations” (Gadde & 
Mattsson, 1987: 29). 
My paper also differs from Aral and Van Alstyne’s (2011) diversity-bandwidth 
trade-off paper in at least three ways. Specifically, Aral and van Alstyne (2011) examine 
the success rate of job openings filled in the context of email exchanges among 
employees within a single firm. First, a critical assumption in their paper is that, “Given 
evidence suggesting the prevalence of weak ties in structurally diverse networks and the 
likelihood of increased information flow in cohesive networks due to motivation and 
exposure, the bandwidth of communication channels should be lower in diverse 
networks. Thus, network diversity and channel bandwidth should trade off such that 
greater network diversity is associated with lower channel bandwidth” (2011: 94). By 
their logic, the variation in channel bandwidth or volume of communication derives from 
the assumption that structural holes are comprised of weak ties. (Note that, according to 
Burt (1990), weak ties are not a necessary condition for structural holes to exist). I do not 
foresee this variation in my case because of the formal contractual nature of interfirm 
alliance ties. These formalized relationships are strong, by definition, from the very 
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beginning.  
Thus, I do not focus on any specific configuration of the network structure, such 
as structural holes, nor on the strength of the ties, but focus instead on the stability of the 
ego-network structure in general in my theorizing and empirics. Relatedly, there is no 
trade-off between diversity and bandwidth in my setting not only because formal alliance 
ties are strong but more importantly, the diversity arises from the differences in 
composition of the alters over time, rather than from structural holes. For instance, I 
provide the example of ImmuCell in my discussion of the first hypothesis, whose two 
alters changed over time, suggesting greater diversity (and lower stability), even though 
the configuration of the structure stayed constant. 
Second, Aral and Van Alstyne (2011: 103, 119) assume that each employee 
within the firm keeps providing diverse and novel information in perpetuity because as 
the authors posit, “…each bit of novel information represents a job opening…” (2011: 
104). The novel information required to fill a job vacancy relying only on emails from 
employees within a firm in their case is qualitatively different and possibly less complex 
than the novel information required to innovate in a knowledge-intensive context relying 
on interaction between two or more profit-maximizing firms. Further, I argue that 
knowledge novelty from alter firms within alliance networks in knowledge-intensive 
industries diminishes over time due to rapid obsolescence. Thus, the nature of “novelty” 
or “diversity” and, more to the point, their dynamics, are so fundamentally different in 
my setting as to make comparisons theoretically moot.  
Third, unlike job search, where a client provides quite specific job requirements, 
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the focal firm in my case initially has only a vague idea of the research problem in hand, 
with the steps needed to find an optimal solution even more ambiguous. Thus, the nature 
of the task (dependent variable) differs so completely (job vacancy fulfillment vs patents) 
that their theoretical framework, again, may not apply to my setting. Also, it is difficult to 
attribute the focal firm’s innovation to any specific alliance because firms recombine 
ideas from multiple sources and have less incentive to acknowledge whatever they 
learned over and beyond that in the stipulated contract (because of IP concerns). In this 
regard, knowledge flow from the ego network that is relevant to the focal firm remains a 
much more complex phenomenon than that studied in the Aral and Van Alstyne paper, 
one that fundamentally modifies the theoretical underpinnings of the argumentation.  
I empirically test my hypotheses using a panel of 198 U.S. firms in the 
biopharmaceutical industry over a 21-year period from 1985 to 2005. To control for the 
unobserved time invariant heterogeneity, and the fact that my dependent variable is a 
citation-weighted patent count sans self-citations, I use a Poisson fixed effects quasi-
maximum likelihood estimator. Several tests support the robustness of my results. 
In the following sections, I first theorize about the stability of the network 
structure and its negative effect on the focal firm’s innovation performance. Next, I 
examine how the focal firm’s structural holes ameliorate the negative effect of the 
relationship between stability and innovation. Thereafter, I investigate the role of the 
geographic concentration of the focal firm’s inventive activity in enhancing (i.e. 
worsening) the negative effect of stability on innovation. Following this, I introduce my 
empirical context, the biopharmaceutical industry, and detail the methods I employ to test 
 18 
 
my hypotheses. I conclude with a discussion of my results and implications for future 
research. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Ego-Network Stability and Focal Firm Innovation 
I begin my theoretical exposition with an illustration of how ego-network 
stability, and its obverse, network churn, differ from a more conventional assessment of 
structure that does not take into account the composition of the network nodes. Consider 
the illustrative example of ImmuCell Corp’s ego network. In 1995, ImmuCell had 
alliance relationships with Univax Biologics and Carrington Laboratories, and with 
Center for Special Immunology and Carrington Laboratories in 1996. The two alter firms 
(Univax and Carrington; and Center for Special Immunology and Carrington) were 
unconnected with each other in both periods. A mere focus on structural configuration in 
this scenario risks painting an incomplete picture because of the change in the 
composition of the network partners over time (Halgin & Borgatti, 2012; Sasovova et al., 
2010; Feld, Suitor, & Hoegh, 2007). Conventional wisdom might argue that Immucell’s 
network structure does not vary in that structural holes spanned and degree centrality 
remain the same (Burt’s constraint = 0.5; direct ties = 2) for both time periods. However, 
as is evident from the case, the composition of the ego network changed with Special 
Immunology replacing Univax over the two periods. At the same time, it is possible that 
the innovation outcomes of the structural stability measured in this way will also differ 
because even though the network structure is the same across the two time periods, the 
fact that one of the partners changes may further increase knowledge diversity for the ego 
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firm. The example underscores how stability, or its complement, network churn, is 
necessary to more fully understand the effects of network change.  
As mentioned earlier, I argue that ego-network stability is likely a negative when 
it comes to the innovation-creation potential of the network. In the build up to this, my 
central hypothesis, I first present a set of arguments that spell out the efficiency-
enhancing dimensions of network stability, before arguing the opposite for a net effect 
that is negative. Ego-network stability, by which I mean a network with all repeated 
partners, is likely to enhance the efficiency of interorganizational knowledge transfer 
through four mechanisms: routines, shared beliefs, strength of ties, and trust (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). First, repeated interactions as a result of relational stability among the focal 
firm and partner firms lead to the development of interorganizational routines (Zollo, 
Reuer, & Singh, 2002), facilitating smooth coordination and cooperation. Second, with 
the passage of time, common language and shared beliefs and meanings, as well as 
standardized templates for knowledge transfer, develop as managers start to better 
understand the other party’s behavior, language and beliefs, facilitating communication 
and mitigating conflict (Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010; Doz, 1996; Uzzi, 1997).  
Third, stability imparts strength to the alliance relationships underlying the ego 
network via multiple interactions (Granovetter, 1973). Strong ties in the network 
structure in turn smooth the transfer of not only codified knowledge but also complex and 
tacit knowledge, permitting richer, and finer-grained, information exchange (Kotabe, 
Martin, & Domoto, 2003; Hansen, 1999; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). Fourth, frequent 
interactions over time inculcate trust (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Sytch, 2008; Zaheer, 
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McEvily, & Perrone, 1998; Hoetker, 2005). Trust, thus generated, facilitates coordination 
between the focal firm and its alter firms (Obstfeld, 2005) and reduces monitoring costs 
by inhibiting opportunism and mitigating conflict (Inkpen & Currall, 2004). Overall, 
stability enhances knowledge transfer efficiency (Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 
2004), thereby possibly increasing innovation. 
A contrasting view of the relationship between stability and the focal firm’s 
innovation performance emerges when we consider how stability affects the knowledge 
diversity available to the focal firm through its network. Diversity, in general, in its 
various forms such as geographic diversity (Zhang, Li, Li, & Zhou, 2010), ethnic 
diversity (Nathan, 2015), science-based diversity (Feldman & Audretsch, 1999), 
employee diversity (Østergaard, Timmermans, & Kristinsson, 2011), top management 
team diversity (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), R&D team diversity (Reagans, Zuckerman, & 
McEvily, 2004), and technological diversity (Suzuki & Kodama, 2004), has been shown 
to be a key ingredient in studies of creativity and innovation. Such diversity allows for 
knowledge recombination, a critical condition for focal firm innovation (Hargadon, 2002; 
Fleming, 2001; Henderson & Clark, 1990). Dissimilar knowledge available to the focal 
firm increases both the quantity and variety of potential combinations of ideas, enhancing 
the likelihood of finding innovative solutions (Utterback, 1971; Fleming, 2001). Van 
Wijk, Van den Bosch, and Volberda (2001) show that the breadth of the knowledge to 
which the focal firm is exposed makes the firm more likely to search for novel and 
related knowledge. In the network context in particular, emphasizing information 
diversity, Burt (1992: 48) in his exposition of structural hole theory states that 
 21 
 
“information is the substance” in order to reap the performance benefits from the network 
structure. Similarly, Phelps (2010) finds that technological diversity, coupled with 
network closure, enhances innovation. In sum, “… while network structure matters, 
access to heterogeneous knowledge is…of greater importance for innovation 
performance” (Rodan & Galunic, 2004: 541, emphasis mine).  
My conceptualization of the performance implications of network stability is 
consistent with social resource theory (Lin, 1982; 1990) or Gulati’s (2007) network 
resource theory. Theories that focus on the configuration of network structure (e.g., Burt, 
1992; Coleman, 1990) treat resource access as given in that alliance partners are assumed 
to be homogeneous and to contribute equally to the focal firm’s innovation (Tortoriello, 
McEvily, & Krackhardt, 2014). In contrast, social resource theory emphasizes the role of 
resources that the focal firm can access from its network (Lin, Ensel, &Vaughn, 1981). 
Seen through a social resource lens, neither weak ties nor bridging ties per se impart 
network advantages, but whether the focal firm’s partners have the resources the focal 
firm needs to fulfill its research needs and whether the focal firm can access such 
resources matters for deriving network benefits. In this regard, the nature of resources 
that the focal firm’s social network makes available takes center stage. Social resource 
theory is a natural extension of Penrose’s (1959: 75) analysis of the resource-based view 
of the firm in which “heterogeneity of the productive services available or potentially 
available from its resources…gives each firm its unique character.” 
However, network stability reduces the knowledge diversity that is available to 
the focal firm for generating innovation, even more so in the context of interfirm alliance 
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network, for three reasons. First, the “tapping points” of these interfirm relationships 
through which the focal firm, inhabiting the ego network, accesses partner knowledge 
over time are relatively restricted because alliance agreements typically cover only a part 
of the partner firm’s knowledge base. Even this limited knowledge access is conditional 
on the motivation and ability of the partner firms’ research professionals (Reinholt, 
Pedersen, & Foss, 2011), who are both rationally- and contractually-bound to not share 
any additional information over and beyond the stipulated agreement between the two 
firms. Thus, the focal firm has a small window of opportunity for accessing the social 
resource in that “initially” it is easier for the focal firm to absorb “relevant and easy-to-
transfer knowledge” from partner firms (Schildt, Keil, & Maula, 2012: 1155). Further 
attempts to acquire knowledge from partners might entail further investments in the focal 
firm’s time and effort, especially in R&D (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). 
Therefore, the likelihood of innovation reduces over time compared to the period early in 
the life of the alliance when the focal firm can easily assimilate network resources based 
on its preexisting knowledge (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). 
Second, in knowledge-intensive industries, uncertainty, knowledge complexity, 
and rapid obsolescence of technological knowledge make it almost impossible for the 
focal firm to innovate by relying on social resources from the same set of alliance 
partners. The reason is that partner inertia and idiosyncratic technological trajectories 
ensure that partners keep innovating in the same direction as they did in the past, thus 
making it detrimental for the focal firm to depend on the same partners for continued 
innovation (Schweizer, 2005; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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For example, in the biopharmaceutical industry drug development is a complex 
process that requires amalgamating and updating knowledge from such multidisciplinary 
fields as “molecular biology, physiology, biochemistry, analytic and medicinal chemistry, 
crystallography and pharmacology” (Henderson, & Cockburn, 1994: 65). In this regard, 
alliances and, by extension, networks created at a particular point in time might lose 
relevance because the focal firm might face different knowledge requirements at different 
points in time. But network stability might create network “lock-in” (Gulati & Westphal, 
1999). In this regard, network stability represents the “dark side” of social capital which 
puts the focal firm’s adaptability to changing research needs at peril, thus negatively 
affecting innovation (Portes & Landolt, 1996; Gargiulo & Benassi, 1999; Gargiulo & 
Ertug, 2006). In contrast, network churn, by removing inefficient partners, frees up the 
focal firm’s resources to be used for other innovation projects (Vissa & Bhagavatula, 
2012). 
Third, network stability might make any specific configuration of network 
structure sub-optimal. As relationships get stronger the focal firm and its partners are 
more likely to have similar redundant ideas (Granovetter, 1973). The development of 
partner-specific absorptive capacity (Dyer & Singh, 1998) makes the focal firm’s and its 
partners’ knowledge bases similar, reducing the combinatorial opportunities. Stability 
breeds familiarity among the focal firm and its alters, making the knowledge embedded 
in the network structure more redundant by promoting the smooth flow, and the repeated 
use, of ideas among member firms. Of course, these ex post knowledge homophily effects 
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might be slowed or limited by knowledge stock that is long lived, harder to learn, and by 
lower absorptive capacity (see e.g. Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). 
One way to resolve the tension between the positive effects of stability on 
knowledge transfer efficiency and stability’s eventual negative effects on information 
diversity benefits is to bear in mind that the underlying alliance relations that constitute 
the focal firm’s ego network are formal in nature. The formalized nature of inter-firm 
alliance relations ensures that the ties are relatively strong from the very start. High-
powered incentives (Williamson, 1985) make it likely that partner firms are induced to 
cooperate with the focal firm to fulfill the knowledge-sharing goals of the alliance 
(Locke, 1999). Given strong ties, network stability and the routines thus formed might 
not further enhance knowledge transfer efficiency beyond a point. Further, because 
knowledge rapidly becomes obsolete in fast-paced knowledge-intensive industries and 
because partner firms, like all firms, suffer from inertia (as mentioned earlier), it reduces 
the likelihood that partner firms continue to provide diverse knowledge elements over 
time. Supporting this argument, Hoang & Rothaermel (2005), contrary to their 
expectations, find that partner-specific experience negatively affects joint project 
performance in the biopharmaceutical industry.  
In addition, partners in interfirm networks are often more calculative and more 
likely to exercise their bargaining power over the focal firm (Gargiulo & Ertug, 2014), 
reducing the focal firm’s chances of gaining knowledge elements (Lavie, 2007). Thus, 
increased knowledge transfer efficiency at the alliance level might be a processual 
advance that does not necessarily translate into innovation derived from the ego network. 
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Other prior research also hints at these downsides. Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande 
(1992) find that over time, focal firms’ relationships are less valuable because they 
become “stale or too similar.” In contrast, Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman (2000) find 
that network churn, characterized by additions of new partners, increases innovation 
performance in the Canadian biotechnology context. Holloway and Parmigiani (2016) in 
their study of construction projects show that repeated partnerships reduce profitability. 
Goerzen (2007) shows that firms quite often engage in repeated equity-based alliances, 
with lower economic performance for those who have more repeated partnerships. 
Overall, the suggestion is that stability reduces knowledge diversity. 
In sum, I argue that, with network stability, the beneficial effects of 
communication and trust and the subsequent efficiency gains in knowledge transfer 
among the firms in the ego network might not provide enough novel knowledge elements 
for innovation. In addition, these effects are further weakened by the lowered innovation-
directed knowledge diversity benefits of stable networks. Thus, I posit that: 
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, greater ego-network stability of a focal firm is 
associated with reduced innovation performance for the focal firm. 
Contingent Effects of Structural Holes Spanning 
In the previous hypothesis, I posited that ego-network stability has a negative 
effect on the focal firm’s innovation performance. However, if the focal firm spans 
structural holes in its network, prior theory and research contends that it gains access to 
both more information sources (i.e., alters or partner firms), as well as much diverse 
information, compared to firms that span fewer structural holes (Burt, 1992). The 
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arguments for why and how firms that span structural holes tend to generate superior 
innovation outcomes are well established, so I only briefly reprise them here. Structural 
hole theory posits that accessing disconnected alter firms (partner firms that are not 
themselves connected) enables the focal firm to tap into nonredundant knowledge and 
information diversity, which it can recombine to create innovation (e.g. Hargadon & 
Sutton, 1997). Also, firms spanning structural holes are able to receive information in a 
timely manner, view the world more holistically, and filter good ideas using the network 
as a prism (Burt, 2004; Podolny, 2001). Such benefits apply even more strongly in 
knowledge-intensive contexts in which technology keeps evolving. 
Furthermore, for innovation, knowledge flows must occur among the focal firm’s 
partners. One alter firm’s bid to outdo the other may allow the focal firm to extract better 
terms for knowledge exchange from each of the alters. Thus, the power inherent in this 
network configuration facilitates beneficial knowledge exchange for the focal firm, and a 
nonredundant network structure allows the focal firm to quickly locate and retrieve the 
knowledge needed for recombination and innovation (Schildt et al., 2012).  
Moreover, a network structure full of structural holes enhances the quality of 
information available to the focal firm because it is able to compare and contrast the 
veracity of information provided by the different alter firms. Also, alter firms vying for 
the focal firm’s attention allow the focal firm to have more control over its alters, 
conceding the focal firm more favorable terms for knowledge generation and transfer. In 
sum, the focal firm that spans structural holes is able to harness a greater ability to 
arbitrage. The enhanced ability to arbitrage, to access diversity and nonredundant 
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knowledge allows the focal firm to mitigate the negative effects of stability described in 
the previous section because of the greater novelty, vision advantage and arbitrage 
possible via the structural holes that it spans (Rodan, 2010). 
In contrast, access to fewer structural holes or structural closure in the network is 
likely to worsen the negative relationship between ego-network stability and innovation 
performance. In this case, lack of enough options to choose among different alters might 
constrain the focal firm’s ability to arbitrage (Burt, 2004), further enhancing the negative 
effects of lock-in created by network stability. The focal firm might have to adopt a more 
conciliatory stance while negotiating terms of knowledge generation and transfer with 
alter firms. Stability and the ensuing repeat interactions limit the leeway of the focal firm 
because the alter firms might become aware of the focal firm’s rent extraction techniques, 
unlike the case of focal firms spanning more structural holes, where increased 
competition among alters keeps their power at bay. Also, spanning fewer structural holes 
impairs the vision advantage of the focal firm as it may not be able to validate the 
accuracy of the information and not exercise the threat option as effectively in the case of 
deviant alter firms.  
Taken together, I argue that when the focal firm spans more structural holes, the 
negative effects of ego-network stability on innovative performance are mitigated. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, the greater the spanning of structural holes by a 
focal firm, the less negative the relationship between stability and the focal firm’s 
innovation performance. 
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Contingent Effects of Geographic Concentration 
I further posit that the degree to which the focal firm is geographically 
concentrated in its inventive activities increases the negative effect of ego-network 
stability on the focal firm’s innovation performance. Conversely, a focal firm with 
operations in different countries (low geographic concentration) benefits from four key 
knowledge advantages. First, multicountry presence offers it a more benevolent 
environment for innovation. Differences in culture, markets, and institutions translate into 
heterogeneity in knowledge elements across countries (Ghemawat, 2003). The reason is 
that within each country, innovation systems in general, and firms in particular, face 
different, idiosyncratic environments, thus leading to the development of unique 
technological trajectories (Ahuja & Katila, 2004). The diversity made available by 
multicountry knowledge environments is crucial in the innovation context because “a 
diverse background provides a more robust basis for learning because it increases the 
prospect that incoming information will relate to what is already known” (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990: 131). In contrast, the lack of a multicountry presence (high geographic 
concentration) prevents the firm from tapping into greater knowledge variety for 
innovation. The reason is that knowledge is well known to be sticky, geographically 
bounded and does travel easily across geographic boundaries (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & 
Henderson, 1993). 
Second, having operations in different countries allows the focal firm to learn 
from the best operating practices in different countries and handle complex transnational 
knowledge environments to search for market opportunities (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988; 
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Westney & Zaheer, 2008; Hitt et al., 1997). Unlike the focal firm with multicountry 
presence, the geographically-concentrated firm might lag behind in adopting the cutting-
edge practices from multiple countries. Third, multicountry presence allows the focal 
firm to take advantage of employee diversity for innovation wherein employees educated 
at diverse technical institutions are more likely to enhance innovation performance 
(Østergaard et al., 2011). In this case also, the firm lacking in multicountry presence 
might have a lower recombination potential because of technological know-how 
similarity among its employees. Fourth, a presence in multiple countries allows the focal 
firm to engage in arbitrage in knowledge-related factor markets, such as by performing 
R&D in offshore locations, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of its innovation-
related activities (Zhao, 2006; Nandkumar & Srikanth, 2016). In contrast, the 
geographically-concentrated firm is less likely to engage in arbitrage because of the 
relative efficiency of factor markets within one location.  
In sum, high levels of geographic concentration (low internationalization) make it 
less likely that the focal firm can take advantage of knowledge diversity. This lack of 
diversity is likely to aggravate the negative effects of network stability. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, the greater the geographic concentration of a focal 
firm’s inventive activities, the more negative the relationship between stability 
and the focal firm’s innovation performance. 
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METHODS 
Data and Sample  
I test my hypotheses with biopharmaceutical industry data. For the purposes of 
this paper, the biopharmaceutical industry consists of medicinal chemicals (SIC 2833), 
pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834), human diagnostics-- in vitro and in vivo (SIC 
2835), and biological products, other than diagnostic substances (SIC 2836). This 
empirical context is apt for various reasons: The industry is knowledge-intensive and 
firms invest heavily in R&D (Henderson, 1994; Boland Jr & Tenkasi, 1995). Also, 
innovation and new product introductions are crucial to survive in this industry (Nerkar 
& Roberts, 2004). However, drug development is an uncertain process. Firms take, on an 
average, 12.5 years to develop a new drug (PhRMA, 2013). Only 0.02% of the total 
compounds from the discovery or pre-clinical testing stage get final approval as a drug 
(PhRMA, 2013). In addition, the total cost to develop one drug varies from $1.5 billion to 
$1.8 billion (DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003, 2008). Furthermore, as discussed 
before, drug development is a complex process that requires amalgamating and updating 
knowledge from such multidisciplinary fields as “molecular biology, physiology, 
biochemistry, analytic and medicinal chemistry, crystallography and pharmacology” 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1994: 65).Uncertainty, high costs, knowledge complexity, and 
rapid knowledge obsolescence make the network a commonplace “locus of innovation” 
in this industry (Powell et al., 1996) because it almost impossible for firms to innovate 
only in-house (Schweizer, 2005). 
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Furthermore, pharmaceutical firms tend to patent the bulk of their innovations 
(Paruchuri, 2009; Levin, 1986), which is my dependent variable of interest. In fact, the 
biopharma industry is more prone to ‘patent cliffs’ –a phenomena in which a firm’s 
revenue fall sharply (fall off a cliff) when one of its leading drug approaches its patent 
expiration date. For example, as soon as the patent protection for Pfizer’s Lipitor expired 
on November 30, 2011, Watson Pharmaceuticals’ and Ranbaxy Laboratories’ generic 
substitutes became available in the market (Time, 2011). As a result, Pfizer’s profit 
reduced by 19% in the first quarter of 2012. Similarly, Eli Lilly saw a decline of 15% in 
its sales volume on the patent expiration of Cymbalta and Evista. In contrast, Otsuka 
Pharmaceutical was able to avoid the competition from generic manufacturers by 
reinventing its blockbuster Abilify as a pediatric treatment drug besides its original use to 
treat bipolar disorder. Thus, patents play an important role in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Using the SDC Platinum database as a baseline, I selected all firms in the global 
pharmaceutical industry, both public and private, which participated in alliances 
announced from 1980 through 2005. I further augmented this information with 
information from archival search using multiple sources such as SEC-EDGAR, 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Bloomberg (Phelps, 2010). Few alliances exist before 1980, 
reducing the possibility of left censoring in the data. I used all alliance types because the 
alliance’s scope is often understated, and innovative knowledge can come from any 
alliance (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Next, I define the network boundary as follows: 
First, each pharmaceutical firm must have an alliance with another pharmaceutical firm 
(Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). In case the alliance has multiple partners, extant 
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work constructs dyads based on all possible dyadic combinations of alliance partners 
(Lavie & Miller, 2008). In my case I determine how to deal with multiple partners on a 
case-by-case basis after carefully analyzing the alliance text. As an example, I reproduce 
below the alliance description from the SDC for Cambridge Biotech Corp, BioNebraska, 
and R&C Enterprises: 
Cambridge Biotech Corp., BioNebraska Inc., and R&C Enterprises have entered 
into an agreement to create a joint venture specializing in osteoporosis 
therapies…Under the joint venture agreement, Cambridge Biotech provided 
funding and drug delivery technology and BioNebraska and R&C provided the 
GHRF technology. 
 
For this case, I created three alliances, namely one between Cambridge and 
BioNebraska, one between Cambridge and R&C Enterprises, and one between 
BioNebraska and R&C Enterprises. However, I take a different approach in the case of 
the multi-party alliance between Igen, Inc., Eisai Co., Ltd., and Boehringer Mannheim, 
GmbH whose alliance text I reproduce below from the SDC: 
Igen granted Eisai and Boehringer Mannheim GmbH a license to develop a 
clinical diagnostic system using its Origen technology. Eisai was granted the 
exclusive right to work with Igen to develop a system and market the products in 
Japan for the clinical diagnostic market. Mannheim was granted the license to 
develop instruments and assays for the centralized diagnostic market. 
 
For this case, I created only two alliances, namely ones between Igen and Eisai 
and between Igen and Boehringer. From this specific alliance, I do not find any evidence 
of relationship between Eisai and Boehringer. 
Second, each alliance itself must be in the pharmaceutical domain (Schilling & 
Phelps, 2007). Then, I aggregated all subsidiaries, joint ventures, spin-offs (50% or more 
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of the ownership), and business units at the ultimate parent level. In case a joint venture 
was a 50-50 venture, I assigned all alliances formed by the joint venture to both the 
parent firms. For example, TAP Pharmaceutical Products’ alliances were assigned to 
Abbott and Takeda. 
I further accounted for future name changes, reorganizations, and mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) using multiple sources such as the SDC Alliance Database, 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations, Who Owns Whom and Bloomberg. Pharmaceutical 
firms change names to, among other reasons, reflect changes in their drug profiles and to 
deflect negative attention due to failed drugs or due to some external conditions beyond 
their control. For example, Isis Pharmaceuticals changed its name after Paris attacks in 
2015 to Ionis to avoid any negative connotation of being a terrorist organization. A 
failure to consider such changes might inflate the number of firms in my sample, and, 
also, make my network structures ‘artificial’ in that two alter firms might be one and the 
same. 
Some firms in my sample underwent multiple acquisitions. For example, Pacific 
Biotech was acquired by Eli Lilly in 1990 and, later, acquired by Quidel in 1995. I 
assigned alliances between Pacific Biotech and any other pharmaceutical firm before 
1990 to Pacific Biotech, between 1990 and 1995 to Eli Lilly, and from 1995 onward to 
Quidel. 
I was especially cautious about reverse acquisitions in which (mostly) a private 
firm in order to avoid the time and costs of the initial public offering (IPO) acquires a 
public company. In such cases the acquired public company is the surviving entity but in 
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reality the private firm has the controlling interest and manages the operations. For 
example, in the case of Access Pharmaceuticals and Chemex Pharmaceuticals merger in 
1996, even though Chemex was the surviving entity, I treat it as the acquisition of 
Chemex by Access. The reason is that Access had 60% interest in the company and not 
otherwise. It is also consistent with the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
requirements.  
In addition, I tracked each merger announcement through completion to ensure 
that the merger did not fell through post its announcement. In the case of ‘merger of 
equals’ in which two firms of roughly equal size merge to form a new entity, I assigned 
the combined alliance data to the new entity and updated further (post-merger) alliance 
information using the new entity. For example, in 1995 Pharmacia of Sweden and 
Upjohn of the US merged on a 50-50 basis to form Pharmacia and Upjohn. I assigned the 
combined alliances of these two firms from 1995 onwards to Pharmacia and Upjohn. 
For arriving at an accurate empirical estimate of each alliance’s duration, which 
most prior literature assumes away by adopting a five-year rolling window approach, I 
painstakingly created a hand-collected database with complete deal information using 
multiple archival databases including SEC-EDGAR, LexisNexis, Factiva, Bloomberg 
Professional Terminal, and Mergent Online, news sources such as PR Newswire, 
Business Wire, PharmaTimes, Strategic Transactions :: Pharma & Medtech Business 
Intelligence, BioCentury, and Pharmaceutical Online, trade journals such as Japan 
Chemical Week, and company websites, especially their timelines and news sections for 
major events such as NASDAQ listings. I removed alliances that did not actually get 
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created, and used a multi-pronged five-stage process to search for termination dates. 
First, for alliances that specified termination dates in my deal text database, I further 
accounted for alliance extensions or new alliances. Second, for open-ended alliances (the 
majority of my data), I used a keyword-based search using partners’ names in 
combination with multiple variations of the word “termination,” “end,” “complete,” 
“dissolve,” “break” “withdraw,” “leave,” with or without drug or disease names and 
further checked for any alliance extensions or new alliances. Joint venture terminations 
were relatively easy to find using the names of joint ventures from deal texts.  
Third, I used pharmaceutical compounds, disease areas or drug names from deal 
texts to search such databases as Adis Insight to help me identify possible reasons for the 
termination of alliances. If the trial or the drug was discontinued by the firm and no new 
alliances were formed between alliance partners, I treated the discontinuation date as the 
alliance termination date. Fourth, for every year since alliance formation I tracked its 
mention in SEC filings and annual reports’ exhibit or agreement sections or followed the 
deal’s progress using Factiva, until these reports did not discuss the deal anymore, which 
I then used as the termination date. I did not use this method when the deal was 
mentioned in only one year. Fifth, I checked for bankruptcies and mergers and 
acquisitions and verified if the deal still continued between the new partners to 
incorporate this new information. Taken together, these new data were used to calculate 
alliance duration. The sequence of actions that I spell out here are the progressive, 
cascading steps that I took if data on termination dates were unavailable in previous steps 
– i.e. I went to the next step only if I could not find data in the prior step.  
 36 
 
In Appendix 1 at the end of this dissertation, I present a detailed step-by-step 
flowchart of how I determined termination dates, including the percentage of 
observations for which I could identify the termination date in each step. In addition, in 
Appendix 2 (also at the end of this dissertation), I provide further fine-grained detail 
about this process using real-world examples (cases) from my dataset for each of the 
steps mentioned in the flowchart. The cases selected for the detailed discussion are 
broadly reflective of the different ways in which I arrived at the termination dates. 
Together, the flowchart and the case examples provide fine-grained detail on the 
exhaustive and systematic process that I utilized to determine alliance termination dates. 
Given the exhaustiveness of my process, I am confident that these new data are well-
reflective of actual alliance termination dates and form a sound foundation of my 
measure of ego-network stability. 
I used this alliance duration information to construct undirected adjacency 
matrices consisting of dyadic alliance ties between firms for each year and further to 
create my network and alliance-based measures. This criterion resulted in 208 U.S. firms 
each with at least two direct ties and 1,379 firm-year observations. The reason for 
including firms with at least two direct ties is that I consider, in line with classic theory 
(Simmel, 1950), the triad rather than the dyad is the smallest social unit that still retains 
the distinctive properties of the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Choi & Wu, 2009). 
Furthermore, I collected U.S. patent data using multiple sources such as the 
United States Patent and Trademarks Office (USPTO) (bulk downloads using Google’s 
data mirror), NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001), 
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Harvard U.S. Patent Inventor Database (Lai, D’Amour, Yu, Sun, & Fleming, 2011), and 
the Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman’s (2011) dataset from its inception through 
November, 2014. I further supplemented this data using the hand-collected data from the 
USPTO website. Consistent with prior work, I used the application year in which firms 
applied for the patent rather than year in which the patent was granted (Ahuja, 2000). My 
last year of observation for the dependent variable is 2010. Since the patent grant lag is 
approximately 3-4 years, tracking the patents through 2014 reduces the right censoring 
bias for patents applied in 2010. 
Next, I used the Office of Technology Assessment and Forecast concordance as 
of 2008, otaf 283, to convert my 4-digit SIC code to relevant pharmaceutical technology 
classes to identify pharmaceutical patents. Then, adjusting for name changes and M&As, 
I aggregated these patents at the parent firm level. Using the application year of patents 
entailed additional data collection effort when the original assignee firm merged or was 
acquired by another firm. A case in point is the US patent number 7,189,412. The patent 
was granted in 2007 to Aska Pharmaceutical but was applied for even before Aska 
existed. Aska was formed by the merger of Grelan Pharmaceutical and Teikoku Hormone 
in 2005 but the last application for this patent was filed in 2004. In this case, I tracked 
other prior patents (patent number JPH09227364A) of Masaru Okamoto, the inventor of 
the US patent number 7,189,412, and identified the original assignee to be Grelan 
Pharmaceutical for the year 2004. Thus, in these cases, I tracked the prior patent 
applications of the inventors of the granted patents to find their original employers 
(assignees) in the patent application year and, thus, assigned the granted patent to the firm 
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which actually applied for that patent.  
I matched this patent dataset with the data on 208 focal firms with 1,379 firm-year 
observations. First, I matched the two datasets using firms’ CUSIP (Committee on 
Uniform Securities Identification Procedures) numbers. I was careful not to ‘blindly’ 
match the CUSIP numbers. The reason is that CUSIP number changes even when firms 
change their names. For example, Liposome Technology (CUSIP number 536311) 
changed its name to Sequus Pharmaceuticals (CUSIP number 817471) in 1995. As a 
result, a single firm might appear as two separate firms in the datasets if I ignore the 
name changes, thus both overstating the number of firms in my sample and making the 
match less likely if one of the firms were missing in one of the databases. In addition, 
alliance datasets such as the SDC use historical CUSIP, i.e., the CUSIP assigned to firms 
on the date the alliance was reported whereas patent datasets such as NBER use the 
updated GVKEY or CUSIP at the time when the dataset was merged with the 
COMPUSTAT database. To alleviate these issues, I created my own database of all the 
name changes that the firms in my sample underwent. Then, I used the CUSIP history 
(historical CUSIP and updated CUSIP) from the WRDS CRSP database to assign the 
appropriate CUSIP to firms before matching. 
Second, I used the exact name matching to identify the patents of the remaining 
firms in the alliance-network dataset. Third, I used Hall’s (2008) name-matching 
algorithm, with some modifications to enhance its workability, to match the firms left 
after the previous step. Fourth, I manually matched the remaining unmatched firms in the 
alliance-network dataset. I standardized and sorted all the firms in the patent dataset in 
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alphabetical order to make the matching from visual inspection feasible. Finally, I 
manually searched for the remaining unmatched firms in the alliance-network dataset 
using the google patent search engine (https://patents.google.com/) to confirm that the 
unmatched firms did not patent at all. 
I further triangulated the matched data by comparing the adjustments for M&As 
and reorganizations in the patent and network databases. My final usable sample consists 
of an unbalanced panel of 198 U.S. pharmaceutical firms with 1,236 firm-year 
observations. An unbalanced panel is close to empirical reality and “is preferable” 
because it avoids survivorship bias (Baum, 2006).  
Dependent Variable 
Citation-weighted patent count sans self-citations. I measure the focal firm i’s 
innovation output for year t, as the citation-weighted patent count of granted patents p 
applied for in a five-year window (t + 1 to t + 5) as: ∑ (1 + Citationn
p
n=1 ), where 
Citationn is the total number of citations, net of self-citations, for the n
th
 patent 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). Most firms apply for patents within five years of conducting R&D 
(Jaffe et al., 1993). Citation-weighted patents have been used extensively in innovation 
studies, with time frames ranging from one to five years (cf. Sampson, 2007; Vasudeva, 
Zaheer, & Hernandez, 2012; Kotha, Zheng, & George, 2011; Funk, 2014). Citation-
weighted patent counts are more informative than simple patent counts in capturing the 
value of underlying innovations, or the value of R&D outputs (Trajtenberg, 1990). 
Though patent-based measures correlate highly with other measures of innovation 
performance such as new products (Comanor & Scherer, 1969) and market value (Hall et 
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al., 2005), they are not without limitations. Specifically, they do not represent innovations 
without paper trails such as those based on trade secrets. However, any alternative data 
collection effort that matches the volume and depth of information provided by patents 
would be an extreme challenge. Further, some have argued that though citation-weighted 
patent measures are better than simple patent counts in capturing the differences in values 
of individual patents, they are still susceptible to interindustry variations in patenting 
propensity. My focus on a single industry, pharmaceuticals, in which patenting is 
commonplace, mitigates such issues because patenting propensity is more likely to be 
stable within a single industry (Ahuja, 2000). In addition, my firm fixed-effects 
specification controls for the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in patenting.  
Independent Variables 
Stability. Stability of the ego network captures the extent to which the focal firm’s 
ego network remains unchanged from one time period to the next. I measure stability as 
the percentage composition of the focal firm’s partners in its ego network that stayed the 
same. I operationalize firm-level stability in two steps. First, I calculate network churn as 
the percentage of the focal firm’s alliance partners that change (are added or lost) from 
one year to the next (Burt & Merluzzi, 2016). I calculate the ratio for year t2 with the total 
number of a) new ties that the focal firm formed between year t1 and year t2; and b) old 
ties that the focal firm dissolved between year t1 and year t2 as the numerator (Sasovova 
et al., 2010), and the total number of unique ties the focal firm had during the period as 
the denominator (Burt & Merluzzi, 2016). Figure 1 illustrates the calculation of churn for 
Amgen in 2001. From 2000 to 2001, Amgen dissolved two ties (Arris and Techne) and 
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initiated one new tie (Perkin-Elmer), resulting in a total change of three. During this 
period, Amgen had ten unique ties (Arris, NPS, Chugai, Indevus, Techne, Yamanouchi, 
Roche, Perkin-Elmer, Sumitomo, and Regeneron). Thus, 30 percent of Amgen’s ties 
changed in 2001; therefore the churn rate of Amgen is 0.3.  
Second, I measure the network stability at the focal-firm level using the 
transformation Stability
it
=1- Churnit. In other words, the focal firm’s ego-network 
stability in year t2 is the percentage of ties that stay the same from year t1 to year t2. For 
Amgen for 2001, the stability is thus 1 - 0.3 or 0.70. When the focal firm enters the 
sample for the first time, I assign a stability score of 1, in other words, assume the firm 
experiences zero churn in that year. 
Control Variables 
Structural holes. Structural holes capture the lack of constraint faced by the focal 
firm as regards its relationship with the partner firms in its ego network. I measure 
structural holes in three stages. First, I compute the dyadic constraint using Burt’s (1992) 
formula ciqt= (piqt+ ∑ pikt pkqt)
2
, k ≠ i, q, where p
iqt
 measures the proportion of the focal 
firm i’s involvement with the alter firm q in year t. The term ∑ p
ikt 
p
kqt
 represents the 
aggregate indirect tie strength between firms i and q via firm k in year t. A higher value 
means that not only the focal firm has invested a large amount of time on the alter firm 
but also that indirect ties impose constraint on the focal firm to negotiate better terms. 
Second, I calculate the aggregate constraint faced by the focal firm i in year t using 
Cit= ∑ ciqtq . Though in practice it varies from 0 to 1, the measure can exceed 1 (Borgatti, 
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2014) when q is not i’s only contact (Burt, 1992: 55) Third, I measure access to structural 
holes using the Zaheer and Bell’s (2005) transformation Structural holesit=1- Cit. A high 
score indicates exclusive access to alter firms and the measure differentiates between 
closed and open triads in the focal firm’s ego network (Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 
2016). I prefer this measure to other efficiency-based measures because it captures the 
focal firm’s dependence in relationships and better reflects the ability of the focal firm to 
negotiate and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Burt, 1992). 
Geographic concentration (focal firm). The underlying latent variable I attempt 
to capture is the focal firm’s geographic organization of activities for innovation. I use 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the focal firm’s inventive activities using 
inventor location data for each year from the focal firm’s patents. I calculate this measure 
as ∑ ini
2
i , where i indexes the countries in which the focal firm’s inventors are present and 
ini is the fraction of the focal firm’s patents in country i. An index value of 1 would 
indicate that the research is concentrated in a single country. Firms with missing inventor 
locations were assigned a score of 1, assuming no international presence.  
I employed a robustness test, and find consistent results, with an alternative 
measure of the firm’s geographic configuration that accounts for the organization in 
different countries of the focal firm’s subsidiaries that formed alliances during my 
sampling period. For year t, using the countries of the focal firm’s subsidiaries that 
participated in alliances, I calculate the geographic concentration as ∑ c𝑖
2
i , where i 
indexes the countries in which the focal firm’s subsidiaries are present and ci is the 
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fraction of the focal firm’s alliances in country i. Like for its inventors, an index value of 
1 indicates that all of the firm’s subsidiaries with alliances are present in one country.  
Direct ties. The innovation benefits of knowledge exchange and scale provided by 
the focal firm’s direct partners might be correlated with the advantages from spanning 
structural holes (Ahuja, 2000).I control for Freeman’s (1978) degree centrality of the 
focal firm by calculating the number of dyadic ties between the focal firm and its alter 
firms in a network at time t.  
Indirect ties. I counted the number of firms to which the focal firm was indirectly 
connected in the whole network for year t to capture knowledge sharing via informal 
channels in the network (Ahuja, 2000). 
Technological opportunity. This measure controls for the fact that the focal 
firm’s patenting might be affected by the opportunities it foresees in different 
technological domains. For year t, I constructed this variable as the sum of the total 
number of patents by all firms in that year in the technology classes in which the focal 
firm patented, weighted by the proportion of the focal firm’s patents in each class (Ahuja, 
2000). The technological opportunity variable is coded zero if the focal firm does not 
patent in that year. 
Technological base (log). I measure the focal firm’s technological base, a proxy 
for the absorptive capacity and aggregate R&D, as the logged cumulative patent counts 
until year t, with zero replaced by a very small number (0.0001) before transformation 
(Funk, 2014). The focal firm with no patents till year t is coded 0. I use a discounted 
stock model in which past patents are valued less than recent ones calculated as 
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∑ (1 - discount)
t-α
PSiα
t
α = 1  where PS is the number of patents at time α and the annual 
discount rate is 15% (Hall et al., 2005). 
Technological diversity (focal firm). In order to account for the technological 
scope of the focal firm based on its innovations until year t, I calculate the Blau Index of 
diversity (Blau, 1977) as 1 - ∑ pat
i
2
i , where i indexes the patent classes in which the focal 
firm has patented thus far and pat
i
 is the proportion of the focal firm’s patents in patent 
class i (Jiang, Tao, & Santoro, 2010; Vasudeva et al., 2012). An index value of 1 
indicates perfect heterogeneity whereas 0 denotes exact homogeneity. The diversity 
measure is assigned a value of zero if the focal firm did not patent until year t. 
Technological distance (cosine). To measure technological similarity between 
the focal firm and its partners for each firm-year t, I construct a k-dimensional vector l 
containing the cumulative distribution of a firm’s patenting across different patent classes 
until year t such that each element of the vector is equal to the fraction of the firm’s 
patents in a class k. Next, I calculate the cosine angular distance (Jaffe, 1986) between a 
firm i and its partner j using cosineijt = litljt
'  / √(l
it
lit
'
)(ljtljt
'
). This measure ranges from 0 to 
1, where 1 represents complete similarity. Next, I average the cosine distance between the 
focal firm and its partners to calculate the aggregate measure. When the focal firm 
patents but none of its alter firms do, I assume a distance of zero. 
Industry similarity. To capture the effect of market-resource overlap, I measure 
the proportion of the focal firm’s alliance partners that operate in the same four-digit SIC 
codes as the focal firm (Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011). Lavie (2007) finds that when 
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alliance partners and the focal firm belong to the same industry, alliance partners’ 
increased bargaining power places limits on the focal firm’s knowledge appropriation 
capacity, affecting innovation. 
Partners’ innovation value. The focal firm might gain more from partners that 
have more valuable patents than from those who have less worthy patents. I account for 
these differences in the technological importance of partners using the percentage of 
citations received by partners’ patent out of total pharmaceutical patent citations up to 
year t (Vasudeva et al., 2012). 
Technological diversity (alliance partners). The focal firm’s alliance partners’ 
willingness to share knowledge for innovation might depend on whether or not the 
partners are working in the same technological space. Similar to the technological 
diversity of the focal firm, I control for this using the Blau Index of partners’ patent 
diversity (Blau, 1977) as 1- ∑ partnerpat
i
2
i , where i indexes the patent classes in which 
the partner firms have patented thus far and partnerpat
i
 is the proportion of the partner 
firms’ patents in patent class i (Vasudeva et al., 2012). An index value of 1 indicates 
perfect heterogeneity whereas 0 exact homogeneity. The diversity measure is assigned 
zero if none of the focal firm’s partners patent until year t. 
Equity alliance (% of total alliance). For year t, I control for the differences in 
firms’ incentives based on the proportion of alliances with equity transfer, cross equity 
transfer, or joint venture in the alliance network (Lavie & Miller, 2008). 
Cross-border participants (% of total alliance). For year t, I calculate the 
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proportion of the focal firm’s international partners to control for the knowledge diversity 
imparted by foreign firms (Phelps, 2010). 
Knowledge alliances (% of total). I control for the proportion of R&D, cross-
technology, or cross-licensing alliances that might affect patenting more directly relative 
to the other types of alliances in each alliance network (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). 
Cumulative alliance experience (focal firm). I capture the focal firm’s 
differences in the management of alliances using the total number of alliances up to year t 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000). 
Average age of alliances. The focal firm’s alliance duration might affect both 
stability and innovation performance. I control for this using the mean age of the focal 
firm’s alliances in year t (Soda et al., 2004). 
Acquirer dummy. I code the Acquirer dummy variable 1 in year t when the focal 
firm acquired for the first time any other firm from my sample during the period the focal 
firm was present in my sample to control for firm entry by acquisition. 
Mergers and acquisitions stock (log). I measure the firm’s propensity to innovate 
because of M&As by using its logged cumulative stock of M&As till time t, with zero 
substituted for a very small number (0.0001). 
Status (Bonacich centrality). Scholars have shown status to affect firm 
performance (Podolny, 1993; Ertug & Castellucci, 2013). I capture status as normalized 
Bonacich power centrality (Bonacich, 1987). 
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Model estimation 
My dependent variable, Citation-weighted patent count sans self-citations, is 
limited (nonnegative) and takes only discrete (integer) values (Maddala, 1983). In such 
cases, estimation by the linear regression model will generally have heteroscedastic and 
non-normal idiosyncratic errors (Manning, 1998; Manning & Mullahy, 2001). Also, the 
predicted conditional mean values can be negative. I cannot log transform the dependent 
variable because 15% of the count data is zero (Wooldridge, 2010). A brute-force log 
transformation (adding a small positive quantity Δ to my dependent variable) yields 
E[ln( Δ + y | x)] which cannot be retransformed to get my regression of interest E( y | x) 
(O’hara & Kotze, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). Also, it yields biased parameter estimates 
(King, 1988). Any model from the linear exponential family such as the Poisson or the 
negative binomial is a better fit here (Allison, 2009). Consequently, I use the Poisson 
fixed effects unconditional quasi-maximum likelihood estimator in which the conditional 
mean of my model (y
it
= αie
xit
' β+ ϵit) takes the exponential form 
EE [y
it
 | xit,αi] = αiexit
' β= e(lnαi+ xit
' β), t =1, 2, …, T, i =1, 2, …, N,                                   (1)                           
where y
it
 is the citation-weighted patent count net of self-citations for the pharmaceutical 
firm i at time t, xit include the independent variable, controls, and time effects, β are 
estimated regression coefficients, αi are firm-specific unobserved time-constant effects, 
and ϵit are idiosyncratic errors (shocks) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). The fixed-effects 
estimator controls for the unobserved differences in the focal firm’s predisposition to 
patent. The firm-effects  αi in this case are allowed to be correlated with the predictor 
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variables xit. The estimation assumes strict exogeneity in that any of the past, present, and 
future shocks (idiosyncratic errors) ϵit are uncorrelated with any of the explanatory 
variables xit conditional on the unobserved effects  αi (Wooldridge, 2010). In other 
words, E[y
it
 | xi1, xi2, …, xiT,  αi]= E[yit | xit,αi]                                                               (2) 
I choose the Poisson fixed effects unconditional quasi (pseudo)-maximum 
likelihood estimator for six reasons. First, the estimator allows for the consistent 
estimation of 𝛽 without any incidental parameters problem (Lancaster, 2002). Second, 
the marginal effects are identified (estimable) in this case in contrast to the Poisson 
conditional maximum likelihood (CMLE) and the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimators (Greene, 2002) because the first-order partial derivative of the 
conditional mean with respect to any explanatory variable (
∂E[yit | xit, αi]
∂xitj
) will always 
contain the multiplicative term αie
xit
' β and these estimators eliminate the fixed effects αi. 
The conditional maximum likelihood estimators estimate 𝛽 by partialling out the firm-
specific latent effects using the sufficient statistics ∑ y
itt
 (Blundell, Griffith, & Van 
Reenan, 1999); and the generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators estimate 𝛽 
by conditioning out the fixed effects using a quasi-differencing term (
λityi
λi
).  
Third, “access to longitudinal data can control for heterogeneity through the 
individual-specific effect  αi, so the efficiency gains in going beyond Poisson models may 
not be as great as in the cross-section case” (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013: 347; Hsiao, 
2014). Fourth, the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation estimates “sandwich” cluster-
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robust variance-covariance matrix that accounts for any intra-firm correlation and 
overdispersion (Wooldridge, 1999). Fifth, the Poisson fixed-effects estimator is robust to 
distributional misspecification (overdispersion or underdispersion) in its estimation of 𝛽 
as long as the conditional mean specification in Equation (1) holds (Gourieroux, Monfort, 
& Trognon, 1984; Wooldridge, 2010). Sixth, the Poisson fixed-effects estimation applies 
equally well to any positive-skewed continuous variable whose domain is nonnegative 
(Wooldridge, 2010).  
In contrast, the negative binomial maximum likelihood estimators, both NB1, in 
which the exponent of mean in the variance equation of count variable is 1, and NB2, in 
which the exponent of mean is 2, are very sensitive to variance misspecification, making 
the estimation inconsistent when variance is incorrectly specified (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010, 1986). Furthermore, in the case of unconditional maximum likelihood fixed-effects 
estimation, the negative binomial estimators do not provide consistent estimates of β 
because of the incidental parameters problem (Greene, 2007; Hilbe, 2011). Jointly 
estimating N different incidental parameters  α and K different β parameters makes the 
number of estimated parameters to be estimated go to infinity, thus diluting the efficacy 
of a large sample (NT) with fixed T and large N and making the estimation of 𝛽 
inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2010). Moreover, negative binomial fixed-effects estimators 
are restrictive in that “parametric model results are most easily obtained for the Poisson” 
whereas the iterative algorithm in the negative binomial case might not converge 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2013: 347, 2010; Winkelmann, 2008). Moreover, some estimation 
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methods such as conditional maximum likelihood apply only to the NB1 model and not 
the NB2. 
Thus, the Poisson unconditional fixed effects quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimator is appropriate for my empirical context because I can identify both consistent 𝛽 
and the marginal effects. One caveat on using the quasi-maximum likelihood method is 
that we cannot predict the probabilities of counts because the actual conditional density 
of the count variable might be different (Wooldridge, 1997a). However, my main focus is 
on the expected value of the count not the probability. I also used several alternative 
model specifications as robustness tests (reported below). 
There could still be some concern that though the model consistently estimates β 
parameters, αi might be inconsistent because of their dependence on group size (T). To 
the best of my knowledge none of the studies have looked at the impact of possibly 
inconsistent incidental parameters αi on the marginal effects of the explanatory variables 
xit whose estimates are consistent. I surmise that it is a lesser evil for two reasons. First, 
even when both αi and β are inconsistently estimated and the incidental parameters 
problem are present (not in my case), the marginal effects “have reasonable properties” 
(Wooldridge, 2010: 618; Fernàndez-Val, 2009). In binary choice models, Greene (2004a: 
110; words [in brackets] added) finds that “the marginal effect [at the mean] is closer to 
the true value than the coefficient estimator is to its population counterpart.” Also, the 
biases are much smaller than those in coefficients (Greene, 2004b), with the bias in the 
marginal effect at the mean being possibly smaller than the average of individual 
marginal effects (Greene, 2004a). Second, the bias might not be serious for T ≥ 5 
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(Wooldridge, 2010). Greene (2004a) does not find the bias to be as severe as that 
described in Hsiao (2014) even for T = 2. 
Results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and the Pearson’s (bivariate) correlation 
matrix for my variables. Though some variables exhibit moderate-to-high correlation, this 
is not an issue because the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the overall model does not 
exceed 10 (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988), with the mean VIF being 7.72. Even 
though I use a nonlinear regression model, I calculate the VIF using a linear regression 
because multicollinearity is independent of the nature of the dependent variable (count or 
otherwise) and is determined solely by the right-hand side predictor variables. An 
interesting side-note is that how measures of multicollinearity (e.g., VIFs) relate to the 
regression coefficients in nonlinear models remains an open question (for an exception, 
see Bonate [1999]) and the VIF might not tell the complete story. 
I mean-centered Structural holes, Geographic concentration (focal firm) and 
Stability to eliminate nonessential multicollinearity and to “increase the interpretability of 
regression coefficients” because of the presence of interaction term in the full model 
(Hoffman & Gavin, 1998; Afshartous & Preston, 2011: 2; Aiken & West, 1991). As 
shown in Table 1, my stability measure is negatively, though not significantly, correlated 
with size-related measures such as direct ties, the focal firm’s technological base, and 
indirect ties. One could argue that large networks are more prone to change just by 
random chance, as explained by the negative correlation. The ego-network stability is 
positively correlated with technological similarity between focal firms and alters (r = 
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0.08; p < 0.01), focal firms’ cumulative alliance experience (r = 0.06; p < 0.05), and the 
average age of alliances in focal firms’ ego network (r = 0.30; p < 0.01). Some of these 
correlations can be explained by noting that firms with greater alliance experience might 
be more successful in retaining alliance partners. Increased alliance age might translate 
into enhanced trust and repeated partnerships, thus enhancing their stability. Consistent 
with extant theorizing that structural holes are fragile, stability is negatively associated 
with structural holes (r = -0.07; p < 0.05). The geographic concentration of inventive 
activities, one of my moderators, is negatively correlated with size-based measures, 
namely, direct ties (r = -0.47; p < 0.01) and technological base (r = -0.29; p < 0.01), 
suggesting that large firms are less likely to be geographically concentrated. Similarly, 
firms are less likely to find alliance partners with high innovation value when the focal 
firms are geographically concentrated (r = -0.36; p < 0.01). 
Table 2 presents results of the regression analysis using the Poisson fixed effects 
unconditional maximum likelihood estimator. Model 1 in Table 2 is a control variables 
only baseline model. Structural holes, a moderator variable, Geographic concentration, 
another moderator variable, and Stability, my main variable in the study, enter in Model 
2. I add the interaction between Stability and Structural holes in Model 3 and the 
interaction between Stability and Geographic concentration in Model 4. Model 5 is my 
fully specified model with all variables and interaction terms.  
Consistent with much of the prior work, I find that innovation performance 
increases with access to structural holes. The coefficients of Structural holes in Models 2, 
3, 4, and 5 are positive and significant (p < 0.05). I plotted in the top left corner of Figure 
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2 the predicted values of the conditional mean counts against Structural holes using the 
regression estimates from Model 5, holding the other variables constant at their 
respective sample mean values. Structural holes has a positive and increasing impact on 
the conditional mean across the range of its observed values. 
In nonlinear estimators, the marginal effects of changing predictors differ from 
those calculated directly using the regression-coefficient estimates (Greene, 2007). Thus, 
I also investigate the marginal effect of Structural holes on my dependent variable, 
keeping all the other variables at their sample mean values (Long, 1997). I calculate the 
marginal effect by taking the partial derivative of Equation (1) with respect to structural 
holes in Model 5 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013; Shaver, 2007).  
Marginal Effect
Structural holes
= 
∂E[yit | xit,αi]
∂xitStructural holes
=  αie
xit
' β(β
Structural holes
+β
Stability X Structural holes
 Stability)                                (3) 
xThe marginal effect of Structural holes at the sample mean of all variables is 12.43 
citation-weighted patent counts net of self-citations (p < 0.05). In other words, 12.43 is 
the instantaneous rate of change or the marginal change in the predicted conditional 
expected value of Citation-weighted patents sans self-citations with respect to Structural 
holes, keeping other variables at their sample means (Long & Freese, 2014). 
The range of Structural holes is approximately one, calling for changes in the 
variable that are of lesser magnitude than 1 for meaningful interpretation. Hence, I further 
investigated discrete effects of the variable using the finite-difference method (arbitrary 
changes in the variable), holding all other variables at their respective sample means 
 54 
 
(Long, 1997).                                                      
Discrete Effect
Structural holes
= 
ΔE[yit | xit, αi]
ΔxitStructural holes
=                                                                                                                                                                                            
E[y
it
 | xit, αi, xitS.holes = xitS. holes FINAL]- E[yit | xit, αi, xitS.holes= xitS.holes INITIAL]                   (4) 
The discrete effect of an explanatory variable refers to the change in the expected count 
when the variable changes (∇ = final value - initial value) from its initial value to the final 
value, when all other variables remain constant. The patent count increases by 4.63 as 
Structural holes increases from the 10
th
 percentile to the 90
th
 percentile (χ2 = 5.27; p < 
0.05). These results are consistent with expectations about the beneficial effects of 
structural holes. I note that the formulae for the marginal and discrete effects in the case 
of Geographic concentration and Stability use a logic similar to that in Equations (3) and 
(4). Hence, I do not explicitly specify them in this essay to avoid repetition.  
Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 show a significant, negative effect of Geographic 
concentration (p < 0.05). I graphed in the top right corner of Figure 2 the predicted values 
of the conditional mean of the dependent variable against Geographic concentration 
using the regression estimates from Model 5, with all other variables at their respective 
means. Geographic concentration negatively affects the conditional mean across the 
range of its observed values, though at a diminishing rate as Geographic concentration 
increases in value. The marginal effect of Geographic concentration at the sample mean 
of all variables is -10.84 citation-weighted patent count sans self-citations (p < 0.05). The 
expected count decreases by 2.27 as Geographic concentration increases from the 10
th
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percentile to the 90
th
 percentile (χ2 = 5.65; p < 0.05), thus suggesting that innovation 
performance decreases when firms’ inventive activities are geographically concentrated. 
Hypothesis 1 states that network stability negatively affects the focal firm’s 
innovation performance. Stability has negative and significant (p < 0.05) coefficient 
estimates in Models, 2, 3, 4, and 5. I graphed in the bottom left corner of Figure 2 the 
expected count predictions against Stability. The bottom panel shows that Stability has a 
negative, but diminishing, and significant (p < 0.05) impact on the predicted mean 
counts. Stability, at the mean, reduces the conditional mean count of citation-weighted 
patents by 3.87 (p < 0.01). The mean count reduces by 1.96 when Stability increases from 
the 10
th
 percentile to the 90
th
 percentile (χ2 = 8.49; p < 0.01). These findings are 
consistent with H1. 
Hypothesis 2 proposes a positive moderating effect of structural holes on the 
relationship between Stability and innovation performance. Equivalently, the effect of 
Structural holes on patent counts becomes more positive as the level of Stability 
increases and vice versa (Saunders, 1955). The coefficient of interaction between 
Stability and Structural holes is positive and significant (p < 0.01) in Model 3, and is 
positive and significant, though marginally, in Model 5 in Table 2 (p < 0.10). I plot this 
interaction in Panel A of Figure 3 to gain further insights. The graph shows that the 
negative effect of stability on the predicted patent counts is more detrimental to a focal 
firm with low levels of structural holes in its network than for a focal firm with high 
levels of structural holes. 
We can interpret the interaction effect in two ways: one is to present the effect as 
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incidence-rate ratio (IRR) (multiplicative effects) and the other is to calculate marginal or 
discrete interaction effects (Buis, 2010). I discuss both to evaluate my hypothesis. Using 
the IRR, I find that as Stability increases by one unit when the focal firm spans no 
structural holes, the patent count reduces by a factor of 0.75 (or 25 percent reduction in 
patent counts). This effect of Stability on patent counts increases by a factor of 2.34 as 
Structural holes increases by one unit from zero to one. Hence, if the focal firm spans 
structural holes (or Structural holes = 1) then the effect of Stability is positive: 133.97 
percent increase in patent counts with a unit increase in Structural holes. The effect is 
significant with 90 percent two-tailed confidence interval, marginally supporting H2. I 
note that the benefit of using the multiplicative interaction effects is that these effects 
control for differences in baseline IRRs in their own category: thus, these effects control 
for the baseline differences among firms with high and low Stability even when these 
firms do not span structural holes (or Structural holes = 0) (Buis, 2010). 
As suggested by Ai and Norton (2003), I also calculate the marginal interaction 
effects on the predicted mean patent counts by taking the cross-partial derivative of 
Equation (1) with respect to Structural holes and Stability or by taking the partial 
derivative of Equation (3) with respect to Stability. The marginal interaction effect 
(Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004; Shaver, 2007) is                                                                                                                                                
∂
2
E[yit | xit, αi]
∂xitStructural holes ∂xitStability
 = αie
xit
' β[β
Stability X S.holes
+                                                            
(β
S. holes
+ β
Stability X S. holes
 Stability) (β
Stability
+ β
Stability X S. holes
 Structural holes +              
 β
Stability X Geog. concentration
 Geographic concentration)]                                                      (5) 
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Substituting the coefficient estimates from Model 5 and holding all regressors at their 
sample mean values, the interaction effect of Stability and Structural holes on the 
expected patent count is 7.65. The effect is significant for one-tailed test at the 10% 
significance level, marginally confirming the veracity of my Hypothesis 2. 
Next, in order to assess the effect of a discrete change in the level of Structural 
holes on the relationship between a discrete change in Stability and predicted mean count, 
I follow Zelner (2009) approach to calculate the interaction effect using the discrete 
double difference method. The discrete interaction effect is                                                                                                                                                 
Δ2E[yit | xit,αi]
ΔxitStability ΔxitS. holes
 = (E[y
it
 | xit,αi, xitS.holes= xitS. holes FINAL, xitStability = xitStability FINAL]    
- E[y
it
 | xit, αi, xitS.holes = xitS.holes INITIAL, xitStability = xitStability FINAL])                            
- (E[y
it
| xit, αi, xitS.holes = xitS. holes FINAL, xitStability = xitStability INITIAL]                                   
- E[y
it
 | xit, αi, xitS.holes = xitS.holes INITIAL, xitStability = xitStability INITIAL])                                 (6) 
The discrete interaction effect on the expected value of patent count as Structural holes 
changes from low (10
th 
percentile) to high (90
th
 percentile) and Stability changes from 
low (10
th 
percentile) to high (10
th 
percentile) is 1.54. The effect is significant with 90 
percent one-tailed confidence interval. Thus, I find marginal support for my second 
hypothesis. 
I have faith in the validity of the use of one-tailed test for the marginal effects for 
H2 for two reasons. First, I formally hypothesize about the direction of the interaction 
effect and my hypothesis derives from theory. Second, interaction effects between 
continuous variables are, in general, difficult to detect at the 95 percent confidence level 
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(Morris, Sherman, & Mansfield, 1986; McClelland & Judd, 1993) because, among other 
things, the test lacks statistical power (Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 1990). Given my 
constraints in increasing the sample size or in increasing the variance of the underlying 
variables, I chose to increase the significance level to increase the statistical power of the 
effect (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). The results largely support H2. 
Hypothesis 3 states that Geographic concentration negatively moderates the 
relationship between Stability and innovation performance. Models 4 and 5 depict a 
negative and significant interaction effect of Geographic concentration (p < 0.05). I plot 
this interaction in Panel B of Figure 3. As can be seen, the effect of stability on the 
predicted value of citation-weighted counts net of self-citations is more negative as the 
focal firm’s network is highly geographically concentrated, thus providing support for 
H3. 
As regards multiplicative interaction effects, the effect of Stability on patent 
counts further decreases by a factor of 0.29 as Geographic concentration increases by 
one unit from zero to one. Hence, if the focal firm is geographically concentrated (or 
Geographic concentration = 1) then the effect of Stability is negative: 71.35 percent 
decrease in patent counts for each unit increase in Geographic concentration. The effect 
is significant with 95 percent two-tailed confidence interval, supporting H3. 
To calculate marginal and discrete effects, I use Equations (5) and (6) with 
Structural holes replaced by Geographic concentration and vice versa, controlling for all 
other regressors at their sample means. Substituting the coefficient estimates from Model 
5 and holding all regressors at their sample mean values, the interaction effect of Stability 
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and Geographic concentration on the expected patent count is -13.56. The effect is 
significant for two-tailed test at the 10% significance level, marginally confirming the 
veracity of my Hypothesis 3. The discrete interaction effect on the expected value of 
patent count as Geographic concentration changes from low (10
th 
percentile) to high (90
th
 
percentile) and Stability changes from low (10
th 
percentile) to high (10
th 
percentile) is -
1.48. The effect is significant with 90 percent two-tailed confidence interval. Thus, my 
third hypothesis is largely supported. 
Robustness Checks 
My results are robust to different measures of the dependent variable such as 
patents alone, and citations alone net of self-citations. Direct ties (r = 0.69; p < 0.01) and 
status (r = 0.66; p < 0.01) might be closely associated with structural holes (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Johnson, 2013). In addition, some other control variables are fairly highly 
correlated. Direct ties is highly correlated with status (r = 0.80; p < 0.01) and cumulative 
alliance experience (r = 0.82; p < 0.01), and status is correlated with partners’ innovation 
value (r = 0.72; p < 0.01). I chose to retain them in my main model for four reasons. 
First, these controls derive from theory (Ahuja, 2000; Podolny, 1993; Vasudeva et al., 
2012). Second, the overall VIF for the full model is less than ten. Third, my findings are 
robust with respect to excluding the direct ties, status, and partners’ innovation value 
measure, either one at a time or jointly as shown in Appendix 3 (Models, 2, 3, 4, and 5) at 
the end of this chapter. Fourth, high correlation between control variables such as that 
between the direct ties and status in and of itself does not affect the “coefficients of the 
variables of interest… and the performance of the control variables as controls is not 
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impaired” (Allison, 2012:1) in that multicollinearity may not affect the joint significance 
of linear combination of these control variables (Kennedy, 2008). 
In addition, firm size might be correlated with both innovation performance and 
my network measures. I use size-related measures such as technological base and direct 
ties in the main model. My results hold when I introduce an additional control for firm 
size using the logged number of employees (not shown). This measure exhibits high 
association with my technological base measure (r = 0.74; p < 0.01) indicating, as might 
be expected, that larger firms have larger technological bases. Next, in my sample, some 
firms do not patent. On the one hand, inclusion of such firms helps mitigate the self-
selection on my dependent variable. On the other hand, such firms might be different 
from firms that patent in that such firms might be young with innovations underway. I 
categorize firms into innovators and imitators based on whether or not they have patents. 
However, my fixed-effects controls for such differences, and STATA omits this 
innovator variable. In addition, my results are stable to introducing R&D intensity to 
control for such differences in Appendix 3 (Model 6).  
The Poisson conditional maximum likelihood estimator (not shown) provides 
consistent estimates as those in Model 5 of Table 2 (my main model), confirming the 
absence of incidental parameter bias. In Model 6 (Table 3) I use the Poisson-Gamma 
random effects estimator to alleviate the concern that the coefficients of some variables 
with relatively small within-firm standard deviation may limit their identification (Baum, 
2006). The Poisson-Gamma random effects model effectively results in the negative 
binomial model (Greene, 2007). Coefficient estimates and their significance for my main 
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variables of interest are essentially unchanged in this model.  
So far, my main results are based on the nonlinear fixed-effects model, which 
assumes that, conditional on the fixed effects  αi, my count data yit do not exhibit 
correlation over time. However, firms’ current patent counts might be influenced by past 
realizations of successful patents, inducing autocorrelation in the count response even 
after controlling for latent firm heterogeneity. In the presence of dynamic feedback from 
the dependent variable (state dependence), the strict exogeneity assumption in Equation 
(2) is violated, making my Poisson fixed effect estimator inconsistent. The conditional 
mean in this case depends on both the current and past xit values and lagged count values. 
In this case, though the GMM estimators using, among others, Chamberlain (1992) or 
Wooldridge transformation (1997b), can replicate the fixed effects nonlinear model with 
dynamic feedback under weak exogeneity, the marginal effects are not identified because 
of the elimination of  𝛼𝑖 . Also, the algorithm for the GMM estimation might not 
converge. Hence, I use the conditionally correlated Poisson-Gamma random effects 
dynamic model (CCRE model) in Model 7 (Table 3) to account for dynamic feedback 
using the Wooldridge (2005) and Mundlak (1978) corrections (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2013).  
The fixed-effects model, as discussed earlier, allows the firm-specific time-
invariant latent heterogeneity αi to correlate with the time-varying observed heterogeneity 
(represented by predictor variables) xit but does not put any restriction on its distribution, 
permitting arbitrary correlation. In contrast, the Poisson random-effects model considers 
the firm effect 𝛼𝑖 independent and identically distributed (iid) (i.e., not correlated with 
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regressors) drawn from the gamma (conjugate to the Poisson density) distribution (shape 
= ω, scale = ω) with mean 1 and variance 1 / ω. In other words, we specify a distribution 
for the random-effects model unlike that in the case of the fixed-effects model. The 
CCRE models in my case explicitly model the correlation between αi and xit , restricting 
the distribution of αi and making it conditional on the predictors. In the nonlinear case, 
the Poisson fixed-effects estimators and CCRE estimators yield similar estimates of 
coefficients and standard errors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013), and the marginal effects are 
identified (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Conditionally correlated Poisson-gamma random effects dynamic estimators 
model the unobserved variable αi as two (multiplicative) components, the correlated 
unobserved heterogeneity (e(θ0yiINITIAL  + x̅i
'γ)) and random unobserved heterogeneity(eεi), 
which is iid gamma distributed. Equivalently, εi follow log-gamma distribution. The 
sufficient statistics to proxy for the correlation in the CCRE model consists of two 
components, viz., the statistic (y
iINITIAL
 = Citation-weighted patent counts sans self-
citations of a firm i at time zero before its entry into the sample ~ initial condition) that 
reflects correlation between 𝛼𝑖 and the dynamic regressor yit-1 (Wooldridge, 2005); and 
the statistic (x̅i = within-firm average of each time-varying regressors) that controls for 
the correlation between αi and other time varying regressors xit, excluding the time 
dummies (Mundlak, 1978 ). I note that in CCRE models the sufficient statistics enter as 
regressors to proxy for 𝛼𝑖, not to eliminate 𝛼𝑖. My estimator is E[yit | Xi(t),Yi(t-1), αi]=                                                                                   
αie
(xit
' β+δy
it-1
)
 = e(θ0yiINITIAL  + x̅i
'γ) eεi  e
(xit
'
β + δy
it-1
)
 = e
(xit
'  β + δy
it-1
+ θ0yiINITIAL+ x̅i
'γ + εi)                        (7) 
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where Xi(t) = (xi1,xi2,…,xit), Yi(t)= (yi1,yi2,…,yit-1), and is estimated using the Poisson-
gamma random effects estimator (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). I also note that the 
covariates here are weakly exogenous (predetermined). The estimator exhibits 
exponential feedback. Though Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer (2002) call for linear 
feedback to overcome the explosive nature (δy
it-1
 ≥ 0 if δ > 0) of the exponential 
estimator, explosiveness is a nonissue in short panels and “the relative ease of 
interpretation favors the” exponential feedback model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013: 371). 
I suppress, for brevity, the coefficient estimates of initial conditions and other 
sufficient statistics (available upon request). In Model 7 (Table 3), my lagged dependent 
variable, Citation-weighted patent count sans self-citations-1 is significant at the 1% 
level. Its coefficient estimate is very close to zero (a little greater), making the model 
very slightly explosive. Though the coefficient for Geographic concentration is not 
significant, it is in the right direction, i.e., negative as hypothesized. Structural holes (p < 
0.05), Stability (p < 0.01), the interaction between Structural holes and Stability (p < 
0.05), and the interaction term between Geographic concentration and Stability (p < 
0.10) have the same signs as those in my main Model 5 in Table 2. Overall, the results 
are similar to those in Table 2 and confirm hypotheses support from the main analyses.  
Next, I delve into another source of autocorrelation in y
it
, over and above that 
controlling for  αi. In Model 8 (Table 3) I test for the possible endogeneity of Structural 
holes manifested in the autocorrelation of εit in that firms with more patent counts may be 
likelier to span more structural holes. The use of inverse Mills ratio derived from the 
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Heckman’s (1979) method in any fixed-effects nonlinear estimator might result in 
inconsistent estimates (Terza, 1998). Hence, I use a two-part approach suited for 
nonlinear models known as the Control Function approach for the Poisson fixed-effects 
estimator based on the recursive system (Wooldridge, 2015).                                  
E[y
it
 | xit, αi, S.holesit, uit1 ]= αi1e
(xit
'
β1 + ℵ1S.holesit + ∁1Stability X S.holesit + uit1)                         (8.1) 
S.holesit = z1it
' β
2
+ z2it
' ξ2 + αi2+ εit2 (reduced-form equation Structural holes)                (8.2) 
uit1 = ρεit2+ εit      (Wooldridge, 1997a)                                                                          (8.3) 
where z1it contains all the exogenous variables from Equation (8.1), i.e., xit (controls, 
time dummies, and Stability) and z2it excluded exogenous variables or instruments.  
The instrument should capture the variation in Structural holes but should not 
influence patent counts directly. I use uncertainty experienced by the focal firm in 
innovation as an excluded instrument for Structural holes to capture the firm’s 
willingness to engage in an alliance (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976) and to span structural 
holes. Uncertainty faced by the focal firm negatively affects Structural holes (Martin, 
Gözübüyük, & Becerra, 2015). When faced with firm-specific uncertainty, the focal firm 
would reduce the search costs associated with new potential alter firms and the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by members of its ego network. Consequently, it would engage in 
fewer structural holes (Gulati, 1995a). I measure uncertainty by the standard deviation of 
the rolling five-year window of patent counts of the focal firm until time t (Martin et al., 
2015). I created an additional instrument by multiplying Stability with this uncertainty 
measure (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). In the first stage (results available upon request), I 
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use a linear fixed-effects panel data estimator in Equation (8.2) to predict the residuals 
(ε̈it2̂= S.holes̈ i t- z̈1it
' β̂
2
- z̈2it
' ξ̂2, where   ̈symbolizes firm-specific deviations from the time-
averaged values of the respective variables). The two instruments are jointly significant 
(F = 4.48, p < 0.05).  
Although my test statistic misses the Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) criterion 
value of 10, I believe it is not a serious issue for three reasons. First, it is difficult to find 
strong significance when we add interactions in general. Second, we “can’t always 
determine instrument relevance using a mechanical rule, such as “f > 10.” In some cases, 
a low F may not be fatal” (Angrist & Pischke, 2009: 215). Angrist and Pischke (2009) 
find the value of 4.91 to be relevant too in their example. Third, I already explicitly 
control for the principal determinants of alliance formation such as alliance experience, 
status, and direct ties.  
In the second stage, I estimate the Poisson fixed-effects model using the predicted 
residual from the first stage as a predictor in the mean function in Equation (8.1). 
E[y
it
 | xit, αi, S.holesit, ε̈it2̂ ]= αi1e
(xit
'
β1 + ℵ1S.holesit + ∁1Stability X S.holesit + ρε̈it2̂). Results show that 
there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of Structural 
holes (ρ = 0) using the robust Wald test, which is non-significant (χ2 = 1.49; p = 0.22). 
The results from my main analyses are supported, further validating the robustness of my 
conditional mean specification. 
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SUMMARY 
How does ego-network stability affect innovation performance? A long network 
research tradition has mostly argued that the configuration of network structures (e.g., 
structural holes) benefits firms’ innovation performance. However, researchers appear to 
have overlooked a fundamental dimension of social structure, its stability. Consistent 
with much extant work, my baseline (but not hypothesized) findings indicate that a focal 
firm that spans structural holes reaps greater innovation benefits. However, in addition to 
the innovation benefits provided by network structure configuration per se, I empirically 
disentangle the negative innovation implications of ego-network stability and show how 
these effects are contingently influenced by network configurations, specifically, 
structural holes. Moreover, I demonstrate how the geographic concentration of the focal 
firm’s inventive activities contingently accentuates the negative ego-network stability-
performance relationship. 
Specifically, I show that network stability has a detrimental effect on the focal 
firm’s innovation performance. The effect, taken together with the mitigating influence of 
structural holes spanned by the focal firm, highlights the potentially opposing forces at 
play in assessing the value of ego networks. Bringing stability into the picture attenuates 
the knowledge benefits of ego networks because of knowledge retrieval difficulties, 
relational lock-in, and knowledge redundancy, thus reducing the heterogeneity in 
knowledge availability from the firm’s network resources. However, compared to 
network closure, when the focal firm spans structural holes, it is able to limit the negative 
effects of stability. 
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The focal firm’s geographic concentration, on the other hand, amplifies the 
negative impact of ego-network stability. The focal firm that lacks a multicountry 
operation is not able to exploit diversity benefits because both knowledge and labor are 
geographically constrained, with low mobility across geographic boundaries (Jaffe et al., 
1993). In contrast to high concentration, low geographic concentration (high 
internationalization) allows the focal firm to access diverse knowledge from multiple 
countries, increasing the likelihood of recombination (Kogut & Zander, 1993).The focal 
firm with multicountry presence is able to learn from the different country-specific best 
practices for innovation, from the complexity involved in organizing, and from the 
ensuing employee diversity (Ghosal & Bartlett, 1988; Westney & Zaheer, 2008; 
Østergaard et al., 2011). In addition, multicountry location allows for the institutional 
arbitrage in which the focal firm benefits from the intercountry differences in knowledge-
related input factors and output (Zhao, 2006).  
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CHAPTER 3 
Origins of Ego-Network Stability: A Deeper Look into Brokerage (Structural Hole) 
Stability 
That friends, however friends they were,  
Still deal with things as things occur,  
And that, excepting for the blind,  
What’s out of sight is out of mind. 
-- The Poems of Arthur Hugh Clough 
 
In the previous chapter, I underscored the salience of network stability in order to 
understand better the network structure-performance link. Two key insights from Chapter 
2 provide motivation for this chapter. First, stability negatively affects the focal firm’s 
innovation performance. Second, spanning structural holes mitigates the negative effect 
of stability. Given the importance of structural holes in reducing the negative effect of 
stability, I in this follow-up chapter examine what makes structural holes or brokerage 
structures stable or persist in the first place. In this regard, in this chapter, I limited the 
domain of stability to brokerage stability rather than ego-network stability. This change 
in direction from the previous chapter is an essential first step to open the black box of 
ego-network stability. My brokerage-stability focus is valuable for further in-depth 
examination of basic network structures without confounding the stability arising from 
the open or brokerage-structure configurations with that from the closed-structure 
configurations. Put another way, the ego-network stability in the previous chapter may 
arise from closure as well as brokerage. Since the implications of these two structures are 
quite different, a sole focus on the brokerage structure allows me to get directly at the 
antecedents of stability, without any ambiguity about whether or not the network 
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structure configuration per se, i.e., brokerage or closure, is the source of stability. I 
provide additional theoretical rationale for investigating the antecedents of stability of 
these brokerage structures in the following paragraphs. 
 In general, recent scholarship investigates the formation and outcomes of 
organizational networks, but has paid scant attention to the factors that make these 
structures dissolve or persist (Watts, 2001; Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; see Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999 for an exception). Emphasizing both network creation and stability in his 
early work calling out network evolution, Jarillo (1988: 36) originally raised the question, 
“How can a network be created and sustained?” At the same time, in addition to their 
embeddedness in social or organizational contexts (Granovetter, 1985), firms and inter-
firm ties are embedded in geographic space, an infrequently examined factor in the 
network literature (Ter Wal, 2014; Cattani, Pennings, & Wezel, 2003). By ignoring 
geographic embeddeddness, researchers risk misattributing geography’s effect on 
network evolution to nodal, structural, or tie attributes (Gastner & Newman, 2006; for 
exceptions see Bell & Zaheer, 2007; Whittington, Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009; Kono, 
Palmer, Friedland, & Zafonte, 1998).  
In this chapter I address the issue of brokerage stability from the perspective of 
the interfirm network’s embeddedness in geographic space. For both theoretical 
exposition and empirical validation, I use a structural hole – or brokerage – triad as my 
unit of analysis and assess the effects of geography on triadic stability. The triad is often 
viewed as the basic building block of a network (Simmel, 1950; Krackhardt, 1999; 
Madhavan & Gnyawali, 2004). In structural hole or brokerage triads, a focal firm 
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connects to two disconnected alter firms (Burt, 1992), often acting as a “knowledge 
broker” in alliance networks. Much research on inter-organizational alliance network has 
shown the unique benefits of brokerage in accessing new knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Bell 
& Zaheer, 2007) and good ideas (Burt, 2004).  
At the same time, structural holes are believed to be transient (Burt, 2002; 
Krackhardt, 1998). Brokerage positions, while allowing for exploitation of information 
asymmetries, may also generate distrust towards the broker (Stovel, Golub, & Milgrom, 
2011). The broker might choose to play one alter firm off against the other to maximize 
“knowledge rents,” in so doing undermine the trust of the alters in the broker. Alters’ 
effort to reduce unfavorable dependence on the broker once they become aware of each 
other, and of the true nature of the broker’s role, might cause the brokerage triad to decay 
(Buskens & van de Rijt, 2008). In this study I seek to understand when and why 
brokerage triads persist, and conversely, the factors that might hasten their termination in 
geographic space, given that knowledge, including knowledge of the broker’s role, as 
well as of the potential gains to alters from closing the hole, may be geographically 
constrained. Furthermore, recent research shows that technology development triads are 
more successful when ‘group cycling’ exists, isolating each dyad to work together at a 
time towards the triad’s overall goals (Davis, 2016). Geography may help maintain this 
decomposition. 
I define a brokerage triad to be stable if there is no change in its membership for a 
certain period t. A brokerage triad becomes unstable or decays if any of its members 
leave, or if its unconnected members form a new relationship between themselves (Burt, 
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2002). Prior studies examining the role of geographic proximity on networks have 
ignored its effect on network change, focusing principally on tie formation (Bossard, 
1932; Blau, 1977). With a principal focus on the role of technological regimes, Ter Wal 
(2014) examines how effects of geography and triadic closure on tie formation are 
modified with a change in the technological regime. Building on these contributions, my 
point of departure is the direct effect of geography on brokerage stability. 
At the same time, research finds that the membership of firms in network 
communities influences their likelihood of forming bridging ties (Sytch, Tatarynowicz, & 
Gulati, 2012). Network communities are tightly knit mutually exclusive social 
collectivities with increased interdependence and denser ties within the community than 
across communities (Hawley, 1950; Tatarynowicz, Sytch, & Gulati, 2016). However, the 
issue of triadic stability when the broker and alter firms reside in different network 
communities remains an open question. Compared to those from different communities, 
alter firms from same network communities might avail brokerage benefits because of 
positive network externalities, enhancing brokerage stability (Clement, Shipilov, & 
Galunic, 2017). Consistent with the underlying logic, I argue that inter-community 
competition places a severe strain on brokerage relationship, reducing triadic stability 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1994). In sum, I investigate two related questions: How does 
geography affect the stability of brokerage structures? Also, how do firms’ memberships 
in network communities affect brokerage stability? 
I empirically test my hypotheses with interfirm alliances in the global 
pharmaceutical industry context from 1985 to 2005 using 61,495 brokerage triad-year 
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observations and discrete time survival models with complementary log-log estimators. 
Consistent with my sample, log-log estimators work well with both high frequency and 
rare events data, and are invariant to the choice of the interval to measure survival times 
(as I explain in the Methods section) (Allison, 2010). In addition, such models also allow 
me to independently analyze different operationalizations of brokerage decay with 
competing risk models (Allison, 2014) in robustness checks.  
Below, I develop my hypothesis elucidating the link between brokerage stability 
and geography in terms of the triadic evolutionary outcome of decay. Thereafter, I 
develop arguments and hypothesize about the effect of the broker and alter firms’ 
embeddedness in different network communities on brokerage stability. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Geographic Distance and Brokerage Stability 
Prima facie, geographic distance might seem to reduce brokerage stability 
because of the costs associated with distance (Zaheer, 1995). Distance makes it harder to 
establish trust between alliance partners. Also, geographic distance might make the 
alliance less resilient to ‘shocks’ to relationships, with conflicts more likely to escalate 
because of the lack of frequent efficient communication and interaction. However, I 
argue that these issues, though relevant, are more critical during the initial decision-
making process about whether or not to form an alliance across distant geographies. Once 
partner firms self-select into the alliance relationship, these factors might not reduce 
stability because of relationship-specific investments (Subramani & Venkatraman, 2003). 
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Also, at the brokerage-triad level, the presence of the third party changes the dynamics at 
the dyad level. Situating dyadic relationships in a triadic context creates “quite dramatic 
changes in seemingly stable relations” (Gadde & Mattsson, 1987: 29) and vice versa. 
Next, I develop arguments with respect to the effect of geographic distance on the 
stability of the brokerage triad through three sets of related arguments: brokerage 
awareness; search, monitoring, coordination and communication costs; and knowledge 
heterogeneity. 
Brokerage awareness. My starting point in this line of argument is that a 
brokerage triad is likelier to be stable if alter firms remain unaware of brokerage (Burt, 
2005). Otherwise, alter firms might strategically manipulate their networks to increase 
the benefits derived from them (Watts, 1999) by either terminating the disadvantageous 
alliance with the broker or possibly seeking better collaboration opportunities within and 
beyond the triad. In other words, for the brokerage triad to decay, the two alter firms must 
be aware of each other’s existence and, subsequently, each other’s relationship with the 
broker (Hahl, Kacperczyk, & Davis, 2016). 
Lack of geographic proximity decreases the visibility of actors present in the 
spatial milieu, reducing chance encounters (Blau, 1977; Hillier & Penn, 1991). Alter 
firms might know so little about each other that they are less likely to discover that the 
broker firm extracts a surplus from their relationships. Their lack of knowledge about 
brokerage is likely to promote the continuity of the status quo in the broker-alter firm 
triad. At the same time, the formal and informal interactions between broker and alter 
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firms decrease with geographic distance (Saxenian, 1996a), reducing the chances of 
intentional or unintentional leaks of information regarding brokerage. Furthermore, 
inventor mobility may be constrained by distance, making it less likely that a scientist 
from the broker firm is hired by any of the alter firms (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Almeida, 
Dokko, & Rosenkopf, 2003; Breschi & Lissoni, 2009). In addition, spatially distant 
broker and alter firms might not share the same industry and professional associations, 
diminishing the possibility of knowing about the brokerage via a third party. Thus, distant 
alter firms have little leeway to be cognizant of brokerage, enhancing the stability of the 
brokerage triad. 
Spatial barriers to the flow of information may seem to be at odds with recent 
advances in electronic communication and high speed transportation. However, even 
online networks have been shown to be spatially constrained (Liben-Nowell, Novak, 
Kumar, Raghavan, & Tomkins, 2005). Goldenberg and Levy (2009) show that, though 
the quantum leaps in the information technology have increased the total volume of 
communication, local social ties have seen most of the increases in the communication 
volume. Allen (2007) finds that the probability of communication between two product 
development engineers decreases rapidly with growing distance between their offices. 
Locational proximity enhances quick and dynamic feedback mechanism between actors 
in which each party is aware of other’s world view (Nohria & Eccles, 1992), thereby 
increasing the chances of brokerage detection and the likelihood of brokerage decay.  
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Search, monitoring, coordination, and communication costs. Furthermore, in 
light of the well-established findings about the geographically-bounded nature of 
knowledge (e.g. Almeida & Kogut, 1999), geography-induced information insulation 
increases alter firms’ search costs. Such search costs would constrain firms’ ability to 
obtain detailed information about each potential partner’s characteristics relevant for the 
new alliance between them even when one alter firm is on the other’s radar (Geertz, 
1978). This is even more so for knowledge-based alliances because of the uncertainty 
inherent in R&D projects regarding their fruitful completion (Nicholson, Danzon, & 
McCullough, 2005). In addition, each alter firm cannot ex ante share each other’s 
knowledge to reduce the information uncertainty because doing so might itself 
unintendedly reveal proprietary knowledge (Arrow, 1962; Kogut & Zander, 1993). 
Geographic distance may also make the ex post monitoring of the partner’s opportunistic 
behavior difficult or costly because of information asymmetry, increasing the hazard of 
adverse selection in alliance partnering (Reuer & Lahiri, 2014). 
Even when alter firms have perfect information about partner attributes, an alter 
firm would strategically form a tie with the other unconnected alter firm to gain an 
advantage over the broker only when the expected benefits of tie formation and 
maintenance in terms of knowledge generation and transfer exceed the expected costs. 
Seen through a geography lens, when alter firms form a tie with each other, not only do 
they form a social relation but also they connect two different geographies within which 
they are situated. There are extra coordination and communication costs to maintaining 
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such a tie that traverses distant geography over and above the costs of ‘regular’ tie 
formation and maintenance. Increased geographic distance translates to increased travel 
and transportation costs, increasing the costs of maintaining ties across geographies (Bell 
& Zaheer, 2007).  
More importantly, proximity leads to informal high quality communication 
(Hagstrom, 1965). As much of the knowledge relevant for innovation is tacit, proximity 
has an advantage in avoiding transmission loss via multiple face-to-face interactions 
(Mok, Wellman, & Vasu, 2007). Saxenian (1996a) provides evidence for the relationship 
between locational proximity and ease of interaction among knowledge workers in the 
Silicon Valley, facilitating knowledge flow and improving their innovativeness relative to 
those from Route 128. Thus, physical proximity allows for frequent, high quality 
communication at low cost (Kraut, Egido, & Galegher, 1988).  
Also, distance adds to the coordination time and the travel time of concerned 
parties (Boeh & Beamish, 2012). Jeffrey Kalb, the founder of MasPar Computer 
Corporation, in his interview with Saxenian (1996b: x) makes similar arguments: “It’s 
not one thing, but if you spend lots of time on airplanes and on the phone, playing phone 
tag, you can get an overall 20-30 percent slowdown in time to market.” Thus distance, in 
general, increases the cost of tie formation because of coordination costs, reducing the 
likelihood of decay. 
Knowledge heterogeneity. Further, although prior research has pointed to the 
existence of brokerage advantages for the broker firm, the persistence of brokerage 
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advantages is a more subtle and less studied idea. The persistence of brokerage benefits 
stems from the continuing heterogeneity in alter knowledge bases, particularly between 
alters that are geographically distant. Spatially distant alter firms may exhibit continued 
knowledge base heterogeneity for two main reasons. First, alter firms separated by 
geographic distance may face idiosyncratic situations arising from distinct local needs 
and resource availability (Ahuja & Katila, 2004). Also, geographically separated alter 
firms might pursue different trajectories for knowledge development in order to adapt to 
differing local cultures, administrations, and economies (Ghemawat, 2001; Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978). Second, knowledge is sticky (von Hippel, 1994), and knowledge 
spillovers, though possible, are localized or geographically bounded, with spillover 
effects occurring in close geographic proximity to where the knowledge originated (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993; Jaffe, 1989). This knowledge stickiness enables 
knowledge diversity to persist between unconnected but distant alter firms. Such 
knowledge diversity between broker and alters allows the broker to maintain continued 
access to new knowledge over an extended period (Das & Teng, 2003), reducing the 
possibility of hole decay. 
In sum, geographic distance between alter firms enhances brokerage stability 
because it becomes more likely that brokerage remains hidden from the eyes of alter 
firms, because it is costly for alters to form a new tie, and because the broker maintains 
continued access to knowledge diversity. Thus, I posit that 
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Hypothesis 4. Conditional on firms’ membership in a brokerage triad, the greater 
the geographic distance of firms from one another in the brokerage triad, either 
a) the geographic distance between alter firms, or b) the geographic distance 
between a broker and the alters, the lower the likelihood that the brokerage triad 
(structural hole) decays, and therefore, greater the triadic stability.  
Membership in Different Communities and Brokerage Stability 
Next I develop the rationale for brokerage stability when the brokerage triad’s 
members are located in the same network community and conversely, instability when 
they are located in different communities. Network communities or “networks within 
networks” are mutually exclusive social collectivities with greater tie density within 
structural groups than between them (Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). Communities are seen 
as “mesolevel” structures that may exist between dyads and networks (Rowley, Greve, 
Rao, Baum, & Shipilov, 2005). I use the term “communities” in the same way as 
researchers have used “clusters” (Knoke, 2001; 2009), “constellations” (Lorenzoni & 
Ornati, 1988), “blocks” (Zhang & Zhang, 2006), “cliques” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) 
and “groups” (Rowley, Baum, Shipilov, Greve, & Rao, 2004) in their analyses of social 
systems. I base my theoretical explanation regarding the effect of triad members’ 
citizenship in both the same and different communities by drawing on recent research on 
brokerage as a public good (Clement et al., 2017), the threat of community sanctions, and 
the costs imposed by inter-community competition. 
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Brokerage as a public good. When brokers and alter firms are located in the same 
community, they form part of a broader cohesive group. In such a group, dense 
connections are reinforced by previous joint work experience and interactions (e.g. Singh, 
2005).The structural disconnect of the community from other groups and non-group 
members in the network structure results in the development of shared norms, language 
and routines within the community that are quite different from those within other 
communities. Community members identify themselves more as part of the community 
than as part of the whole network (Knoke, 2009). They exhibit homophilous tendencies, 
mostly limiting their search of opportunities and partners to those within community 
boundaries (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999, Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009). In this vein, 
community members are network neighbors (Paxton & Moody, 2003). Similar identities 
and dense ties breed trust within the community (Rowley et al. 2005; Zaheer, McEviley, 
& Perrone, 1998).  
Seen through a community lens, in a cohesive group with an environment of 
reciprocity, a broker might be more willing to share the surplus from brokerage with alter 
firms within the network community than it would be had alter firms been located outside 
its community. Extant work importantly points out that brokerage is in part a public good 
(Fernandez-Mateo, 2007) in that its positive benefits might spill over to the broker’s 
network neighborhood (Galunic, Ertug, & Gargiulo, 2012). The positive externalities thus 
generated become more salient when alter firms are located within the same community 
as the broker’s, especially in the knowledge creation contexts (Clement et al., 2017). 
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Since alter firms are able to tap into the brokerage benefits indirectly via community 
linkages, the brokerage triad is less likely to decay. 
Threat of sanctions. A cliquish structure among community members enables 
more efficient governance and control for those within the group than those outside 
(Coleman, 1988). The dense ties among community members and the ensuing social 
monitoring weakens the insulation that the brokerage position provides in terms of 
playing one alter firm against the other or reducing commitment to any party at will. In 
this regard, a broker’s opportunistic behavior might not remain unsanctioned. In other 
words, brokerage triad members’ location in the same network neighborhood creates a 
reputational lock-in for the broker, reducing its chances of engaging in self-seeking 
behavior (Greif, 1989). A related element of triad members’ positioning within the same 
community is mutual dependence and a symbiotic relationship (Ryall & Sorenson, 2007; 
Sytch et al., 2012). These factors also contribute toward making the triadic relationship 
more equitable and, in turn, less likely to decay. The threat of sanctions, exclusion, and 
mutual dependence result in keeping the brokerage triad stable. 
Inter-community competition. In contrast, competition exists between 
communities (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; 1996). In the case of brokerage triad members’ 
location in different communities, even though the alter firms might not be aware of each 
other, they are wary of the broker because of its location in a different community, 
affecting the broker’s maneuvering abilities. Intense competition between the broker 
firm’s community and alter firm’s communities makes the broker’s task of managing 
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alters from multiple communities more challenging. In this regard, the broker firm’s 
embeddedness in a different community might add to the tension the broker already faces 
by virtue of spanning a brokerage position between two competing alters. The broker 
firm might find itself entangled among the norms and standards of the multiple 
communities in which its alters are positioned, affecting its control benefits. Alter firms 
are more likely to challenge the broker’s authoritative position which does not derive 
from alter firms’ community norms. Thus, alter firms from different communities are 
more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior, increasing the cost of maintaining a 
brokerage relationship. In the extreme case community authority might trump the 
broker’s authority, and the broker’s ability to benefit from being connected to two 
unconnected alters might be marred by community-level competition and the ensuing 
mistrust. Thus, the location of brokerage triad members in different network communities 
makes the cost of maintaining the brokerage relationship excessive, prompting a 
breakdown of the brokerage structure. Hence, 
Hypothesis 5. Conditional on firms’ membership in a brokerage triad, the 
brokerage triad firms’ (broker and alter firms’) membership in different network 
communities increases the likelihood of brokerage triad (structural hole) decay, 
thereby decreasing triadic stability. 
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METHODS 
Data and Sample 
Some discussions in this section are repetitions from Chapter 2. However, I 
briefly reprise them here to maintain the flow in the story. I use the global pharmaceutical 
industry context with 4-digit SIC codes (2833: Medicinal chemicals; 2834: 
Pharmaceutical preparations; 2835: Diagnostic substance; 2836: Other biological 
products) to test my hypotheses. Pharmaceutical companies invest between $1.5 billion to 
$1.8 billion in R&D for a successful drug (DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2008) and yet 
it takes 10-15 years to successfully develop one (PhRMA, 2013). According to the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA, 2015), “…only 5 in 5,000 compounds that enter 
preclinical testing make it to human testing, and only 1 of those 5 may be safe and 
effective enough to reach pharmacy shelves.” Finding a new molecule entails spanning 
diverse disciplines as chemistry, biology, and clinical studies (Loging, Harland, & 
Williams-Jones, 2007). Under such circumstances it is difficult for any pharmaceutical 
firm to undertake the entire discovery project by itself. Alliances, mostly in R&D, are 
commonplace in the pharmaceutical industry (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005), enabling me 
to create the alliance brokerage network and extract structural hole triads. 
Starting with the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database on joint ventures and 
alliances, I chose both public and private firms in the global pharmaceutical industry with 
at least one alliance announced between 1980 and 2005. Alliances were rare prior to 
1980, thus alleviating left censoring bias. I used archival databases such as Factiva, 
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LexisNexis, and SEC-EDGAR to further supplement this information. Next, I set the 
network boundary using two criteria (Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1989; Gulati, 
1995b). First, both alliance partners must belong to the pharmaceutical industry (Rowley, 
Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000). Second, I required that the alliance context must be 
pharmaceutical as determined by its primary four-digit SIC code. I used all alliances 
types because any type of alliance relationship might contribute to knowledge transfer 
(Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Next, I aggregated the alliance information for all 
subsidiaries (at least 50% stock ownership) at the ultimate parent level, and further 
adjusted for name changes, mergers and acquisitions, and restructuring using numerous 
databases such as Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations, Dun & Bradstreet’s Who Owns 
Whom, Pharma & MedTech Business Intelligence, Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters 
SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions databases. 
To compute alliances’ termination dates, I created a master dataset with detailed 
information on alliance deals by combining archival data from multiple sources such as 
Factiva, LexisNexis, NASDAQ - Datastore, Bloomberg Professional Terminal, SEC-
EDGAR, and Mergent Online. In addition, I used trade magazines and journals such as 
Chemical marketing reporter and Japan Chemical Week; news sources such as Dow 
Jones News Service, PR Newswire, BioCentury, PharmaTimes, Strategic Transactions :: 
Pharma & Medtech Business Intelligence, and Pharmaceutical Online; and firm 
websites. This comprehensive data collection effort helped me drop those alliances that 
were announced but did not come to fruition. Also, in case of alliances with multiple 
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partners, it allowed me to delineate whether all of the partners involved had alliances 
with each other or just one firm had alliance with all others. Next, I derived termination 
dates using a multi-pronged strategy described below.  
First, I identified alliance termination dates which were explicitly mentioned in 
my deal master dataset. I further searched for alliance extensions or new alliances in 
these cases to ascertain when the relationship between two partners actually ended. 
Second, in case of open-ended alliances, a majority in my context, with no predetermined 
termination dates, I engaged in a deep web search using multiple variants of the word 
“end,” “termination,” “dissolve,” “complete,” “break,” “leave,”  “withdraw,” along with 
partners’ names with or without drug or disease names and, in addition, accounted for 
any alliance extensions or additions between partners. It was relatively easy to search for 
joint venture termination dates using their names as stated in the deal (Ahuja, 2000).  
Third, from my master dataset with deal texts, I identified drug names, brands and 
formulations, key pharmaceutical compounds, and disease and used them as search 
queries in additional databases such as Adis Insight, treating the date of discontinuation of 
a drug or trial by the firm as the alliance termination date if the partners did not form any 
new alliance. Fourth, I followed the alliance progress using Factiva, company annual 
reports, and SEC filings until these sources stopped mentioning the deal, which then I 
record as its termination year. I did not follow this approach when these databases 
discussed alliances in only one year without any explicit mention of termination news. 
Fifth, I tracked mergers and acquisitions as well as structural reorganizations, and 
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revalidated the alliance’s existence if the new partners continued with the prior 
relationship. Sixth, I scanned important life events such as NASDAQ listings and CEO 
interviews post award-winning to find deal termination dates. My search followed a 
sequential process in that I moved to the next step only when I was not able to find 
termination data in the previous step.  
Next, based on alliance duration from my termination dataset, for each year I 
created symmetric adjacency matrices or networks of alliance ties. From the network thus 
created, I extracted structural hole or brokerage triads using a hand-written code in 
STATA 13. The results were further validated using Pajek64 4.02. To illustrate by an 
example, I evaluate in Figure 4 whether firm B is a broker or not from B’s ego-network 
using two different scenarios, 1 and 2. As seen in the figure, in scenario 1, all the alter 
firms, A, C, and D, are connected with each other. Hence, firm B is not a broker firm and 
will not appear in my final observation. In contrast, in scenario 2, B is a broker because B 
spans two open triads ABC and ABD respectively. 
Then, I collected data on latitudes and longitudes of all member firms of structural 
hole triads to calculate geographic distances. Using firms’ exact addresses, I employed 
geocoding to retrieve the latitude and longitude via the Google Geocoding Application 
Program Interface. For cases in which the geocoding algorithm did not provide exact 
latitude and longitude or only provided location degrees at the country level, I further 
hand collected the data inputting firms’ complete addresses in Google maps. In all, my 
final sample with complete information on the independent variables consists of 17,212 
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unique brokerage triads with 61,495 triad-year observations involving 329 broker firms 
and 680 alter firms over a 21-year period. 
Dependent Variable  
Decay. My dependent variable Decay is a dummy. Recall that I consider a 
brokerage triad to be stable if both the membership of the triad and the linkages among 
the triad members stay the same for a certain duration t. As can be seen in Figure 5, the 
brokerage triad BAC is stable at time t1 and at t2 because broker firm A continues to 
connect to the same unconnected alters B and C, with no change in relationships among 
A, B, and C during these two periods. I assign a value of 0 to the dummy if the brokerage 
triad appeared for the first time for a particular year. For other years, the dummy retains 
the value of zero if the triad appears consecutively in each year since its first appearance. 
The triad decays if either its members do not continue the existing relationship or its 
unconnected members form a new relationship between them in the next year. I 
operationalize Decay as 1 for the year in which the triad decays. To minimize potential 
simultaneity, I lag my explanatory variables by one year. 
Independent Variables 
Alter-alter geographic distance (in thousand miles). I used the spherical law of 
cosines formula to calculate the great-circle distance between the two alter firms’ 
subsidiaries (or the alter firm themselves) which had an alliance with a common broker 
firm at time t (Sorenson & Audia, 2000; Funk, 2014; Reuer & Lahiri, 2014).  
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distancepqt=R{arccos[ sin(latpt) sin(latqt) + 
cos (lat
pt
) cos(latqt) cos(longqt- longpt )]}             
where R =3,956.54 miles is the radius of the earth; latpt and latqt denote latitudes in 
radians of the alter firms i and j at time t indirectly connected via a common broker firm; 
and longpt and longqt denote longitudes in radians of the alter firms i and j at time t. I 
averaged the distance obtained to calculate an aggregate measure of geographic distance 
at the ultimate parent level between alter firms i and j at time t. I then divided the 
measure by one thousand to obtain the final score in units of thousand miles. 
Broker-alter geographic distance (in thousand miles). I used the spherical law of 
cosines formula to calculate the great-circle distance between the broker firm’s and each 
of the alter firms’ subsidiaries or the firms themselves, whichever was directly involved 
in the alliance at time t. Next, I averaged these distances to obtain the distance between 
the broker firm and the first alter firm and the distance between the broker firm and the 
second alter firm. I then take the mean of these two distances and divide it by a thousand 
to obtain my ultimate measure of geographic distance between the broker and alter firms 
in thousand mile units. 
Different community. I used the community detection method proposed by 
Girvan and Newman (2002) and Newman and Girvan (2004) to detect communities and 
define modularity M as ∑ (d
ii
-{drandomii})i  , where dii is the fraction of ties within the i
th
 
community and drandomii is the expected fraction of ties within communities using another 
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network with the same number of communities and with the same tie distribution but 
with a random connection between nodes (firms). M = 0 indicates that fraction of within-
community ties in the observed network are not different from the expected fraction if the 
same quantity in a random network whereas M = 1 suggests a strong community. I then 
use the Guimera and Amaral’s (2005) simulated annealing optimization algorithm to find 
the partition of firms into communities such that M has the largest value. Recent studies 
have used the same approach to detect communities (e.g., Gulati, Sytch, & Tatarynowicz, 
2012; Sytch et al., 2012; Tatarynowicz et al., 2016). Next, I code this measure as 1 if all 
the three members of the structural hole triad pertain to different communites and 0 
otherwise. 
Control Variables  
Alters’ brokerage experience. I measure the sum of the number of brokerage 
triads spanned by the two alter firms before year t for Alters’ brokerage experience 
because the structural hole spanning could enhance the ability of alter firms to identify 
brokerage relations. The alter firm’s acquaintance with the existence of structural holes 
determines whether it would act to reduce the structural benefits reaped by the broker 
firm (Hahl et al., 2016). How the alter firm’s managers create mental maps of actual 
networks affects the bargaining posture they adopt against the broker firm’s managers 
(Krackhardt, 1987; 1990).  
Alter-alter past ties. I next control for Alter-alter past ties because alter firms 
might know one another because of their past alliances by aggregating all alliances 
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between the two alter firms of a structural hole triad before time t (Levin, Walter, & 
Murnighan, 2011). Not controlling for this variable might misattribute structural hole 
instability from past alliances to the geographic distance.  
Alter-alter knowledge difference. I capture Alter-alter knowledge difference until 
time t with the Jaccard coefficient (Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008) using the formula 
1-
| Subclassalter1 ∩ Subclassalter2 |
| Subclassalter1 ∪ Subclassalter2 |
 , where Subclassalter1 and Subclassalter2 are the unique 
pharmaceutical patent subclasses that each alter firm patented in until the observation 
year t.  
Alters’ status difference. In year t, I next control for Alters’ status difference in a 
triad using the differences in Bonacich centrality (normalized) (Bonacich, 1972).  
Broker's normalized degree. To proxy for the broker firm’s influence in the 
overall network, which might influence the number of alternatives available to the broker 
and also its power over the alter firms, I use Broker’s normalized degree centrality 
(Freeman, 1978). I next control for the number of structural holes spanned by the broker 
firm at time t.  
Broker’s lack of constraint. I use the Burt’s (1992) constraint measure with 
Zaheer and Bell’s (2005) transformation for Broker’s lack of constraint. This measure 
captures the autonomy the broker firm has in managing the relationship.  
Broker-alter past ties. This measure captures the strength or intensity of 
relationships between the broker and alter firm. Strong relationships engender trust 
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(Granovetter, 1973; Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998), increasing the opportunity for 
the closing of the structural hole or at least less exploitation of surplus by the broker. 
First, I measure the number of past alliances between the broker and alter firm 1 and also 
the broker and alter firm 2 before time t. Second, I multiply both the values to calculate 
the effect of transitivity (Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007). 
Broker-alter status difference. I account for the status difference between the 
broker firm and each of the alter firms in a triad, Broker-alter status difference, using the 
differences in normalized Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1972) and taking the mean of 
the two differences for the year t.  
Broker-alter knowledge difference. I measure Broker-alter knowledge difference 
using the Jaccard coefficient (Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008)                                                  
1-
| Subclassbroker ∩ (Subclassalter1 ∪ Subclassalter2) |
| Subclassbroker∪ (Subclassalter1 ∪ Subclassalter2) |
 , where Subclass refers to the unique 
pharmaceutical subclasses in which each of the three broker and alter firms patented until 
time t.  
# of same country dyads. This variable takes a value of 3 if all the three members 
of the structural hole triad or their subsidiaries, whichever is directly responsible for the 
alliance, belong to the same country because when the triad’s firms are in different 
countries, the effects of geography are likely to be stronger. Zero reflects all the members 
are located in different countries.  
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# of same SIC dyads. This measure captures the influence of different sub-
industries using this variable. It takes a maximum value of 3 when all the three members 
of the brokerage triad operate in the same 4-digit SIC codes, and 0 when none of them 
share the same sub-industry.  
Triad main component membership. For this variable, I assign a value of 1 to 
this dummy variable if all the three broker and alter firms belong to the main component 
of the network. Membership in the main component might make it easier for partners to 
collaborate and access information, reducing the likelihood of brokerage persistence 
(Dahlander & McFarland, 2013).  
Model Estimation 
I use discrete-time survival method for non-repeated events to empirically test my 
hypotheses (Allison, 1982). My event of interest, decay or “death” of the brokerage triad, 
is non-repeated in that it occurs only once over the life span of the brokerage triad. In 
case of non-repeated events, I do not need any correction for non-independence of 
observations for the same brokerage triad (D’ Agostino, Lee, Belanger, Cupples, 
Anderson, & Kannel, 1990). 
Although a continuous-time proportional hazards model could represent the 
underlying data generating process for my estimation sample, I do not have the exact 
dates of alliance termination but I do have exact years. In other words, although the 
survival time might be continuous, I observe it in (yearly) intervals. Also, for the same 
year, I have multiple terminations (Ryu, 1994). In such cases, discrete time survival 
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models are more appropriate than their continuous time counterparts (Allison, 2014). 
Under such circumstances, a complementary log-log discrete time survival model is 
identically equal to the continuous time Cox proportional hazards model (Allison, 1982). 
Also, this model is more robust to the choice of interval length whereas a logit model 
changes significantly with the selection of the interval, say triad-years versus triad-
months, making the coefficients from different interval choices incomparable (Allison, 
2010).  
The complementary log-log model is preferred to logit or probit models in the 
case of events in which either failures (deaths) or successes (continuity) are rare (Powers 
& Xie, 2000). In other words, the model is suitable when the response variable, y, has a 
skewed distribution, with a high percentage of either 1’s or 0’s in the estimation sample 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). My estimation sample has 85.57 percent decay cases (14,453 
events). Thus, my data exhibits asymmetry. In contrast to the logit or probit models, the 
complementary log-log links are asymmetric in that, for hjt (y = 1 | x) = 0.5, the change in 
hazard when a covariate x increases by a given amount is different from the change when 
the covariate decreases by the same amount (Long, 1997).  
In the complementary log-log model, ht (y = 1 | x) = F(Xit β), F(Xit β) is the 
cumulative distribution function of the extreme value distribution (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005). An extreme value distribution is the limiting (asymptotic) distribution for the 
maximum or the minimum of an extremely large number of random observations drawn 
from the same user-specified distribution. I estimate the hazard of brokerage instability 
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using the following complementary log-log regression model. log{- log(1-ht)} = αt+Xitβ, 
where ht refers to the hazard of brokerage decay at time t; αt are the survival time period 
dummies; and Xit is the set of independent variables including controls and a constant.   
Results 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and the bivariate correlation matrix for 
explanatory variables and controls. The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for the 
variables is 2.27, and none of the variables exceed the VIF limit of 10, suggesting no 
significant multicollinearity concerns (Belsey, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). In Table 5, I 
present the results of the discrete time complementary log-log survival model. Model 1 is 
my baseline model with only control variables. Next, I add my main theoretical variables 
of interest in Models 2, 3, and 4, with Model 4 being my full model. 
As predicted in H4a, I see in Model 4 of Table 5 that as the Alter-alter geographic 
distance increases by one standard deviation, the hazard of brokerage decay decreases by 
9.31 percent (b = -0.04, p = 0.00), keeping other variables constant. Likewise, consistent 
with H4b, a one standard deviation increase in the Broker-alter geographic distance 
decreases the hazard of decay by 8.85 percent (Model 4: b = -0.05, p = 0.00), thus 
providing support for H4b, holding other variables constant at their respective values. 
Consistent with H5 about the brokerage triad’s partners’ locations in different 
communities, I find that the broker and alter firms’ membership in different communities 
increases the hazard of decay by 8.42 percent (Model 4: b = 0.08, p = 0.00).  
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Robustness Checks 
My specification of the discrete-time survival model is equivalent to the Cox 
proportional hazard model. However, my results are robust to discrete-time equivalent of 
exponential, Gompertz, and Weibull models for continuous survival time data. I also ran 
a discrete-time survival regression using logistic regression and found similar results 
(results available upon request). 
I further investigate whether my hypothesized effects change over time. I adopt 
two approaches. First, I interacted my independent variables with a continuous measure 
of the age of the brokerage (results available upon request). I do not find enough evidence 
to reject the null that the effects of Alter-alter geographic distance and the Broker-alter 
geographic distance do not vary over time (b = 0.00, p = 0.31; b = 0.00, p = 0.66), 
keeping other variables constant. This suggests that knowledge transfer across 
geographies remains an issue even with the passage of time. However, the effect of 
broker and alter firms’ membership in different communities decreases by a factor of 
0.97 for each unit increase in brokerage age. In other words, membership in different 
communities reduces the hazard of decay by 2.76 percent as the brokerage age increases 
by one year (b = -0.03, p = 0.00). It could be that with time, brokerage across different 
communities stabilizes due to the generation of trust between the alter firms and the 
broker firm.  
Second, I interacted my independent variables with age dummies (results 
available upon request). In this case I do not find enough evidence to suggest that 
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brokerage across different communities stabilizes over time. Since I did not find 
consistent results across both the approaches, I did not include this interaction in my main 
model. 
I further tested the robustness of my dependent variable using three alternate 
measures of decay. As shown in Figure 6, a brokerage triad can decay or become 
unstable (or end) in three different ways. First, in dissolution, either or both of the 
existing ties might dissolve. Second, bypassing the broker, the two alter firms might sever 
ties with it and form a tie between themselves leading to the broker’s disintermediation. 
Lastly, the alter firms might connect with each other while maintaining their relationships 
with the broker, resulting in triadic closure. 
I assign a value of 0 to the dummy Dissolution if the brokerage triad appeared for 
the first time for a particular year and for other consecutive years, if the relationships 
continue. The triad dissolves if the broker firm does not partner with either of the alter 
firms or vice versa. I operationalize Dissolution as 1 for the year in which the triad 
dissipates. I follow the brokerage triad over its life span and use a dummy code of 1 for 
Disintermediation to indicate whether the two alter firms connect while dissolving their 
tie with or cutting out the broker firm. Likewise, I use a dummy variable to capture the 
brokerage triad dissipation via Closure in which two unconnected alter firms connect 
while ties with the broker firm stays intact. Closure is coded as 1 for the year in which 
the two alter firms form a tie.  
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To test my hypotheses using these three alternative decay measures, I use 
discrete-time survival method for non-repeated events of multiple kinds (Allison, 1982). 
My event has multiple kinds in that the brokerage triad can decay via dissolution, 
disintermediation or closure. My estimation sample comprises of both high-frequency 
events (Dissolution – 83.97 percent) and rare events (Disintermediation – 0.57 percent; 
Closure – 1.03 percent). Logit models underestimate the probability of rare events (King 
& Zeng, 2001). Prior research has used complementary models in the context of extreme 
events, highly-frequent or rare (Coff, 2003; Barthélemy, 2017). Similar to my main 
model, I estimate the hazard of brokerage instability using the following complementary 
log-log regression model log{- log(1-hjt)} = αt+Xitβ, where hjt refers to the three different 
hazards of brokerage triad dissolution, disintermediation and closure at time t.  
The hazards of dissolution, disintermediation and closure are competing risks 
because the decay or death of brokerage triad because of any one type of event, for 
example by disintermediation, means that the triad is no longer at risk of other types of 
events such as closure, and vice versa. Similar to the continuous time survival models for 
competing risks, it is possible to use separate analyses for each type of termination (three 
in my case), treating the other types as censored, if we assume that censoring for other 
termination types occurs at the beginning of the year in which brokerage triads end 
(Allison, 1982; Jenkins, 2005). The maximum likelihood estimator thus generated is 
consistent and asymptotically normal (Anderson, 1980). Though it might not be as fully 
efficient as a multinomial logit estimator, the estimator consistently estimates the true 
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standard errors (Allison, 1982). Also, the presence of rare events might make the 
multinomial logit estimation difficult. 
Table 6 shows the estimates of the discrete time complementary log-log survival 
model. As Model 5 indicates, a one standard deviation increase in the Alter-alter 
geographic distance decreases the hazard of brokerage triad Dissolution by 9.01 percent 
(b = -0.04, p = 0.00), keeping other variables constant. Likewise, the hazard of 
disintermediation reduces by 21.72 percent (Model 6: b = -0.09, p = 0.05) with a one 
standard deviation increase in the Alter-alter geographic distance. Similarly, as the Alter-
alter geographic distance increases by one standard deviation, the hazard of brokerage 
triad closure reduces by 22.54 percent (Model 7: b = -0.10, p = 0.01). Thus, the Alter-
alter geographic distance significantly reduces the hazard of decay in all three 
operationalizations of the decay measure, namely dissolution, disintermediation, and 
closure. Overall, these results are consistent with my principal finding. 
Next, as seen in Model 5, a one standard deviation increase in the Broker-alter 
geographic distance decreases the hazard of brokerage triad Dissolution by 8.26 percent 
(b = -0.05, p = 0.00), holding other variables constant at their respective values. 
Similarly, I find that as the Broker-alter geographic distance increases by one standard 
deviation, the hazard of disintermediation reduces by 50.55 percent (Model 6: b = -0.39, 
p = 0.00), also consistent with my main finding. However, the results from Model 7 do 
not provide enough evidence to reject the implied null hypothesis of no significant 
relationship between Broker-alter geographic distance and the risk of brokerage triad 
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closure although the (negative) sign is in the right direction (b = -0.05, p = 0.33). Thus, 
the Broker-alter geographic distance significantly decreases the hazard of decay in all 
operationalizations except for Closure which has a negative but non-significant effect, 
mostly supporting my principal results. 
Model 5 shows that the broker and alter firms’ membership in different 
communities increases the hazard of brokerage triad Dissolution by 7.83 percent (b = 
0.08, p = 0.00), providing clear support for H5. Similarly, I find that Different community 
increases the hazard of brokerage disintermediation by 60.76 percent using two-sided 
10% significance level, providing mild support for H5 (Model 6: b = 0.47, p = 0.06). The 
results from Model 7 are not significant (b = 0.21, p = 0.25), although the positive sign is 
in the hypothesized direction. Thus, the effect of location of triad members in different 
communities finds generally consistent support across the three operationalizations of the 
decay measure, with the postulated relationship supported for Dissolution, mildly 
supported for Disintermediation, and although the sign is in the right direction, not 
statistically significant for Closure. At the same time, I note that when I used the 
combined measure of decay in my main analysis, my results unambiguously support the 
hypothesis (H5), likely because the combined effects of dissolution and disintermediation 
are far stronger than those of closure. 
As a further robustness test, I fit the three main models for Dissolution, 
Disintermediation, and Closure (Models 5, 6 and 7) simultaneously using the generalized 
structural equation estimator (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004). The model 
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assumes a common latent variable affecting all three dependent variables. I get virtually 
identical results as regards the direction and significance of the postulated effects (results 
on request). 
One could argue that, in contrast to Closure, Dissolution and Disintermediation 
are similar in nature because in both the cases the broker firm is not in the picture and ties 
with respect to the broker does not exist. I re-estimate the discrete time complementary 
log-log survival model using a new dependent variable, Death, which takes a value of 1 
in the event of either Dissolution or Disintermediation. My results hold (results not 
reported for brevity). As predicted in H4a, as the Alter-alter geographic distance 
increases by one standard deviation, the hazard of brokerage Death decreases by 9.14 
percent (b = -0.04, p = 0.00), keeping other variables constant. Likewise, a one standard 
deviation increase in the Broker-alter geographic distance decreases the hazard of decay 
by 8.78 percent (b = -0.05, p = 0.00), thus providing further support for H4b, holding 
other variables constant at their respective values. In relation to the brokerage triad’s 
partners’ locations in different communities, I find that the broker and alter firms’ 
membership in different communities increases the hazard of decay by 8.16 percent (b = 
0.08, p = 0.00), consistent with H5. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter I examine the evolution of brokerage, especially its persistence or 
its decay, by delving more deeply into the embeddedness of (brokerage) triad members in 
geographic, and also network, space. As hypothesized, my results show that geographic 
 107 
 
distance, either between the alters, or between the broker and the alters, promotes the 
persistence of brokerage structures, thereby highlighting the importance of the spatial 
embeddedness of network ties. More to the point, when the network tie comprises of the 
flow of knowledge resources between alliance partners in a network, the role of distance 
matters greatly, given the sensitivity of the flows of information, particularly that of a 
tacit nature, across geographic distance.  
Interestingly, my supplementary analyses breaking down the construct of 
brokerage decay show that for alter-alter distance, structural holes are least likely to 
terminate through closure or disintermediation but comparatively more likely to terminate 
through dissolution (even though the overall effect for dissolution is also negative). The 
findings suggest that greater distance between the alters imposes greater costs of tie 
formation between them, either for a disintermediating tie or a closure tie, thereby 
skewing the pattern of brokerage evolution away from direct alter ties and toward a 
breakdown of the tie. For broker-alter distance, termination through disintermediation is 
least likely, partially mirroring the results for alter-alter distance, but suggesting that 
when the true nature of brokerage is less accessible to the alters, alter firms also find it 
harder to find common ground with each other and form a direct disintermediating tie. 
However, they are comparatively likelier to terminate their tie with the broker through 
dissolution (even though the effect is negative, or less likely overall). Future research 
might examine the contingencies which govern when and why one form of brokerage 
termination is less frequent than another. 
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My hypothesis on the impact on persistence of the presence of the triad’s 
members in the same or different network communities also found clean support. The 
results suggest that the location of the triad’s members within the same community may 
attenuate the broker’s self-seeking behavior, lowering the incentives for and the 
likelihood of brokerage decay. At the same time, when the triad’s members are located in 
different network communities, inter-community competition and greater costs of 
spanning community boundaries limit the value from brokerage, prompting brokerage 
decay. Interestingly, in light of my first set of results on the enhanced stability of 
brokerage from geographic distance, these results might seem counter-intuitive if 
network communities are viewed as synonymous with geographic clusters. However, my 
results also highlight the essential distinction between network communities and 
geographic clusters, playing up the countervailing mechanisms that operate in networks 
to maintain stability. However, the mechanisms that promote persistence are quite 
different in geographic clusters.  
Some research in economic geography hints at how and why the seemingly 
counterintuitive results might have come about. Ter Wal and Boschma (2009) suggest 
that the assumptions of the geographic cluster literature may not map onto networks 
because just by virtue of being in the same geographic cluster, firms are not necessary 
connected to one another, and therefore not in the same network community. Thus, when 
in the same geographic cluster, firms are only connected to one another through unevenly 
distributed networks. My results regarding the stability of brokerage in network 
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communities also supports recent work that brokers may not only be ‘playing nice’ when 
they are present in the same network community as their alters but through externalities 
may also be sharing the fruits of brokerage more broadly.  
In my supplementary analyses splitting apart the decay construct into three 
component parts for the network community effects on stability I found, as expected, 
statistically significant results for dissolution, suggesting that brokerage termination was 
more likely when the triad’s partners were located in different communities. The results 
regarding the greater likelihood of disintermediation when partners are located in 
different communities are weakly supported, suggesting that brokerage or triadic decay 
through alters connecting directly is hampered by the excessive costs of traversing 
community boundaries. 
My study is not without limitations. I assume that the technological knowledge 
attributes do not change over time, or at least change only proportionately, and hence, the 
effect of geographic proximity on knowledge transfer is always along the same direction. 
To the extent that knowledge characteristics evolve differently over time and the effect of 
geographic distance is contingent on how these properties evolve, my conclusions could 
be weakened. In addition, it could be that my geographic distance construct is a crude 
measure of the underlying differences in time zones, differences in language and 
differences in countries. In this regard, future work could explore the black box of 
geographic distance. Nevertheless, to the extent that # of same country dyads controls for 
such differences, my hypothesized effects can be attributed to geographic distance. 
110 
 
 
 
 111 
 
  
 112 
 
  
 113 
 
FIGURE 4 
Open Triad 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
Stable Triad 
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FIGURE 6 
Different Types of Decay Events 
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CHAPTER 4 
Conclusion 
This dissertation focuses on first the consequences and second the antecedents of 
network stability. I find that ego-network stability negatively affects the focal firm’s 
innovation performance because knowledge is more difficult to retrieve over time, 
because the focal firm faces relational lock-in, and because knowledge becomes 
redundant in stable networks, thus reducing the overall knowledge heterogeneity in the 
firm’s network resources. Spanning structural holes mitigates this negative effect because 
holes allow the focal firm to access diversity and timely knowledge. In contrast, the focal 
firm’s geographic concentration of inventive activities increases the negative effect of 
stability because of the lack of diversity in knowledge environments. 
My work speaks to the extensive debate on the innovation value of network-
structure configurations. Though most studies acknowledge that innovation benefits 
accrue from open network configurations, i.e., structural holes, both at the inter-firm level 
(e.g., Zaheer & Bell, 2005) and at the level of individuals (e.g., Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 
2010), some studies have shown the contrary (e.g., Ahuja, 2000). In view of conflicting 
results, research has shifted focus to either conditioning variables (e.g., Tan, Zhang, & 
Wang, 2015) or hybrid positions that emphasize both structural holes and closure 
occurring together (e.g., Baum, van Liere, & Rowley, 2007) to better understand the 
relationship between structure and innovation performance. Yet, studies analyzing the 
structural determinants of innovation performance have focused mostly on the outcomes 
of variations in the configuration of network structures. In that case, not taking ego-
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network stability into consideration might render empirical models that study the 
relationship between network structure and performance underspecified because stability 
may be acting as an unobserved variable.  
The possibility that stable network structures can get stale and ossified raises an 
important question about its implications for network renewal and performance. As firms 
evolve their networks, what structures should be retained and what types need to be 
reconstituted in order to maintain the highest levels of ego-network performance? 
Further, the creation and deletion of network ties, particularly at the interfirm level, are 
hardly costless. In this regard, there clearly exists a trade-off between the cost of network 
change and its declining innovation value over time. Put another way, at the limit firms, 
in order to keep innovation high, may be spending too much in the process of changing 
network partners. At the same time, given that firms are known to get locked in with 
unproductive partners over time, and alliances may persist beyond their useful life 
(Inkpen & Ross, 2001), the challenge of dynamically maintaining an optimally 
innovative network presents both an empirical and a substantive opportunity. In sum, 
future research examining the dynamics of superior network performance would be 
worthwhile. 
Another interesting area for future research would be to examine how ego-
network stability, or the stability of a basic network building block, affects the stability of 
global network structures and properties such as small-worldliness, overall connectivity, 
and centrality. In other words, examining the link between local and global network 
stability may produce important insights if the effects are super-additive or substitutive. 
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In this regard, Palla, Barabási and Vicsek’s (2007) work on the stability of network 
communities provides a useful exemplar, suggesting that the relationship between local 
and global stability varies with network size.  
In this essay, controlling for knowledge-based and equity-based alliances, I 
assume that relevant knowledge for innovation might come from any type of alliance. 
Future studies could further refine our understanding of stability by classifying the 
network of  relationships based on different activities in the alliance value chain such as 
upstream (e.g., research) relationships and downstream (commercialization) relationships 
(Stuart, Ozdemir, & Ding, 2007). Research could investigate, for example, if the 
innovation effects of stability are the same for these classifications or would a mix of 
“unstable” upstream and “stable” downstream ego-network relationships provide the best 
recipe for innovation?  
In the follow-up essay of my dissertation, I study the origins of stability by 
examining the evolution of brokerage, especially its persistence or its decay, by delving 
more deeply into the embeddedness of (brokerage) triad members in geographic, and also 
network, space. My study elucidates how spatial and community embeddedness at the 
macro level influences firms’ behavior at the micro nodal level, affecting the persistence 
of brokerage structures. In addition, my focus on the triad for theoretical exposition 
underscores the role of collective agency in the context of network longevity and 
reorganization. Embeddedness, both geographic and social, may heterogeneously affect 
the individual agency of different members in the triad members as regards the 
continuity, or lack thereof, of brokerage. The net effect of these individual agencies and 
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their interactions determines the life expectancy of existing brokerage structures. Given 
that brokerage structures have been shown to exert such significant effects in alliance 
networks, my study becomes salient from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.  
I extend recent work on network dynamics by studying the end of brokerage. 
Though we know much about network formation (e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Zaheer 
& Soda, 2009), little is known about the mechanisms underlying the persistence, and 
subsequent termination of, network structures. My emphasis on network structure 
termination derives from my belief that, though termination and genesis may seem 
different as they pertain to different stages in the life cycle of a network structure, both 
could actually be two sides of the same coin. Specifically, knowledge of both yields a 
rich picture of network reorganization and change. For example, brokerage decay through 
disintermediation or closure that results in the ending of a brokerage structure also marks 
the genesis of a new tie between network members, implying thereby the need for a more 
holistic study of network reorganization and evolution. Similarly, if we take a Penrosian 
view of network relationships as evolving in response to endogenous resource creation by 
firms in alliances, then structural hole dissolution might result in a new tie formation with 
firms outside of the existing brokerage triad, catalyzing network change. Thus, my 
research on brokerage termination is relevant for a more complete understanding of the 
genesis, and evolution, of networks. 
My theorizing about stability also adds critical nuance to the research on strategic 
alliances. This study suggests that the fundamental unit to understand alliance learning 
and management may be the ego network or triad and not the dyad, providing support for 
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recent work that views alliances as a portfolio (Lavie, 2007; Vasudeva & Anand, 2011). 
Learning under such circumstances is not merely a function of dyadic alliance experience 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005) but entails managing possibly conflicting relationship 
within the wider alliance portfolio. In addition, alliance research could take into 
consideration the stability of the portfolio of relationships (Bakker & Knoben, 2015) to 
understand how the focal firm may enhance its knowledge rents. Alliance governance 
likely has to be related to network governance, especially when it comes to the selection, 
monitoring and termination of structures over time.  
My research also highlights the limitations of dyadic analyses in capturing the 
complexities of relational stability. Much of the scholarly work investigating stability and 
dissolution at the network level has looked into the benefits of having common third 
party ties or structural embeddedness (e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). The presence of a 
common third party aids in maintaining order in the network relationship via social 
sanctions. However, extant work provides little theoretical insight into the situation when 
the common third party is a broker firm that is willing to withhold information and take 
sides for individual profit maximization. Opportunities and constraints available to the 
broker and alter firms jointly influence network reorganization and change and might not 
always be additive. In sum, in addition to existing theorizing about the “shadow of the 
future” (Axelrod, 1984) and the “shadow of others” (Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011) 
emphasizing structural embeddedness in the persistence of network structures, I highlight 
the distinct influence of the “shadow of the broker.” 
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My research may also inform practitioners in industry. Managers seeking 
innovation using interfirm alliances need to pay attention to both alliance network 
configuration and network stability. In situations which necessitate open-ended alliance 
relationships, or in uncertain situations in which firms cannot foresee alliance 
terminations in the near future, managers might improve their firms’ innovation 
performance by spanning more structural holes. In sum, rewiring and refreshing the 
network configuration is the recommended course of action. However, when network 
stability looms large due to alliance persistence compulsions or other reasons, geographic 
dispersion and open structures limit its ill effects. In addition, managers are better off 
when they also pay attention to the geographic distance between alliance partners. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the empirical context for my dissertation is the biopharmaceutical 
industry, I believe that my results are likely to hold in other industries with similar 
features such as the salience of innovation. Where the importance of innovation is less 
critical, or where alliances are used for purposes other than innovation, network stability 
may not produce negative effects on innovation. A further potential arena for 
generalizability may be to assess whether and when ego-network stability affects 
innovation at the level of individual scientists. In addition, a promising avenue for future 
studies is to examine the antecedents of overall ego-network stability, given its 
implications for performance (e.g., Sasovova et al., 2010). Overall, this study provides 
rich prospects for future research. 
As regards network dynamics, questions to investigate with future work are: Are 
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alter firms empirically at a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the broker firm in terms of 
returns, or even innovation? Does that disadvantage attenuate post decay? What are the 
contingencies in which one manifestation of decay gains prominence over the other? For 
example, under what conditions will a disintermediation strategy trump a closure strategy 
in terms of knowledge gains for the alter firms? Another area worthy of future 
scholarship is a mixed-level study with both a dyadic and a network focus and investigate 
if results differ at different levels of analysis.  
Extant studies either ignore stability or assume a homogeneous distribution of 
stability among structural holes, typically that structural holes are transient and quick to 
decay (Burt, 1992: Stovel et al., 2011). I study differences in structural hole stability as a 
useful point of departure to theoretically enrich the discussion about the stability 
dimension of social capital and its consequences. One future avenue of research in this 
domain would be to dig deeper into the broker firm’s motivation and its effect on 
stability.  
Burt’s theory of structural holes treats broker motivation and brokerage 
opportunity generated from the structural hole “as one and the same” and views the 
motivation question as a “nonissue” (Burt, 1992: 35). In contrast, one could argue that 
broker motivation is relevant because the firm has to decide whether to exploit the 
information and control benefits provided by the structural hole or forego some of these 
benefits in favor of pursuing more reciprocally-beneficial relationships with alter firms, 
which might lower the incentives for alter firms to close the hole, but possibly be 
perceived as benefiting the broker firm in the long run.  
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Framed in Burt’s terms, the focal firm can adopt one of two logics of action while 
spanning a structural hole: in contrast to Burt’s tertius gaudens logic, or “the third who 
enjoys,” there could be an alternative brokerage logic: tertius coordinans or “the third 
who coordinates.” In other words, how the focal firm acts as a broker might have 
implications for brokerage stability. 
The tertius coordinans rationale. While others, such as Obstfeld (2005), have 
also suggested alternatives to tertius gaudens, such as tertius iungens, it is important to 
recognize that in a tertius iungens setting the broker essentially brings together the two 
disconnected alters. My suggestion (for future work) of tertius coordinans differs from 
both tertius iungens and tertius gaudens in that unlike iungens the broker keeps the two 
alters apart, but unlike gaudens the broker coordinates between the alters rather than 
exploiting or controlling them. Thus, the tertius coordinans logic represents an “honest” 
broker that stays “passive” despite the two alter firms not connecting directly with each 
other. Burt (1992: 34) actually makes a reference to this kind of broker as the “passive 
player” who is interested in information but not control benefits, simply coordinating 
information or knowledge flow across alters (also see Spiro, Acton, & Butts, 2013). Put 
another way, the active, controlling broker, even in Burt’s original theorizing, is but one 
manifestation of brokerage, although prominent in the current literature. The broker, on 
its part, might benefit through coordination by acting as a channel for knowledge 
exchange, and by recombining the knowledge acquired from the two alters. Over time, a 
high level of trust builds among the broker and alter firms, which reduces negotiation and 
knowledge transfer costs. Agreements are reached more easily and parties can more 
 123 
 
readily have a “meeting of the minds.” Moreover, trust decreases the propensity to defend 
against opportunistic behavior thereby promoting a more stable, long-term view on the 
part of all the members of the brokerage triad (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995). 
More specifically, such a longer-term brokerage orientation implies that some 
brokers may believe that their self-interest is better served by a more reciprocal and 
equitable knowledge sharing and coordination approach. This logic is akin to the work of 
economist Ernst Fehr and his colleagues, from which I quote below:  
A long-standing tradition in economics views human beings as exclusively self-
interested. In most economic accounts of individual behavior and aggregate social 
phenomena, the “vast forces of greed” (Arrow, 1980) are put at the center of the 
explanation. In economic models human actors are typically portrayed as “self-
interest seeking with guile (which) includes . . . more blatant forms, such as lying, 
stealing, and cheating ... (but) more often involves subtle forms of deceit” 
(Williamson, 1985: 47). However, as we will document below, many people 
deviate from purely self- interested behavior in a reciprocal manner. Reciprocity 
means that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and 
much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model…There is 
considerable evidence that a substantial fraction of people behave according to 
this dictum (Fehr & Gachter, 2000: 159). 
 
Such reciprocity characterizes the “honest broker” and the subsequent trust that 
develops between the broker and the alters enables the structural hole to be stable and 
persist over time. In this respect, I am not assuming that the broker is “selfless” – rather I 
am assuming that the range of broker behaviors might extend beyond the consistent self-
interested exploitation of the brokerage position. Furthermore, I am not implying that all 
brokers behave in a reciprocal fashion; just that because some significant proportion 
does, we are likely to see variation in the stability of the brokerage triad.  
On the other hand, in the case of tertius gaudens, power asymmetries in the triad 
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make conflict or competition for the brokerage position imminent. In such situations, 
alter firms may attempt to replicate the structural advantages of the broker, severely 
straining the stability of structural holes (Buskens & van de Rijt, 2008) and making the 
brokerage structure transient. Also, the broker firm, while engendering competition 
among alters, might make the two alter firms aware of their combined bargaining power 
against it, eliminating the rents from brokerage. In sum, the coordinative nature of 
brokerage in tertius coordinans might increase the stability of the hole in contrast to the 
exploitative orientation in tertius gaudens (Simmel, 1950). Thus, because brokerage 
motivations might differ from one brokerage triad to the other, future research might look 
into how variations in the motivation of brokers affect stability. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Exemplars for Each Step in the Flowchart 
STEP 1: DOES THE ALLIANCE EXIST IN REALITY? THREE EXEMPLARS 
(CASES) OF ALLIANCES THAT I DROPPED (1.88%) 
Case 1: Advanced Magnetics, Inc., and Matritech, Inc. [01Aug1991] 
“Advanced Magnetics signed an agreement with Matritech to distribute jointly developed 
cell death detection products.” - SDC 
My conclusion: The alliance might not exist. I could not find any news or description 
pertaining to this alliance. The 10-K and 10-Q reports of Matritech, Inc., are available at 
http://www.getfilings.com/comp/k0000884847.html from 1996 to 2005. None of these 
documents discuss the alliance of 1991 or mention Advanced Magnetics, Inc., in a new 
alliance. Likewise, I know that Advanced Magnetics, Inc. (NASDAQ: AMAG) changed 
its name to AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in 2007 (https://www.amagpharma.com/ ) but 
again no information about the alliance exist.  
Case 2: Green Cross, Corp., and Oxford Virology, Ltd., (Oxford Virology, P.L.C.) 
[01Jun1990] 
“Green Cross Corp signed an agreement with Oxford Virology Ltd to market their 
vaccine Hepavax.” - SDC 
My conclusion: The alliance might not exist. I could not find any news or description 
pertaining to this alliance. Furthermore, Oxford Virology, P.L.C., which was 
incorporated on 20 April 1989 is dissolved with latest accounts filed only till 30 Sep 
1990. Next filing of accounts was due on 30 Jun 1992 but was not filed according to 
https://companycheck.co.uk/company/02374305/OXFORD-VIROLOGY-
PLC/companies-house-data. Given that the alliance was announced on 01 Jun 1990 but 
no news exist, and Oxford was dissolved with a year or so with last account filing till 30 
Sep 1990, I cannot conclude that the alliance exist in reality. 
Case 3: HBT Holland Biotechnology, B.V., and Diagnostica Stago, S.A.S. 
[01Jan1991] 
“HBT Holland biotechnology B.V. signed an agreement with Diagnostica Stago for 
Diagnostica to distribute Hbt’s IFN-related products in the German market.” - SDC 
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My conclusion: The alliance might not exist. I could not find any news or description 
pertaining to this alliance. HBT Holland Biotechnology, B.V., is located in Leiden in the 
Netherlands and Diagnostica Stago in Cedex, France. Even local searches such as those 
using google.fr and google.nl yielded no results. 
STEP 2: IS THE ALLIANCE TERMINATION DATE GIVEN? CHECK FOR 
ANY EXTENSION OR NEW ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTNERS 
AND USE THE FINAL ALLIANCE ENDING DATE AS THE TERMINATION 
DATE. THREE EXEMPLARS (CASES) (TERMINATION DATES FOUND IN 
9.81% OF THE CASES) 
Case 1: Axcan Pharma, Inc., and Grupo Ferrer Internacional, S.A. [20 Jul 2000] 
“Axcan Pharma (AP) and Grupo Ferrer International (GF) planned to form a strategic 
alliance wherein AP sublicensed to GF the rights to distribute PHOTOFRIN in Spain, 
Portugal, Greece as well as in all Central and South America countries (original length = 
5 years)” (emphasis mine). - SDC  
https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Axcan+and+Grupo+Ferrer+to+form+Strategic+Alliance
+for+the...-a063583153 
“Axcan and Grupo Ferrer to form Strategic Alliance for the Distribution of Photofrin in 
Europe, Central and South America. 
MONT SAINT-HILAIRE, Quebec, July 20 /CNW-PRN/ -  
…Under the terms of the proposed agreement expected to be executed in October 2000, 
Grupo Ferrer will assume responsibility for completing the registration of 
PHOTOFRIN(R) in all countries that are part of its exclusive territory. Axcan will also 
benefit from a right of first refusal granted for a five-year period with respect to the 
distribution of a gastro-intestinal product developed or acquired by Grupo Ferrer in 
Canada and the United States. Other terms were not disclosed...” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: I reconfirm that the alliance existed in reality and its original length was 
five years.  
http://www.secinfo.com/dVut2.25Hk.d.htm 
“Axcan Pharma Inc – ‘40-F/A’ for 9/30/02 – EX-1 
In January 2002, Axcan entered into a sublicense agreement for a 10-year period with 
Grupo Ferrer International, S.A. (“Grupo Ferrer”), a Spanish company based in 
Barcelona, for the distribution of PHOTOFRIN in Spain, Portugal and Greece” (emphasis 
mine).  
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My conclusion: I further checked for any extension or new alliance and find that the 
relationship between Axcan and Grupo Ferrer was further extended from a five-year 
duration to a ten-year duration in 2002. Thus, the alliance existed at least till 2005, my 
last period of observation. I further validated that these parties did not terminate this 
alliance till 2005 because no such news exist. 
Case 2: Discovery Partners International, Inc., and Pfizer, Inc. [20 Dec 2001] 
“Discovery Partners International Inc(DO) and Pfizer Inc(PI) planned to form a strategic 
alliance to manufacture and develop libraries of high purity chemical compounds to be 
used in PI’s drug discovery programs in the United States. The estimated potential value 
of this 4-year collaboration was to reach $95 mil US. Financial terms were not disclosed 
(original length = 4 years).” - SDC  
http://www.thepharmaletter.com/article/discovery-partners-int-expands-pfizer-deal 
“Discovery Partners Int expands Pfizer deal 
01-03-2004 
Discovery Partners International has signed a multi-year strategic chemistry agreement 
with drug major Pfizer, expanding the scope of their current collaboration which was 
initiated in December 2001…, the company expects at least $43-$46 million from Pfizer 
over the next two years” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: I reconfirm that the alliance existed in reality in 2001 and existed at least 
till 2006 because the news is from 2004 and Discovery Partners expects payment from 
Pfizer over the next two years.  
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/discovery-partners-international-announces-
termination-of-new-collaboration-discussions-with-pfizer-inc-and-consolidation-of-
chemistry-operations-55733102.html 
“Discovery Partners International Announces Termination of New Collaboration 
Discussions With Pfizer Inc and Consolidation of Chemistry Operations 
Nov 29, 2005, 00:00 ET from Discovery Partners International, Inc. 
 SAN DIEGO, Nov. 29 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Discovery Partners International, Inc. 
(Nasdaq:   DPII) announced today that the Company and Pfizer Inc have terminated 
discussions regarding a potential new collaboration to replace the Company’s existing 
agreement with Pfizer that expires on January 5, 2006” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: I further verified and found that the relationship was terminated on 
January 5, 2006. 
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Case 3: Corixa, Corp., and GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, S.A. [26 Jul 2004] 
“Corixa Corp (CC) and GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals (GB), a unit of GlaxoSmithKline 
PLC, formed an 8-year strategic alliance to manufacture as well as wholesale and supply 
adjuvant, monophosphoryl lipid A or MPL(R).;CC’s MPL adjuvant, a component in 
GB’s novel, proprietary adjuvant systems used in the development of future vaccines 
currently undergoing clinical trials or awaiting regulatory approval. Under terms of the 
agreement, CC agreed to expand cGMP compliant MPL production capacity in 
association with anticipated approvals of GB vaccines that contain MPL adjuvant 
(original length = 8 years).” - SDC  
www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Preclinical-Research/GSK-acquires-Corixa-for-233m 
“GSK acquires Corixa for €233m 
May 2, 2005 
GlaxoSmithKline has announced plans to acquire the Corixa Corporation...” 
My conclusion: Even though SDC shows that the alliance duration is eight years or till 
2012, I find that the alliance ended in 2005 because GlaxoSmithKline acquired Corixa on 
12 July 2005. 
STEP 3: CAN WE SEARCH THE TERMINATION DATE USING PARTNER 
NAMES WITH THE WORD “TERMINATE,” “END” ETC., WITH/WITHOUT 
DRUGS OR DISEASE NAMES? FURTHER CHECK FOR ANY EXTENSION OR 
NEW ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTNERS AND USE THE FINAL 
ALLIANCE ENDING DATE AS THE TERMINATION DATE. SEVEN 
EXEMPLARS (CASES) (TERMINATION DATES FOUND FOR 69.17% OF THE 
CASES)  
Case 1: Incara Pharmaceuticals, Corp., and Elan Corp, P.L.C. [28 Dec 2000] 
“Incara Pharmaceuticals Corp (IP) and Elan Corp PLC(EC) completed their joint venture. 
In December 2000, IP and EC announced plans to form a joint venture named Incara 
Development Ltd to develop Herparin products using EC’s medipad delivery system for 
treatment of inflammatory bowel disease. ID was to be owned 80% by IP, with EC 
owning the remaining 20% with an option to own 50% within the next six years. As part 
of the agreement, EC was to make a $4 mil US investment in IC.” - SDC 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1261734/000119312504138007/d424b3.htm 
“Aeolus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(f/k/a Incara Pharmaceuticals Corporation) 
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Prospectus Supplement No. 5 dated August 11, 2004 
(To Prospectus dated May 27, 2004) 
In January 2001,…, Elan and the Company formed a Bermuda corporation, Incara 
Development, Ltd., to develop deligoparin,...In September 2002, Incara Development 
ended its Phase 2/3 clinical trial and the development of deligoparin due to an analysis of 
the clinical trial results, which showed that treatment with deligoparin did not meet the 
primary or secondary endpoints of the study. The results of the trial did not justify further 
development of deligoparin for treatment of ulcerative colitis and the development of 
deligoparin was terminated. Elan and the Company ended their collaboration in the joint 
venture in November 2003 and the Company became the sole owner of Incara 
Development” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Even though the two partners formed a joint venture, which are supposed 
to be relatively stable, I find this partnership lasted only three years till November 2003. 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1261734/000095016204000670/0000950162-
04-000670.txt 
“CONFORMED SUBMISSION TYPE: SC 13D/A 
FILED AS OF DATE: 20040527 
COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: INCARA PHARMACEUTICALS CORP 
FILED BY: 
COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: ELAN INTERNATIONAL SERVICES LTD 
13. Termination Agreement, made the 19th day of November, 2003 (filed herewith)” 
(emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Incara and Elan terminated their partnership on 19 Nov 2003. I further 
find no new relationships were formed between the two parties. 
http://adisinsight.springer.com/drugs/800006120 
“Most Recent Events 
OP2000 
17 Sep 2002 Discontinued - Phase-III for Ulcerative colitis in USA (SC) 
29 Aug 2002 Incara has completed patient enrolment in its phase II/III trial of deligoparin 
for the treatment of ulcerative colitis 
20 Mar 2002 A study has been added to the Inflammatory Bowel Disorders therapeutic 
trials section” 
 
My conclusion: I don’t need this information because I already determined the 
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termination date. Note that Incara’s drug was discontinued on 17 Sep 2002 and the 
alliance terminated by next year. Thus, drug discontinuity date is a close proxy for 
determining alliance duration, though not a focus of this section. 
Case 2: Eisai, Inc., and Pfizer, Inc. [25 Jul 2002] 
“Eisai Inc, a unit of Eisai Co Ltd, and Pfizer Inc formed a strategic alliance to 
manufacture and market Cerebyx, used for the treatment of epilepsy. Financial terms 
were not disclosed” (emphasis mine). - SDC 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/eisai-inc-assumes-us-distribution-
responsibilities-for-aciphexr-58749807.html 
“Jan 07, 2004, 00:00 ET from Eisai Inc. 
…Last year, Eisai acquired exclusive U.S. rights to promote Pfizer’s Cerebyx(R) 
(fosphenytoin sodium injection)” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Eisai and Pfizer were partners at least till 2003. 
http://www.eisai.com/pdf/eir/emat/4523_070515e.pdf 
“FY2006 
Financial Results 
Presentation 
May 15, 2007 
Eisai Co., Ltd. 
Expanded product portfolio: 
…5. Cerebyx 
® (Status epilepticus control agent)” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Eisai and Pfizer were partners at least till 2005, my last year of 
observation because Esai still has Cerebyx in its portfolio in 2006. 
Case 3: Sonus Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Sicor, Inc. [01Jul 2002] 
“Sonus Pharmaceuticals Inc (SP) and Gensia Sicor Pharmaceuticals Inc formed a 
strategic alliance to manufacture and supply SP’s TOCOSOL(TM) Paclitaxel to support 
advanced clinical development of cancer therapy product in the United States” (emphasis 
mine). - SDC 
http://ir.oncogenex.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=265742 
“July 1, 2002 
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Sonus Pharmaceuticals Announces TOCOSOL Paclitaxel Manufacturing and Supply 
Agreement with Gensia Sicor Pharmaceuticals” (emphasis mine). 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/949858/000089256903002113/a92469b3e424b
3.htm 
“SONUS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. 
PROSPECTUS 
August 28, 2003 
SICOR Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is our primary manufacturer of TOCOSOL Paclitaxel for 
clinical studies and has also agreed to manufacture TOCOSOL Paclitaxel for 
commercialization” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Sonus and Sicor were partners at least till 2003. 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/SNUS/0x0xS1104659-07-
19876/949858/filing.pdf 
“FORM 10-K 
SONUS PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
(Annual Report) 
Filed 3/16/2007 For Period Ending 12/31/2006 
In mid-2002, we entered into a manufacturing and supply agreement with Sicor 
Pharmaceutical Sales, Inc. (Sicor is now known as TEVA Pharmaceuticals USA). During 
2003, in collaboration with TEVA Pharmaceuticals USA, we completed scale-up of … 
“ MSA ” means the Manufacturing and Supply Agreement between Sonus and Gensia 
Sicor Pharmaceutical Sales, Inc. (now known as Sicor Pharmaceuticals, Inc.), effective as 
of June 26, 2002. 
“ Quality Agreement ” means the Quality Agreement for the Manufacturing and Supply 
of Tocosol® Paclitaxel Injectable Emulsion between Sonus and Sicor Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., effective as of February 1, 2005. A complete copy of the Quality Agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A” (emphasis mine).  
My conclusion: Sonus and Sicor were partners at least till 2005. Note that Sicor was 
acquired by Teva in 2004 (from my research on acquisitions). Hence, from 2002 to 2004 
Sonus and Sicor were partners, and from 2004 to 2005 Sonus and Teva were partners. 
Case 4: Human Genome Sciences, Inc., and Genentech, Inc. [20 Apr 1994] 
“Human Genome Sciences Inc entered into a strategic alliance with Genentech Inc, a unit 
of Roche Holding, in which Human Genome Sciences granted Genentech an exclusive 
license to its Heart/Lung Selective DNase gene and recombinant DNA products derived 
 155 
 
from the gene. Genentech intended to use the gene in the development of a treatment for 
cystic fibrosis. Financial terms were not disclosed.” - SDC 
“HD  Human Genome Sciences and Genentech to collaborate 
WC  271 words 
PD  20 April 1994 
SN  Business Wire 
SC  BWR 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright (c) 1994, Business Wire) 
LP  
ROCKVILLE, Md.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--April 20, 1994--Human Genome Sciences Inc. 
(HGS) (NASDAQ:HGSI) announced Wednesday that it has granted Genentech Inc. 
(NYSE:GNE) an exclusive option to license its recently discovered human Heart/Lung 
Selective DNase (HL-DNase) gene and recombinant DNA products derived from the 
gene” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
“HD  Genentech Terminates HL-DNase Pact With Human Genome Sciences 
WC  83 words 
PD  3 March 1995 
ET  04:09 PM GMT 
SN  Dow Jones News Service 
SC  DJ 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.) 
LP  
ROCKVILLE, Md. -DJ- Human Genome Sciences Inc. (HGSI) said Genentech Inc. 
(GNE) terminated its previously announced option and evaluation agreement with 
Human Genome for heart-lung selective human HL-DNase. 
TD  
Genentech found the protein difficult to express in the systems used, Human Genome 
said. 
(END) DOW JONES NEWS 03-03-95” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: Human Genome and Genentech terminated the relationship on 3 March 
1995. 
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Case 5: Ciba-Geigy, A.G., and CoCensys, Inc. [17 May1994] 
“Ciby-Geigy AG and CoCensys Inc have agreed to jointly develop in the US a 
therapeutic for the treatment of strokes and head trauma. The jointly developed drug was 
known as Acea 1021. Under the terms of the agreement, Ciba agreed to make an initial 
investment in CoCensys, with additional payments to be made in the future. In return, 
Ciba received the right to develop and market Acea 1021 outside the US. Ciba was also 
slated to take an equity stake in CoCensys. CoCensys also entered into a marketing 
agreement with Ciba-Geigy Corp, Ciba’s unit in Summit, New Jersey, at the same time as 
this agreement” (emphasis mine). - SDC 
http://www.biocentury.com/biotech-pharma-news/strategy/1997-05-05/noteworthy-how-
cocensys-plans-life-after-novartis-a4 
“How CoCensys plans life after Novartis 
By Ilan Zipkin 
Staff Writer 
Published on Monday, May 5, 1997 
Finding opportunity in adversity is critical to running a sustainable company. CoCensys 
Inc. (COCN, Irvine, Calif.) is trying to do just that after partner Novartis Pharma AG 
(Basel, Switzerland) said it would drop development of COCN’s ACEA 1021 NMDA-
receptor antagonist for stroke and head injury. …The compound was originally licensed 
to Ciba-Geigy (now part of Novartis) in 1994 from Acea Pharmaceuticals Inc., at the 
same time that COCN acquired Acea and the rights to 1021 (see BioCentury May 23, 
1994)” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: CoCensys and Ciba-Geigy partnership lasted till 1995. In 1996 Ciba-
Geigy and Sandoz formed Novartis (my research on acquisitions).Cocensys and Novartis 
alliance continued from 1996 to 1997. Note Novartis terminated the alliance after the 
merger. 
Case 6 Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., and Warner-Lambert Co. [10 
May2000] 
“Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (YP) and Warner-Lambert Co (WL) formed a 
strategic alliance to manufacture and wholesale Lipitor tablets, a lipid-loweing agent, in 
Japan. Lipitor was developed by WL and was co-promoted by YP in Japan” (emphasis 
mine). – SDC 
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https://www.marketwatch.com/story/astellas-japan-license-for-lipitor-to-run-to-2021-
2012-03-28 
“Astellas: Japan license for Lipitor to run to 2021 
Published: Mar 28, 2012 10:35 p.m. ET 
TOKYO (MarketWatch) -- Astellas Pharma Inc. (4503.TO) said Thursday it has reached 
an agreement to extend its contract to sell Pfizer Inc.’s PFE, +1.43% cholesterol drug 
Lipitor in Japan until March 2021 from 2016. 
The drug maker said in a statement it will initially pay Pfizer a sum of Y1 billion. The 
two firms also agreed to extend their co-promotion agreement until November 2013” 
(emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Note that Pfizer acquired Warner-Lambert Co., in 2000 (my research on 
acquisitions). The correct ultimate parent of Warner-Lambert is Pfizer, and I corrected 
it.Yamanouchi and Pfizer had an alliance from 2002 to 2004. Yamanouchi and Fujisawa 
merged to form Astella in 2005 (my research on acquisitions). Astella and Pfizer had an 
alliance in 2005. Unlike case 5, alliance continued after the merger. 
Case 7: Vical, Inc., and Merck & Co, Inc. [04 May1994] 
“Merck & Co and Vical Inc entered into an agreement which stated that Vical Inc granted 
Merck & Co an exclusive license for the use of Vical Inc’s gene technology used in the 
treatment of tuberculosis. Under the terms of the agreement, Merck also exercised its 
options to license Vical’s technology to integrate two vaccine targets, hepatitis C and 
human papiloma viruses. The agreement stated that Merck extended its exclusive option 
for Vical’s technology to integrate with viral vaccine targets, hepatitis B and herpes 
simplex. Merck & Co was required to exercise its remaining options with Vical by mid-
1995 for hepatitis B and herpes and by mid-1996 for Vical’s tuberculosis {TB} vaccine. 
On May 1, 1995, Merck exercised its remaining three options to Vical’s naked DNA 
vaccine technology. The agreement stated that Merck & Co paid a total of $3.0 mil US 
for licensing fees and option rights. The agreement also stated that Vical Inc would 
receive milestone payments and royalties licensed vaccine-related products developed by 
Merck & Co” (emphasis mine). - SDC 
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Vical_(VICL)/Merck 
“These excerpts taken from the VICL 10-K filed Mar 3, 2009. 
Merck 
In 2003, the Company amended the agreement, providing Merck options for rights to use 
the Company’s core DNA delivery technology for three cancer targets. In addition, 
Merck returned rights to the Company for Certain infectious disease vaccines. Merck has 
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retained rights to use the licensed technology for HIV, hepatitis C virus, and hepatitis B 
virus. In June 2005, Merck exercised options related to three cancer targets that were 
granted under the 2003 amendment” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Vical and Merck partnership lasted at least till 2005, the last year of my 
observation. 
 
STEP 4: WAS THE DRUG OR CLINICAL TRIAL DISCONTINUED? FURTHER 
CHECK FOR ANY EXTENSION OR NEW ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TWO 
PARTNERS. IN CASE OF A NEGATIVE, USE THE DISCONTINUITY DATE AS 
THE TERMINATION DATE; ELSE USE THE FINAL ALLIANCE ENDING 
DATE. FIVE EXEMPLARS (CASES) (TERMINATION DATES WERE FOUND 
FOR 2.37% OF THE CASES) 
Case 1: American Home Products, Corp., and Eisai & Co., Ltd. [01 Oct 1991] 
“American Home Products Corp and Eisai Co., Ltd formed a joint marketing venture 
with American Home Products owning 50.1% and Eisai owning the rest. The new 
company, Wyeth-Eisai Co. Ltd., was to develop pharmaceutical and nutritional products 
made by American Home Products. American Home Products would provide the venture 
with marketing and clinical development personnel, while Eisai was to handle 
management. Both companies were to contribute $7.4 million to the new company. The 
new company expected first year sales to reach $74.1 million.” - SDC 
“HD  Eisai, American Home to establish joint firm 
WC  103 words 
PD  11 September 1991 
SN  Agence France-Presse 
SC  AFPR 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright 1991)” - Factiva 
http://www.eisai.com/news/news199601.html 
“March 1, 1996 
AHP and Eisai End their Joint Venture Partnership 
…AHP will purchase Eisai’s shares Wyeth-Eisai (49.99%) … today (March 1, 1996).  
… Although the joint venture partnership is ending, AHP and Eisai will maintain an 
amicable relationship” (emphasis mine). 
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My conclusion: AHP and Esai ended their JV in 1996. I further validate whether new 
alliances were formed between the two. 
http://www.eisai.com/news/news199705.html 
“March 5, 1997 - Eisai Co., Ltd. of Tokyo (President and CEO: Haruo Naito) today 
announced that Wyeth-Ayerst, a subsidiary of American Home Products Corporation, 
filed a new drug application with the Mexican Ministry of Health on January 17, 1997 for 
Eisai’s new Alzheimer’s disease treatment, donepezil hydrochloride or E2020 under the 
trademark of ERANZ(TM) in Mexico. 
In February 1995, Eisai Co., Ltd. concluded a license agreement with American Home 
Products Corporation for E2020, an Alzheimer’s disease treatment in Latin America. 
Applications for registration in other major Latin American countries will be submitted 
later this year by Wyeth-Ayerst” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Even though the J.V. ended in 1996, AHP and Esai are still partners 
because of the other existing relationship about donepezil or Eranz that started in 1995 
and existed at least till 1997. 
“HD  Alzheimer’s Exelon Patch Enters Costa Rican Pharma Market 
BY  Denise Claux 
WC  282 words 
PD  23 February 2009 
SN  Global Insight Daily Analysis 
SC  WDAN 
LA  English 
CY  Copyright 2009, Global Insight Limited. All Rights Reserved. 
LP  
As reported by La Nacion, Exelon was introduced last year as an oral medication in the 
form of pills in Costa Rica, where Reminyl (galantamine; Shire, U.K.) and Eranz 
(donepezil; Wyeth, U.S.) are also available” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: AHP and Esai relationships continued at least till 2005 because Wyeth 
(new name of AHP) was responsible for Esai’s Eranz in Costa Rica up until 2009.  
Case 2: Genentech, Inc., and SmithKline Beecham Biologicals, S.A., (SmithKline 
Beecham P.L.C.) [31Dec1989] 
“Genentech granted SmithKline Beecham Biologicals a license for its herpes 
vaccine.” - SDC 
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“Herpes simplex glycoprotein vaccine - GlaxoSmithKline – AdisInsight” 
http://adisinsight.springer.com/drugs/800006502 
“The vaccine, Simplirix™, was originally developed by Genentech, but was licensed to 
SmithKline Beecham (now GSK) for development outside Japan” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Further check Simplirix. 
http://adisinsight.springer.com/drugs/800006502 
“Herpes simplex glycoprotein vaccine – GlaxoSmithKline 
Originator Genentech 
Developer GlaxoSmithKline; National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
Class Protein-vaccines; Viral vaccines 
Highest Development Phases 
Discontinued Herpes simplex virus infections 
Most Recent Events 
30 Sep 2010 Discontinued - Phase-III for Herpes simplex virus infections in Canada 
(IM) 
30 Sep 2010 Discontinued - Phase-III for Herpes simplex virus infections in European 
Union (IM) 
30 Sep 2010 Discontinued - Phase-III for Herpes simplex virus infections in USA (IM)” 
(emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: The relationship continued till 2010, hence, at least till 2005. Roche 
acquired Genentech in 1990 (my research on acquisitions).Thus, SmithKline Beecham 
and Genentech had an alliance in 1989. SmithKline Beecham and Roche had an alliance 
from 1990 to 1999. SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome PLC merged to form 
GlaxoSmithKline in 2000 (my research on acquisitions). GlaxoSmithKline and Roche 
had an alliance from 2000 at least till 2005. 
Case 3: Mylan Laboratories, Inc., and Grupo Ferrer Internacional, S.A., [20 
Apr1993] 
“Mylan Laboratories received an exclusive license from Ferrer Internacional for all rights 
to Ferrer’s patented Dotarizine for the United States and Canada. Mylan was responsible 
for developing the drug in North America and had the right of first refusal on all 
derivatives of Dotarizine” (emphasis mine). - SDC 
http://adisinsight.springer.com/drugs/800003533 
“Dotarizine 
Originator Ferrer 
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Developer Azwell; Ferrer; Kayaku; Mylan Laboratories 
Class Antimigraines; Piperazines 
Highest Development Phases 
Discontinued Migraine; Stroke; Vertigo 
Most Recent Events 
18 Jan 2001Discontinued-II for Migraine in USA (Unknown route) 
18 Jan 2001Discontinued-III for Migraine in Switzerland (Unknown route) 
18 Jan 2001Discontinued-preregistration for Migraine in Spain (Unknown route)” 
(emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: The relationship between Mylan and Ferrer ended in 2001. Based on 
further search, no new relationship was formed. 
 
Case 4: Synsorb Biotech, Inc., and Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., [29 Nov 1996] 
“Synsorb Biotech Inc granted Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd an exclusive license to 
develop manufacture, and market Synsorb’s Synsorb PK therapeutic in Japan. Under the 
terms of the agreement, the Synsorb PK application was a preventative therapeutic used 
in the treatment of Hemohytic Uremic Syndrome, a serious complication which resulted 
from E. Col infections, commonly known as "Hamburger disease" in North America. 
Synsorb Biotech would receive a licensing fee of $3 mil US (40.83 mil Japanese yen) and 
an undisclosed amount of milestone payments from Takeda Chemical. Additionally, 
Takeda was to provide all pre-clinical and clinical trial expenses in Japan” (emphasis 
mine). - SDC 
“HD  Synsorb Biotech Begins Phase III SYNSORB Trial In Japan 
WC  254 words 
PD  13 June 1997 
ET  12:06 PM GMT 
SN  Dow Jones News Service 
SC  DJ 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright (c) 1997, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.) 
LP  
CALGARY, June 13 /CNW/ - Synsorb Biotech Inc. (T.SYB) said it has begun a multi-
center Phase III clinical trial in Japan sponsored by its corporate partner, Takeda 
Chemical Industries Ltd., for its SYNSORB Pk product… 
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TD 
Synsorb said that, at current enrollment levels, both the Japanese and North American 
trials are expected to be completed by the end of 1997” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: The relationship between Synsorb and Takeda lasted at least till 1997.  
“HD  oligosaccharide matrix complex Takeda clinical data 
WC  111 words 
PD  7 September 1998 
SN  R & D Focus Drug News 
SC  RDFN 
PG  N/A 
VOL  ISSN: 1350-1135 
LA  English 
CY  Copyright 1998 Gale Group Inc. All rights reserved. 
LP  
Takeda has released preliminary results from a phase III trial completed in Japan, which 
demonstrate that SYNSORB Pk can be safely coadministered with antibiotics in children 
infected with verotoxigenic Escherichia coli (E coli O157:H7). The open label trial was 
conducted June-November 1997 following an outbreak of E coli O157:H7 in Japan, and 
the full trial results will be presented by the company in November 1998. Phase III trials 
with this agent are being conducted in the USA, Canada and Argentina by SYNSORB 
Biotech” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: The relationship between Synsorb and Takeda lasted at least till 1998. 
Also note that trials in other countries such as Canada are conducted by Synsorb alone 
and with Takeda in Japan. 
“HD  Synsorb Biotech Inc - Results from Japanese Synsorb-Pk study 
WC  746 words 
PD  23 November 1998 
SN  Canada Stockwatch 
SC  CNSW 
LA  English 
CY  (c) 1998 Canjex Publishing Ltd. 
LP  
Mr. David Cox reports 
Synsorb Biotech has received the results from an open-label clinical study of Synsorb Pk 
(TAK-751S in Japan) co-administered with antibiotics. The study was part of a global 
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effort focused on the development of Synsorb Pk…(including E. coli O157:H7). 
TD  
The study was sponsored and conducted by the companies Japanese marketing and 
distribution partner for Synsorb Pk, Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd. … The study was 
carried out in Japan from June 1997 to February 1998” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: The relationship between Synsorb and Takeda ended in 1998 because the 
study is over and I do not find evidence of any new relationship or extensions based on 
my search.  
“HD  SYNSORB Biotech Inc. Announces Outcome Of Interim Analysis of SYNSORB 
Pk Phase III Trial 
WC  885 words 
PD  12 July 2000 
ET  08:55 PM GMT 
SN  Business Wire 
SC  BWR 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright (c) 2000, Business Wire) 
LP  
CALGARY, Alberta--(BUSINESS WIRE)--July 12, 2000--SYNSORB Biotech Inc. 
(Nasdaq:SYBB)(TSE:SYB.) today announced the outcome of an interim analysis of the 
SYNSORB Pk(R) Phase III trial…. 
In the overall patient population of 526 children treated within 5 days of the onset of 
symptoms, the data showed a limited trend toward efficacy, and did not successfully meet 
the defined protocol objectives” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: I further checked and find that even the trials conducted by Synsorb in 
Canada failed and did not go further, further validating my termination argument. 
Case 5: Serono International, S.A., and Amgen, Inc., [13 Nov2002] 
“Serono SA (SS) and Amgen Inc (AI) formed a strategic alliance whereby AI granted SS 
license for its multiple sclerosis drug Novantrone. Financial terms were not disclosed” 
(emphasis mine). - SDC 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/07/resolving-anticompetitive-
concerns-ftc-clears-16-billion 
“Resolving Anticompetitive Concerns, FTC Clears $16 Billion Acquisition of Immunex 
Corp. By Amgen Inc. 
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Companies Required to Implement Divestiture and Licensing Remedies in Three 
Biopharmaceutical Markets 
July 12, 2002 
Under the terms of a proposed consent agreement announced today, the Federal Trade 
Commission would allow Amgen Inc.’s (Amgen) proposed $16 billion acquisition of 
Immunex Corporation (Immunex) to proceed….The order also would require the 
companies to grant a license to certain intellectual property rights related to TNF 
inhibitors to Serono S.A. (Serono)…” 
http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/OSI_Pharmaceuticals_(OSIP)/Novantrone 
“OSI Pharmaceuticals (OSIP) 
This excerpt taken from the OSIP 10-K filed Mar 1, 2007. 
Novantrone 
… We market and promote Novantrone for these approved oncology indications in the 
United States pursuant to a co-promotion agreement with an affiliate of Merck Serono, 
S.A. signed in March 2003. We receive commissions from Merck Serono on net 
oncology sales in this market. The patent for Novantrone expired in April 2006, which 
resulted in the loss of market exclusivity for Novantrone. Following the patent expiration, 
we experienced an anticipated significant decrease in our commissions related to 
Novantrone as a result of a large decrease in oncology sales due to generic competition. 
Under our agreement with Merck Serono, we are also no longer obligated to pay fees 
associated with the sales and marketing of Novantrone” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: The relationship between Serono and Amgen existed at least till 2005, 
my last period of observation because the Novantrone patent expired in April 2006, and 
MerckSerono still had rights as evidenced in OSI Pharmaceuticals 10K.  
STEP 5.1: IS THE ALLIANCE FORMATION MENTIONED IN SEC OR 
FACTIVA?  
IN SEC, TRACK THE ALLIANCE EACH YEAR TILL NO MENTION EXISTS. 
CHECK FOR FURTHER ALLIANCE EXTENSIONS BETWEEN TWO 
ALLIANCE PARTNERS. IN CASE OF NEGATIVE, USE THE “NO MENTION” 
DATE AS THE TERMINATION DATE. FOUR EXEMPLARS (CASES) (4.22% 
OF THE CASES) 
Case 1: Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., and Corvas, Inc. [01 Jul 1992] 
“Ortho Diagnostics, a division of Johnson and Johnson, and Corvas International agreed 
to extend their 1991 co-development agreement to a worldwide licensing agreement. 
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Under the new agreement, Ortho agreed to manufacture and distribute prothrombin time 
(PT) blood clotting tests that incorporated Corvas’ recombinant human tissue factor 
(rTF). In addition, Corvas agreed to produce rTF for Ortho in exchange for licensing fees 
and royalties expected to total $1.5 million through 1995. Corvas held an exclusive 
license for in vitro diagnostic usage of rTF from the Scripps Research Institute.” - SDC 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/882100/0001019687-99-000151.txt 
“CONFORMED PERIOD OF REPORT: 19981231 
COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: CORVAS INTERNATIONAL INC 
In November 1998, the Company entered into exclusive license agreements with two 
affiliates of Johnson & Johnson, Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics Inc….These agreements 
…supercede earlier agreements entered in June 1992” (emphasis mine).  
My conclusion: The relationship existed at least till 1998. 
http://www.getfilings.com/o0001019687-00-000326.html 
“For the fiscal year ended December 31, 1999 
CORVAS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
In November 1998, we entered into license agreements with two affiliates of Johnson & 
Johnson, Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics Inc. and LifeScan, Inc….The new agreements 
continue to provide for royalties to be paid based on unit sales of tissue factor.” 
My conclusion: The relationship existed at least till 1999. 
http://www.getfilings.com/o0001019687-01-000430.html 
“For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2000 
Net product sales attributable to affiliates of Johnson & Johnson for the year ended 
December 31, 1998 were $26,000. The agreements continue to provide for royalties to be 
paid based on unit sales of tissue factor” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: The relationship existed at least till 2000. 
http://www.getfilings.com/o0001019687-02-000466.html 
“For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2001 
Revenues from royalties of $117,000, $167,000 and $190,000 were recognized in 2001, 
2000 and 1999, respectively, associated with license agreements with two Johnson & 
Johnson subsidiaries for sales of recombinant tissue factor.” 
My conclusion: The relationship existed at least till 2001.  
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http://www.getfilings.com/o0001019687-03-000502.html 
“For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 
These agreements continue to provide for royalties to be paid to the Company based on 
unit sales of tissue factor. For the years ended December 31, 2002, 2001 and 2000, these 
royalties amounted to $142,000, $117,000 and $167,000, respectively.” 
My conclusion: The relationship existed at least till 2002. 
http://www.getfilings.com/o0001019687-03-000945.html 
“For the quarterly period ended March 31, 2003 
FORM 1O-Q 
My conclusion: The relationship between Johnson & Johnson and Corvas ended in 2003 
because neither the agreement nor J&J finds mention in the filings of Corvas. Also, 
according to Bloomberg, Corvas went out of business in October 2005.” 
Case 2: Human Genome Sciences, Inc., and MedImmune, Inc. [31 Jul 1995] 
“Human Genome Sciences Inc(HGS) and MedImmune Inc formed a joint venture to 
develop and commercialize anti-infective agents which used the genetic structures of 
infectious microbes. Under the terms of the agreement, HGS was to supply the bacterial 
genomes for the joint venture. MedImmune was to be responsible for the development 
and commercialization of products produced by the joint venture. The partners were to 
initially focus on the development of vaccines and antibody-based drug products. No 
financial details were disclosed.” - SDC 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/901219/000095013306001228/0000950133-
06-001228.txt 
“CONFORMED PERIOD OF REPORT: 20051231 
COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES INC 
We entered into a collaboration and license agreement with MedImmune in July 1995, 
which we amended in March and December 1997...We are entitled to a portion of the 
payments received by MedImmune under its sub-license...Through 2003, we have 
received $1.1 million from MedImmune.” 
My conclusion: The relationship between MedImmune and Human Genome Sciences 
lasted at least till 2005 because Human Genome received payments till 2003 and the 
alliance is still discussed in the annual report for the 2005 period. But I check further. 
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/901219/000095013307000843/0000950133-
07-000843.txt 
“CONFORMED PERIOD OF REPORT: 20061231 
COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES INC 
The Company has entered into a number of other agreements. These include agreements 
with…MedImmune, Inc. and others.” 
My conclusion: The relationship between MedImmune and Human Genome Sciences 
lasted at least till 2005 and the link above further recognizes the ongoing nature of 
collaboration with Medimmune. 
 
Case 3: T Cell Sciences, Inc., and Astra, A.B. [06 Nov 1991] 
“T Cell Sciences, Inc. and Astra AB signed an agreement to develop and market 
therapeutic products that result from T Cell Sciences’ antigen receptor(TCAR) 
technology. The partners were to develop monoclonal antibodies and protein-derived 
immunomodulators, which are recombinantly produced proteins identical to certain T cell 
antigen receptor regions on T cells, that have efficacy in treating autoimmune diseases 
such as rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, Crohn’s disease and sarcoidois. The 
partners disclosed their goal was to use the antibody and immunomodulator products to 
activate the immune system to eliminate specific T cells implicated as casual agents in 
autoimmune diseases. The agreement called for Astra to invest US$15 mil over the initial 
two years, with another US$17 mil invested by Astra pursuant to options over the 
duration after the first two years. The agreement also stipulated T Cell Sciences will be 
the sole supplier of the products. Both partners have signed an amended agreement, in 
which Astra reaffirmed its original funding and has agreed to increase its commitment to 
the program by assuming responsibility from T Cell Sciences for future development and 
manufacturing of two monoclonal antibodies, TM27 and TM29” (emphasis mine). - SDC 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/t-cell-sciences-announces-progress-in-phase-
i-multiple-sclerosis-trial-with-astra-ab-76852102.html 
“T Cell Sciences Announces Progress in Phase I Multiple Sclerosis Trial with Astra AB 
Feb 23, 1998, 00:00 ET from T Cell Sciences, Inc. 
NEEDHAM, Mass., Feb. 23 /PRNewswire/ -- T Cell Sciences, Inc. 
(Nasdaq: TCEL) today announced positive progress from a Phase I clinical trial of the 
humanized monoclonal antibody, ATM027, in patients with multiple sclerosis. ATM027, 
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which has been exclusively licensed by Astra AB, is one of the products derived from the 
Company’s T Cell Antigen Receptor (TCAR) program” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: The relationship between T Cell Sciences, Inc. and Astra AB lasted at 
least till 1998 
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/93/93243/reports/199910k.pdf 
“FORM 10-K 
For the fiscal year ended December 31, 1999 
AVANT IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS, INC. 
(f/k/a T Cell Sciences, Inc.) 
In early 1992, we entered into a joint development program with AstraZeneca plc 
(“Astra”) to develop products resulting from our proprietary TCAR technology….The 
original agreement was modified in 1993 with Astra...By the end of 1995, we had 
received substantially all of the original funding payments. In 1996, we amended the 
agreement with Astra to transfer some of our rights to the TCAR technology, including 
two therapeutic products, ATM-027 and ATP-012, to Astra, which is solely responsible 
for further clinical development and commercialization. Under the amended agreement, 
we could receive royalties from product sales, as well as milestone payments which may 
total up to $4 million as specific clinical milestones are achieved. In 1997, we received a 
milestone payment from Astra because one of the products derived from our TCAR 
program entered clinical trials for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. In 1998, Astra 
announced that Phase I data from these trials had shown an effect on the target cells and 
that there had been no serious adverse effects in the study to date, and initiated a Phase II 
study. In 1999, we announced results of the Phase II study of the TCAR monoclonal 
antibody (ATM-027) being developed by Astra for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. 
The results showed that ATM-027 was safe and well tolerated, however, in the view of 
Astra the reduction of disease activity in the study population did not reach a level that 
would be of value for those patients. Therefore, Astra made the decision to stop further 
development of ATM-027 for multiple sclerosis but is reviewing development of the TCAR 
peptide, ATP-012, as a vaccine for multiple sclerosis under the terms of the TCAR 
agreement” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: The relationship between T Cell Sciences and Astra AB ended in 1999 
because Astra stopped the development and none of the annual reports of Avant ever 
mention Astra. Note that T Cell merged with Virus Research in 1998 to form Avant 
Immunotherapeutics Inc. Also, Astra merged with Zeneca to form AstraZeneca in 1999. 
Thus, the alliance between T Cell Sciences and Astra lasted from 1991 to 1997. Avant 
and Astra allied in 1998, and Avant and AstraZeneca in 1999.  
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Case 4: IVAX, Corp., and SS Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. [01 Apr 1991] 
“Ivax Corp and SS Pharmaceutical Co. signed a series of licensing agreements whereby 
Ivax subsidiaries licensed SS Pharmaceutical’s anti-inflammatory drug (unspecified) and 
SS Pharmaceuticals received rights to market Ivax’s nalmefene. In exchange for an up-
front license fee and royalties on sales, SS Pharmaceutical Co. had exclusive rights to 
oral nalmefene in Japan and Korea. Ivax subsidiary, Baker Cummins was to market SS 
Pharmaceutical’s anti-inflammatory drug in North America, and another Ivax subsidiary, 
Waterford, was to distribute the product in the UK, Ireland, Israel, Iran, and certain parts 
of Africa. Ivax and SS. became R&D partners in 1989. SS. owns 3.3% of Ivax 
outstanding shares.” - SDC 
“HD  Ivax acquisitions, not development, pay the way 
BY  By David Poppe 
WC  2401 words 
PD  5 February 1993 
SN  Miami Review 
SC  MIAM 
In 1988, when Ivax was barely more than a concept, Japanese drug maker SS 
Pharmaceutical Co. invested nearly $12 million and Schiapperelli Corp., an Italian 
company, invested $10 million. Both investments have more than quadrupled in five 
years.” - Factiva 
My conclusion: The relationship between Ivax Corp and SS Pharmaceutical started in 
1988 (I fix this in the dataset) and lasted at least till 1993.  
http://www.getfilings.com/comp/k0000772197.html 
I note that none of the annual reports mention SS or Japan 
My conclusion: The relationship between Ivax Corp and SS Pharmaceutical lasted from 
1988 to 1994 because none of the filings from 1995 to 2005 mention SS or Japan. Also, 
there is no news in Factiva about the relationship after 1993. 
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STEP 5.2: IS THE ALLIANCE FORMATION MENTIONED IN SEC OR 
FACTIVA? IN FACTIVA, TRACK THE ALLIANCE EACH YEAR TILL NO 
MENTION EXISTS. CHECK FOR FURTHER ALLIANCE EXTENSIONS 
BETWEEN TWO ALLIANCE PARTNERS. IN CASE OF NEGATIVE, USE THE 
“NO MENTION” DATE AS THE TERMINATION DATE. FOUR EXEMPLARS 
(CASES) (5.56% OF THE CASES) 
Case 1: Enzon, Inc., and Emisphere Technologies, Inc. [09 Jul 1992] 
“Enzon, Inc. and Emisphere Technologies, Inc. signed an agreement to jointly develop 
orally administered pharmaceutical products. The collaboration focused on combining 
proteins modified through Enzon’s Pegnology drug delivery technology, which reduces 
the quantity and frequency of doses and lowers the allergic reactions of proteins used as 
therapeutic agents, and Emisphere’s Oral Drug System technology, which shields 
therapeutic agents by encapsulating them in microspheres composed of amino acids. The 
products that are developed as a result of the collaboration are expected to last longer in 
the bloodstream, have protection from gastrointestinal acids, and exhibit fewer allergic 
reactions.” - SDC 
“HD  Emisphere FY 92 Results 
WC  132 words 
PD  1 November 1992 
SN  Applied Genetics News Business Communications Company, Inc. 
SC  AGNW 
VOL  Vol. 13, No. 4 ISSN: 0271-7107 
LA  English 
CY  COPYRIGHT 1992 by Business Communications Company, Inc. 
LP 
Emisphere Technologies, Inc. reports total revenues for its complete fiscal year ended 
July 31, 1992...The company…has development agreements with The Upjohn Company, 
Sandoz Pharmaceutical, Schering-Plough, Enzon and J3 Biologics” (emphasis 
mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: The relationship between Enzon and Emisphere was at least till July 31 
1992. Note the Emisphere lists firm names with development agreements. 
“HD  EMISPHERE REPORTS 1993 4TH QUARTER AND YEAR END RESULTS 
WC  602 words 
PD  21 October 1993 
SN  PR Newswire 
SC  PRN 
LA  English 
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CY  (Copyright (c) 1993, PR Newswire) 
HAWTHORNE, N.Y. Oct. 21 /PRNewswire/ -- Emisphere Technologies, Inc. 
(NASDAQ: EMIS) today reported financial results for the fourth quarter and year ended 
July 31, 1993…The company has development agreements with a number of companies, 
including The Upjohn Company(NYSE: UPJ), Schering-Plough Corporation(NYSE: 
SGP) and Enzon, Inc.(NASDAQ-NMS: ENZN)” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: The relationship between Enzon and Emisphere was at least till July 31 
1993. Note the Emisphere lists firm names with development agreements and Enzon is 
there. 
“HD  EMISPHERE REPORTS FIRST QUARTER FISCAL 1994 RESULTS 
WC  466 words 
PD  8 December 1993 
SN  PR Newswire 
SC  PRN 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright (c) 1993, PR Newswire) 
LP  
HAWTHORNE, N.Y., Dec. 8 /PRNewswire/ -- Emisphere Technologies, Inc. 
(NASDAQ: EMIS) today reported financial results for the first quarter of fiscal 1994 
ended Oct. 31, 1993…The company has development agreements with a number of 
companies, including The Upjohn Company and the Schering-Plough Corporation” 
(emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: The relationship between Enzon and Emisphere ended on October 31, 
1993. Note the Emisphere lists firm names with development agreements and Enzon is 
not there now. I further validate it from the news below. 
“HD  Organogenesis Optimistic About Skin Product 
WC  316 words 
PD  1 January 1994 
SN  Applied Genetics News Business Communications Company, Inc 
SC  AGNW 
VOL  Vol. 14, No. 6 ISSN: 0271-7107 
LA  English 
CY  Copyright 1994 Business Communications Company, Inc. 
Emisphere (Hawthorne, NY) reports revenues in the quarter ended October 31, all of 
which came from R&D contracts, of $85,000, but a net loss of $1.6 million. The 
company hopes its research investment in an oral drug delivery system will pay off, as do 
its backers, Schering-Plough and Upjohn.” - Factiva 
My conclusion: Further confirms the alliance is gone because Enzon does not find any 
mention. 
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Case 2: Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., and Fujirebio, Inc. [01 Mar1988] 
“Fujirebio Inc licensed Monoclonal Antibodies Inc’s allergy and autoimmune diagnostics 
product line.” - SDC 
“HD  CEO Interview QUIDEL CORP. (QDEL) 
WC  6576 words 
PD  26 October 1992 
SN  The Wall Street Transcript 
SC  TWST 
VOL  Vol. CXVIII, No. 04 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright 1992) 
LP  
QUIDEL CORPORATION (QDEL) 
We made the acquisition of Cytotech in 1989 followed by a merger with Monoclonal 
Antibodies, Inc. in January 1991. We’re very happy with the business in Japan and our 
ventures with Fujirebio, Inc. and Takeda Pharmaceuticals, but we believe that we can 
grow in the European market with our own presence” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: Quidel acquires Monoclonal in 1991 and continues its alliance with 
Fujirebio. 
“HD  QUIDEL FILES FOR FDA MARKETING CLEARANCE FOR RAPID FECAL 
OCCULT BLOOD TEST 
WC  388 words 
PD  1 April 1993 
SN  Biotech Business Worldwide Videotex 
SC  BTBU 
VOL  Vol. 6, No. 4 
LA  English 
CY  COPYRIGHT 1993 Worldwide Videotex 
LP  
QUIDEL Corporation (NASDAQ: QDEL), of San Diego, CA, has filed a 510(k) 
submission with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration...We are pleased to have 
developed this test in conjunction with our Japanese partner, Fujirebio, Inc. and look 
forward to their successful market launch In Japan while we market the test in the United 
States and Europe through our own professional sales force and distribution 
network.” - Factiva 
My conclusion: Quidel’s alliance with Fujirebio lasted at least till 1 April 1993. I impute 
1993 is the end date for two reasons. First, I do not find any relevant news after this year. 
Second, I find that, on an average, if the acquirer is not interested in continuing the 
alliance initiated by the acquired party it does so within one to two years. Thus, I believe 
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Monoclonal Antibodies Inc and Fujirebio Inc had partnership from 1988 to 1990 and 
Quidel and Fujirebio Inc from 1991 to 1993. I further try to validate this as shown below. 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/353569/0000936392-97-000871.txt 
I note that the1997 10k does not mention Fujirebio. 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/quidels-quickvuer-influenza-test-launched-in-
japan-73581357.html 
“Quidel’s QuickVue(R) Influenza Test Launched in Japan 
Oct 10, 2001, 01:00 ET from Quidel Corporation 
SAN DIEGO, Oct. 10 /PRNewswire/ -- Quidel Corporation (Nasdaq: QDEL), a leading 
provider of rapid point-of-care (POC) diagnostic tests, today announced that its 
QuickVue(R) Influenza test product is now being sold throughout Japan by the 
Company’s exclusive Japanese distributor, Sumitomo Seiyaku Biomedical Co., Ltd., ...” 
My conclusion: I find that the exclusive distributor for Japan is Sumitomo not Fujirebio 
for Quidel’s QuickVue(R) further confirming my suspicion that Quidel changed the 
distributor. 
Case 3: Lidak Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Chiron, Corp. [15 Apr 1992] 
“Lidak Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Chiron Corp. signed an agreement to jointly develop 
and test potentially new immune therapies against AIDS. The agreement was based on 
Lidak’s proprietary human immune system-reconstituted severe combined immune 
deficiency(SCID) mouse technology. In this process, mice with SCID are grafted with 
mature human peripheral blood cells to create hu-PBL-SCID mice. The grafted human 
cells make the mice susceptible to HIV infection, and useful in the testing of ant-AIDS 
compounds. Chiron contributed its proprietary vaccines directed against certain 
properties of HIV.” - SDC 
“HD  Corporate Activities (Part 5 of "Review of 1992") 
WC  1071 words 
PD  1 January 1993 
SN  Antiviral Agents Bulletin Biotechnology Information Institute 
SC  AVAB 
VOL  Vol. 6, No. 1 
LA  English 
CY  COPYRIGHT 1993 by Biotechnology Information Institute 
LIDAK Pharmaceuticals raised capital for development of LIDAKOL, a long-chain 
alcohol formulation, for treatment of herpes, HIV and other indications. LIDAK formed a 
collaboration with Chiron Corp. for testing of Chiron’s HIV vaccines in the company’s 
hu-PBL-SCID immune deficient mice with reconstituted human immune 
systems.” - Factiva 
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My conclusion: Lidak and Chiron collaborated at least till 1993. I believe the 
collaboration ended in 1993 because I do not find any news of the collaboration after that. 
I further searched for relevant news and find Lidak tied up with an Israeli firm in 1993 
and Chiron halted the application for vaccine approval in 1996. 
“HD  News Capsule 
WC  484 words 
PD  1 August 1993 
SN  Applied Genetics News Business Communications Company, Inc. 
SC  AGNW 
VOL  Vol. 14, No. 1 ISSN: 0271-7107 
LA  English 
CY  COPYRIGHT 1993 by Business Communications Company, Inc. 
Lidak (La Jolla, CA) says its topical anti-herpes drug candidate, LIDAKOL, has 
completed a Phase II pilot study. The antiviral agent in the product is docosonol. The 
company has licensed the product to CTS Chemical Industries (Kiryat Malachi, Israel) 
for manufacture and marketing in Israel” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
http://www.bioinfo.com/aabtext.html 
“December 1996 Antiviral Agents Bulletin news stories 
Herpes Simplex Virus Subunit Vaccine Development Halted by Chiron 
Chiron Corp. (Emeryville, CA) has announced that it has halted development of its 
bivalent recombinant herpes simplex virus type 2 (HSV-2) subunit vaccine after 
preliminary data from Phase III clinical trials for genital herpes prophylaxis failed to 
indicate efficacy for this product. Chiron will not apply for approval of the vaccine” 
(emphasis mine). 
Case 4: Cortecs, Ltd., and Roche Holding, A.G. [31 Aug 1990] 
“Cortecs and Roche formed a strategic alliance to manufacture and develop an oral form 
of Roche’s Roferon as a potential treatment for AIDS-related Kaposi’s Sarcoma, hairy-
cell leukemia, chronic hepatitis, colorectal cancer, and lung cancer. Under the agreement, 
Cortecs was to manufacture the final products using its Macromol delivery system. The 
system prevented the breakdown of the drug by the digestive system with a “water-in-oil” 
microemulsion. Cortecs was to retain manufacturing rights once the product was 
commercialized.” - SDC 
“HD  HOFFMAN, WESTERN CAPITOL AND CORTECS FORM VENTURE FOR 
RESEARCH INTO ORAL FORM OF ALPHA-INTERFERON. 
WC  139 words 
PD  3 January 1991 
SN  Manufacturing Chemist 
SC  MCHMDI 
PG  13 
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LA  English 
CY  Copyright Miller Freeman 1991 
LP  
Preliminary studies are to be carried out by Cortecs, using Roche’s human interferon 
alpha-2a drug, Roferon-A, and WCL’s drug delivery systems” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: Cortecs and Roche collaborated at least till 1991. 
“HD  F HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE AND CORTECS LIMITED ORAL ALPHA-
INTERFERON ANNOUNCEMENT 
WC  128 words 
PD  27 February 1991 
SN  PR Newswire 
SC  PRN 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright (c) 1991, PR Newswire) 
LP  
LONDON, Feb. 27 /PRNewswire/ -- Cortecs Limited today issued the following 
statement regarding a joint oral Alpha-Interferon study with Hoffman-La Roche: 
Following initial positive results from a joint study at the Macromolecular Clinical 
Research Centre in Korea, the companies are now planning a confirmatory trial in 
Caucasian subjects in Europe.” - Factiva 
“HD  Clinical Trial Milestones (Review of 1992. Part 4 of 9) 
WC  609 words 
PD  1 January 1992 
Cortecs Ltd. in collaboration with Hoffmann-La Roche began trials of oral liposomal-
encapsulated alpha-interferon. Roche has also initiated oral interferon trials in the 
U.S.S.R.” - Factiva 
“HD  Cortecs and Roche Halt Development of Oral Interferon 
WC  138 words 
PD  1 September 1992 
SN  Antiviral Agents Bulletin Biotechnology Information Institute 
SC  AVAB 
VOL  Vol. 5, No. 9 
LA  English 
CY  COPYRIGHT 1992 by Biotechnology Information Institute 
LP  
Cortecs Ltd. (Isleworth, UK) and Hoffmann-La Roche (Basel, Switzerland) have 
suspended their collaborative development of oral formulations of alpha-interferon. 
Clinical trials in Switzerland and the U.K. failed to confirm the positive results reported 
from an earlier trial conducted by the Macromolecular Clinical Research Centre (Korea) 
which had reported that lipid-encapsulated orally administered interferon could pass 
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through the stomach and intestinal linings and enter the bloodstream without excessive 
protein digestion. Cortecs had earlier reported about 30% bioavailability and 
irregularities in manufacturing for the product produced in Korea. The material used in 
the recent clinical trials was formulated by Cortecs itself using a different production 
process. Cortecs and Roche may restart the oral interferon project if Cortec’s oral insulin 
formuation shows significant bioavailability in upcoming clinical trials” (emphasis 
mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: Cortecs and Roche collaboration ended on 1 Sep 1992 because Roche 
suspended the collaborative development and I did not find any news about them after 
this. 
STEP 6.1: DID ANY OF THE PARTNERS GO BANKRUPT OR MERGE? 
USE THE BANKRUPTCY DATE AS THE TERMINATION DATE. FOUR 
EXEMPLARS (CASES) (1.32% OF THE CASES) 
Case 1: deCode Genetics, Inc., and Elitra Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [01 Jul 2002] 
“deCODE genetics and Elitra Pharmaceuticals Inc formed a strategic alliance to provide 
research and development of new antibiotics to combat drug-resistant bacteria in the 
United States.” - SDC 
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=27991 
“November 14, 2016 6:10 AM ET 
Biotechnology 
Company Overview of Elitra Pharmaceuticals 
Elitra Pharmaceuticals went out of business. Elitra Pharmaceuticals, Inc. engages in 
discovering, developing, and commercializing the next generation of antimicrobial drugs 
that target essential gene products of pathogenic organisms. Elitra has research 
collaborations with Merck & Co., LG Life Sciences, bioLeads, and deCODE genetics to 
discover new antimicrobials” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: deCODE genetics and Elitra Pharmaceuticals ended the relationship 
because Elitra went out of business. I further investigate below.  
http://www.fiercebiotech.com/special-report/elitra-pharmaceuticals-2003-fierce-15-
revisited 
“Elitra Pharmaceuticals 
What happened: Elitra found itself among a number of antibiotics developers struggling 
to stay afloat...In late 2004, Elitra cut its workforce of about 70 and sold its assets to 
Merck. The drug giant also paid San Diego State University for the rights to the patents 
on which Elitra was founded” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: deCODE genetics and Elitra Pharmaceuticals ended the relationship in 
2004 because Elitra went out of business and Merck acquired its assets in 2004. 
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http://www.evaluategroup.com/Universal/View.aspx?type=Story&id=58645 
“deCODE and Merck & Co., Inc. Form Broad Drug Development Alliance 
Reykjavik, Iceland  -- February 26, 2004 --  deCODE genetics  (Nasdaq:DCGN) today 
announced the formation of a seven-year alliance with  Merck & Co ., Inc. (NYSE:MRK) 
under which deCODE will conduct information-rich clinical trials on a range of Merck’s 
developmental compounds.” 
My conclusion: Interestingly Merck which acquired Elitra’s assets in 2004 broadens its 
alliance in 2004, further confirming that deCODE might have continued working with 
Elitra till Elitra went out of business. 
Case 2: Essential Therapeutics, Inc., and Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. [09 
Aug 2002] 
“Essential Therapeutics Inc (ET) and Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co Ltd (FT) planned to 
form a strategic alliance in which ET was to utilize its technology to develop assay 
systems for the discovery of novel antibiotics, and was to perform high-throughput 
screening of the compounds in FP’s library through its subcontractor. FP will conduct 
lead generation and lead optimization, and was to exclusively develop, manufacture and 
market the resulting products on a worldwide basis. ET was to retain rights to develop the 
compounds under certain conditions and will receive funding and potential milestone and 
royalty payments.” - SDC 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1010915/000092701603001554/d10k.htm 
“10-K 1 d10k.htm FORM 10-K 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2002 
ESSENTIAL THERAPEUTICS, INC. 
The employees remaining in California will either assist with the closure of certain 
California facilities or assist in the performance of the Company’s obligations under its 
collaborative agreement with Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd, which is expected to 
conclude in the third quarter of 2003” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Essential Therapeutics and Fujisawa ended the alliance in the third 
quarter of 2003. I further investigated and find that Essential filed for bankruptcy in May 
2003 as shown below. Also, I did not find any news pertaining to any new relationship 
between the companies. 
https://www.myglobalbizz.com/ms/manufacture/essential-therapeutics-inc/ 
“ESSENTIAL THERAPEUTICS INC 
In May 2003, the company and its wholly owned subsidiaries, Maret Corporation and 
Althexis, filed a voluntary petition for protection under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code. The plan of reorganization for the company became effective in 
October 2003 by order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and the 
company was renamed Trine Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in November 2003” (emphasis mine). 
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Case 3: VivoRx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and HemoCleanse, Inc. [24 Oct 1994] 
“VivoRx Pharmaceuticals Inc entered into a joint venture agreement with;HemoCleanse 
Inc to develop a bioartificial liver. The new joint venture firm was called HepatoCell Inc. 
VivoRx would contribute its cell separation and encapsulation technologies to the 
venture, while HemoCleanse would contribute its extracorporeal device and sorbent 
chemical technologies. HepatoCell would combined the technologies to create a 
bioartificial liver to provide artificial liver support for severe liver failure patients. 
HepatoCell was still in the development and clinical testing stage of the bioartificial liver. 
Financial details were not disclosed.” - SDC 
“HD  Monsanto Licenses Artificial Liver Tech To HemoCleanse >MTC 
WC  257 words 
PD  10 January 1997 
ET  12:05 PM GMT 
SN  Dow Jones News Service 
SC  DJ 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright (c) 1997, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.) 
LP  
TD  
HemoCleanse also has a joint development and marketing agreement with VivoRx 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. for the supply of hepatocytes for this device.” - Factiva 
My conclusion: HemoCleanse and VivoRx have an alliance at least till Jan 1997. 
“HD  HemoCleanse Receives Grant From the National Institutes of Health for 
Development of Bioartificial Liver 
WC  530 words 
PD  20 August 1997 
ET  08:06 PM GMT 
SN  Business Wire 
SC  BWR 
LA  English 
CY  (Copyright (c) 1997, Business Wire) 
LP” - Factiva 
My conclusion: HemoCleanse and VivoRx partnership ended in Aug 1997 because the 
news no longer mentions VivoRx and, also, HemoCleanse ran out of funds in 17 July 
1998 as shown below. 
“HD  Promising Purdue-based company runs out of funds 
WC  559 words 
PD  17 July 1998 
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ET  07:51 PM GMT 
SN  Associated Press Newswires 
SC  APRS 
LA  English 
CY  (c) 1998. The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. 
LP  
WEST LAFAYETTE, Ind. (AP) - A biomedical company that developed a promising 
blood treatment for liver failure has laid off all of its 26 employees after running out of 
financing. HemoCleanse Inc. has fallen victim, at least temporarily, to the high costs 
associated with the health care industry, its top executive said” (emphasis 
mine). - Factiva 
Case 4: Alpha-Beta Technology, Inc., and IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. [22 Oct 1998] 
“Alph-Beta Technology Inc(AB) and Idexx Laboratories Inc(IL) agreed to form a 
strategic alliance to collaborate on the commercialization of therapeutic and diagnostic 
products for the veterinary, environmental and food markets. AB and IL was to co-
develop products for these markets based on AB’s technology. Also as part of the 
agreement, IL was to have exclusive marketing and distribution rights to Alpha-Beta’s 
beta-glucan immunomoldulatory compunds and fungal detection technology. Financial 
terms were not disclosed.” - SDC 
“HD  Alpha-Beta seeks liquidation. 
WC  173 words 
PD  28 January 1999 
ET  11:46 PM GMT 
SN  Reuters News 
SC  LBA 
LA  English 
CY  (c) 1999 Reuters Limited 
LP  
WORCESTER, Mass., Jan 28 (Reuters) - Alpha-Beta Technology Inc. said Thursday it 
would seek an out-of-court liquidation of assets following its decision to abandon its 
Phase III clinical trial of Betafectin PGG-glucan, a drug designed to prevent infections in 
upper gastrointestinal surgery patients. The company also said its stock would be delisted 
from the Nasdaq Stock Market on Friday” (emphasis mine). - Factiva 
My conclusion: Alpha-Beta Technology and IDEXX ended the alliance on 28 Jan 1999 
because Alpha-Beta Technology abandoned Phase III TRIAL and was also seeking 
liquidation of assets. 
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STEP 6.2: DID ANY OF THE PARTNERS GO BANKRUPT OR MERGE? 
USE THE MERGER DATE AS THE TERMINATION DATE. THREE 
EXEMPLARS (CASES) (5.63%OF THE CASES) 
Case 1: Delsys Pharmaceutical, Corp., and Elan Pharmaceutical Technologies. [27 
Nov 2000] 
“Delsys Pharmaceutical Corp and Elan Pharmaceutical Techologies fomed a;stratgic 
alliance to develop oral controlled release products. The company will also established 
R&D collaborations to develop solid oral dose products with Pfizer, SmithKline 
Beecham, and Johnson & Johnson.” - SDC 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=27477 
“As of September 2001, Delsys Pharmaceutical Corporation was acquired by Elan Corp. 
plc” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Delsys and Elan alliance that started in 2000 ended in 2001 because Elan 
acquired Delsys. 
Case 2: AcroMetrix, Corp., and Nabi Biopharmaceuticals. [31Jan 2003] 
“AcroMetrix Corp (AC) and Nabi Biopharmaceuticals (NB) formed a strategic alliance to 
manufacture and develop ViroSure quality control products for infectious diseases testing 
to clinical laboratories and blood screening organizations in the United States. NB was 
expected to develop and manufacture the products while AC aimed to focus on marketing 
and distribution services. Financial details were not disclosed” (emphasis mine). - SDC 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/acrometrix-corporation-completes-
acquisition-of-virosure-product-line-59040592.html 
“AcroMetrix Corporation Completes Acquisition of Virosure Product Line 
Jan 28, 2004, 00:00 ET from AcroMetrix 
BENICIA, Calif., Jan. 28 /PRNewswire/ -- AcroMetrix announced today that it has 
completed the acquisition of the ViroSure product line previously manufactured by Nabi 
Biopharmaceutical’s antibody business and other assets related to its diagnostics 
business” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: AcroMetrix Corp and Nabi alliance ended in 2004 because AcroMetrix 
acquired ViroSure product line and related assets from Nabi. 
Case 3: Elan Corp., P.L.C and Rorer Group, Inc. [30 Sep 1986] 
“Elan licensed its once-daily nifedipine product to the Rorer Group for the United 
Kingdom. Nifedipine, a calcium antagonist, was used to treat angina and hypertension. 
Elan also licensed the product to Farmitalia Carlo Erba, Green Cross, and Pfizer” 
(emphasis mine). - SDC 
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http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/elan-announces-steps-to-consolidate-and-
build-its-uk-and-irish-pharmaceutical-businesses-77671542.html 
“Oct 21, 1997, 01:00 ET from Elan Corporation, plc 
DUBLIN, Ireland, Oct. 21 /PRNewswire/ -- Elan Corporation, plc (NYSE: ELN) 
In a separate transaction, Elan also announced that it had reached agreement with Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Limited (“RPR”) to acquire Univer(R) (controlled-release verapamil) and 
Nifensar(R) (controlled-release nifedipine) for the U.K., and Nifensar for Ireland. Univer 
and Nifensar are products for the treatment of hypertension and angina that utilize Elan’s 
proprietary drug delivery technologies and were originally licensed to RPR by Elan in 
1987” (emphasis mine). 
My conclusion: Elan and Rorer ended the alliance in 1997 because Elan acquired alliance 
related assets from Rorer. Rorer was part of Rhone-Poulenc SA in 1990 (my research on 
acquisitions). Hence, Elan and Rorer had an alliance from 1986 to 1989, and Elan and 
Rhone Poulenc had an alliance from 1990 to 1997.  
 
